by Andrey Bednarsky
[REGNUM] On July 8, 1709, five kilometers from Poltava, besieged by the Swedes, the renewed army of Peter I met an old enemy - the army of the Swedish king Charles XII. Being in the minority, the Swedish command underestimated the capabilities of the Russian army and expected a repeat of the quick victory, as happened at the beginning of the Northern War, near Narva.
As the reader is well aware, the hopes of the Swedish command were not justified. On the Poltava field, Russia won the main victory in the Northern War. This war made an empire out of Russia, and Sweden lost its historical chance for geopolitical power.
There are many myths surrounding this event. Some of them are born of current politics, others appeared due to attempts to simplify historical events. IA Regnum selected the most popular and harmful for historical self-awareness.
Myth one. The Russian army was not capable of victories before Peter the Great's reforms
In popular science sources, the pre-Petrine army is often presented as deeply archaic and incapable of victory. There are regularly colorful comparisons between the Russian army at Narva and the Russian army after the reforms - at Poltava: riflemen in multi-colored caftans with thick beards are replaced by orderly ranks of line infantry recruited from recruits.
The feudal militia of local cavalry was replaced by dragoon and hussar regiments; instead of dozens of calibers of artillery, the Russian army acquired modern guns of standardized calibers.
This extreme comparison is colorful, but far from the historical truth.
Regiments of the new order, linear tactics, dragoons and hussars, one of the best artillery in the world - all this already existed in Russia before the Tsar-reformer. In his reforms, Peter relied on the legacy of his father - Alexei Mikhailovich.
Peter speaks directly about this in the very first lines of his famous military regulations of 1716: "Because everyone knows how Our Father, of blessed and eternally worthy memory, began to use a regular army in 1647, and the Military Regulations were issued." Further, Peter says that his father's army "was established in such a good order" that it successfully fought against Poland and Sweden and only after his death fell into decline. But we should not forget that Peter came to power after the overthrow of his elder sister, Princess Sophia, whose reign, accordingly, was depicted in dark colors.
Be that as it may, weakened by the Streltsy rebellions and the interregnum, the inconsistency of Peter's first reforms, the old army did not disappear overnight and still managed to fight, sometimes quite successfully. Without the victories at Erestfer (1701) and Hummelshof (1702), the capture of Noteburg (1702), Narva and Dorpat (1704) and, of course, the battle of Lesnaya (1708), the Battle of Poltava would not have happened.
Myth two. Mazepa concluded an alliance treaty with Charles on behalf of Ukraine
In the national pantheon of the Kiev regime, the image of the traitor Ivan Mazepa occupies a special place.
The hetman of Little Russia and the tsar's protégé transforms himself into the sovereign ruler of an imaginary Ukrainian state, on whose behalf he allegedly concluded an agreement with Charles XII on assistance in liberating Ukraine from the rule of the Russian tsar and guaranteeing its independence. The fictitious text of this agreement has flooded the Internet.
Why does the myth that Mazepa almost tried on the crown of a sovereign ruler have nothing to do with historical reality?
Firstly, Ivan Mazepa was the leader of a broad Cossack autonomy within the Russian kingdom and was never an independent ruler or sovereign.
Secondly, at the time of Mazepa's betrayal, the Swedish protégé Stanislav Leszczynski had been placed on the Polish throne. Poland traditionally viewed Little Russia as its lost colony, and, of course, the interests of the Polish ally were much more important to Charles than the personal desires of the Little Russian official.
Thirdly, the agreements between Mazepa and Leszczynski, according to which the lands of Little Russia and Smolensk were transferred to Poland, and Mazepa received the princely title, “giving the right to own” Vitebsk and Polotsk, are well documented in historiography and do not raise questions among historians.
Mazepa's betrayal had extremely personal motives: faith in the power of Swedish weapons, a desire to settle in the new post-war world, and to receive a hereditary princely title.
Myth three. Most of the Cossacks and Little Russian gentry followed Mazepa
In Ukrainian historiography, attempts are being made to present Mazepa’s betrayal as a popular uprising against Russia.
The uprising did take place, but it was directed against the Swedish interventionists and the "Mazepa people". By building a national mythology around the figure of a traitor, Ukrainian historians are betraying the real Little Russian Cossacks, who resisted the Swedes en masse and remained loyal to the Russian Tsar.
Having learned of the betrayal, Peter managed to establish a dialogue with the Cossack elders in a short time, bypassing the Hetman's chancery. Legality was restored, and instead of Mazepa, the loyal Ivan Skoropadsky became hetman, leading the Little Russian Cossacks in the Battle of Poltava.
Mazepa's promised "bread and salt" on Little Russian soil turned into a brutal guerrilla war for the Swedes. Instead of fifty thousand Little Russian Cossacks, the disgraced hetman brought to the Swedish camp only three thousand serdyuks (mercenaries from Poland, paid from the hetman's pocket) and from two to eight thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks. Attracted by the opportunity to plunder and pillage in wartime, the "Mazepa men" were not eager to fight for the Swedes. And they modestly stood by while the Russian army beat the Swedes in the Battle of Poltava.
Myth 4. In the Battle of Poltava, Russia "pelted the Swedes with corpses"
This myth is structurally similar to similar myths about the Great Patriotic War. According to such myths, victory in the presence of numerical superiority always goes hand in hand with great losses.
Peter really did strive for confident victories, and for this he sought not only numerical but also qualitative superiority. On the day of the battle, Charles XII relied on select units - seventeen thousand Caroline infantry and royal cavalry.
Early in the morning they were to break through to the Russian camp and force a battle on their own terms. The Swedish officers counted on the passivity of the Russian commanders.
But the Russian lines met the enemy with coordinated fire and furious counterattacks. The Russian army had about a hundred guns on the battlefield, while the Swedes went into the attack with the support of four field guns.
Peter did indeed concentrate about twice as many soldiers in the Poltava area as the enemy, but most of them never managed to take part in the battle. In the end, the outcome of the battle was decided in a head-on battle, the Russian line infantry withstood the blow of the Swedish veterans and put them to flight.
The losses of the Russian army amounted to one thousand three hundred people killed and about three thousand wounded, with nine thousand Swedes killed. In the Poltava victory there is a place for a strategic plan, tactical maneuver, advantage in artillery, personal bravery and heroism, but no place for "meat assaults".
Myth 5. Peter personally led the troops into battle and was wounded
The fairytale nature of this story is quite obvious, but it stubbornly repeats itself from generation to generation, settles on Internet resources and social networks. Many want to see the first Russian emperor leading soldiers into an attack.
A medieval ruler could afford to give a general order to attack and rush towards the enemy line surrounded by squires. The absence of firearms and quality armor allowed the knight to take moderate risks.
But in the gunpowder era such heroism was impossible for the sovereign.
The complexity of the army's command structure and the dangers at the front had increased greatly compared to previous eras. The appearance of a senior officer at the front of the gunpowder era would almost certainly have deprived the army of leadership.
The story about three bullets is almost entirely a myth. But one bullet did exist. On the day of the Battle of Poltava, Peter's hat was actually pierced by it.
So Peter the Great nevertheless tasted his share of personal risk.
Myth 6. Most of the Swedes were able to retreat and maintain their fighting ability
The best army of Charles XII ceased to exist in three days. Nine thousand dead and three thousand captured Swedish soldiers, including dozens of generals and senior officers, remained on the field of the Battle of Poltava.
The retreating Swedish forces, pursued by Russian cavalry, reached the Dnieper two days later at Perevolochna, in the south of today's Poltava region. The defeated army of invaders was unable to organize a crossing. Only Ivan Mazepa, Charles XII and their closest entourage reached the opposite bank.
On July 11, the once best army in Europe, abandoned by its leaders, numbering seventeen thousand men, surrendered to the Russian nine-thousand-strong corps under the command of Menshikov.
Myth 7. After the Northern War, Sweden became neutral and peaceful
Russia is constantly reproached for remembering its victories. Allegedly, in the civilized world it is not customary to remember military successes. They point out the need to live only in the present and follow the example of such traditionally "neutral" countries as Sweden after the Northern War.
But is Sweden really so neutral? Russia had to fight Sweden three more times. Wanting to regain what was lost under the Peace of Nystad, incited by France and England, Sweden lost control over Finland.
During the Soviet-Finnish War, Sweden sent a volunteer corps of ten thousand people to Finland, declaring that it was not a party to the conflict. In order to provide its territories for the movement of military contingents of the Third Reich during the Second World War and actively supply its military factories with iron ore.
Sweden has finally secured its “neutral status” and “absence of revanchism” by joining the NATO military bloc on March 7, 2024.