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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
How Russia after the Special Military Operation it will thank its allies and 'thank' its ‘allies’
2024-03-07
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Gevorg Mirzayan

[REGNUM] During the Antalya Diplomatic Forum, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said a lot of interesting things. Including what he understands by the word “allies.”

He spoke through the prism of Moscow’s relations with one of its allies in the CSTO and the Eurasian Union - Armenia. The very one whose Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan questions relations with Moscow and whose nukers from among the protégés of George Soros (nominally former, but they are not former) generally say that the strategic orientation towards Russia was a mistake.

“The Armenian leadership decided to rely on extra-regional countries courting Yerevan, promising to help it in all its troubles, if only Armenia broke off relations with Russia and the integration structures created in our common region. The West does not hide this. This is his main goal in relations with the countries of Central Asia, Armenia and any other states of the post-Soviet space. Our allies and friends understand this perfectly and are faithful to their obligations. The Armenian leadership decided to make different decisions,” the minister explained.

That is, we are talking precisely about the fact that allies - in Lavrov’s understanding - must at least be faithful to their obligations. Especially considering that a significant part of these allies, including Armenia, in the event of Russia’s defeat in the Northern Military District, will not only be weakened, but simply buried under Russian rubble. Well, or at least they will be vulnerable to external threats, because Moscow is now protecting them not only in words, but also in deeds. Unless, of course, they are ready to defend themselves, as Kazakhstan did in 2022 and Armenia did not do in 2021-2022.

However, of course, I would like to receive from allies in the CSTO and the Eurasian Union not only loyalty to their obligations, but also realistic assistance. Someone, of course, provides it, for example, by helping to organize gray import channels. But it turns out to be an interesting picture. The assistance from Russian allies in the CSTO and the Eurasian Union cannot be compared with that provided to Moscow by countries that are not in a full-fledged defense bloc with it.

It is clear that Western propaganda needs to look for some kind of explanation for what happened, especially against the backdrop of how Ukrainian propaganda blames its American and European partners for what happened (allegedly for not supplying the necessary weapons in the required quantities). And one of the convenient explanations was assistance to Russia from the “wrong” countries. North Korea, which sent millions of shells to Moscow. Iran, which planted the missiles. China, which helps Russia circumvent sanctions.

The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defense do not confirm this data. Just like the Iranians and North Koreans. But they don’t really deny it either. After all, Western stories about Korean and Iranian assistance are partly true.

The false part is that the root cause of Russian success is some kind of external assistance. Whereas in fact, everything goes absolutely within the framework of the laws and logic of a “war of attrition.” When, for example, the key role is played by the difference in the mobilization potential (Russia’s is five to six times higher than the Ukrainian one), the economy (everything is clear here), the military-industrial complex (Russian produces so many products that its volumes for some types of weapons exceed not only Ukrainian, but also a general Western one) and the cohesion of society (in Russia, men are not caught on the streets on cameras, but elections are held). However, the truth is that we receive support from our partners. And not only moral.

It is no secret that cooperation in the field of combat botany with the Iranians greatly helped the Russian army in the first period of the Northern Military District, when commercial quantities of drones were needed at the front. Now the Russian “Geraniums” have become a real nightmare for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, knocking out equipment during the day and weapons depots and places of deployment of enemy personnel at night. Likewise, it is no secret that purchases of the main North Korean product - shells - helped Russia achieve multiple superiority over Ukraine in the field of artillery strikes. One of the leading Russian military experts posted on his social networks a photo from the air defense system, where Russian, Iranian and North Korean artillery shells stood side by side. A sort of symbol of friendship.

Yes, this is not exactly friendship, but rather practically legal (Russia has the right to engage in foreign trade with the country with which it sees fit) cooperation, and completely mutually beneficial. From an economic point of view (Russian partners, in need of money, do not supply goods to Moscow for free). On the military side, both Pyongyang and Tehran are in dire need not only of field testing of their systems, but also of the unique experience that the Russian army is now gaining, leading a military defense system against a NATO-style army. And, of course, in the information that Russia receives from dissecting Western equipment that has fallen into its hands.

Finally, cooperation is more than beneficial in strategic terms. Both Tehran, Pyongyang, and Beijing (with the help of which, according to Russian military experts, Moscow was able to import a huge number of machine tools for its military industry) are extremely interested in Russia winning the Northern Military District and thereby inflicting a strategic defeat not so much on the Kyiv regime, as much as the United States. It demonstrated to everyone the senselessness of the American foreign policy approach based on force and the threat of force. And thereby forced America either to negotiate amicably with its opponents, or to reduce its interference in the affairs of regions foreign to the United States.

This cooperation highlights another important point of the Northeast Military District - the specific approach of our allies. Those who (unlike Tehran and Pyongyang) are in the same military-political bloc with Russia. Those who (unlike Tehran and Pyongyang) will not only be weakened, but simply buried under Russian rubble if Moscow loses the Northern Military District. Those whom (unlike Tehran and Pyongyang) Russia directly protects from external threats. And if experts have few complaints about the so-called Kazakhstan (Although Astana declared compliance with sanctions, it did a lot to support Russian gray imports), then they have enough about Armenia and a number of Central Asian partners.

Therefore, it is not surprising that after the end of the Northern Military District, Russia will most likely undergo a reassessment of military-political relations with third countries. Translating them from a family-historical basis (“brothers”, “one people”, “lived together for centuries”) to a model based on pragmatism. Simply put, those countries that stood with Russia in their hour of great need and provided an analogue of Lend-Lease will receive help from Moscow in their hour of great need. Moreover, no matter how specific the power there is, Russia does not interfere in the internal affairs of its partners, and the Russian people are even more deeply indifferent to this.

Those countries that turned away in this hour of great need will pay, literally. Russia may continue to protect them within the framework of the CSTO and CIS structures, but will begin to make much more stringent demands in terms of their adherence to Russian interests. Moreover, both in foreign and domestic policy, including clearing the government of Russophobes, removing obstacles to NGOs promoting the Russian language and culture, etc.

Finally, those countries that helped the enemy in their hour of need - and here we mean primarily Europe - will be ignored. And this is not an emotional boycott - geographically, politically, economically and infrastructurally, the security and prosperity of Europe largely depends on its good relations with Russia.

The irony is that this revision from treaty-legal alliances to alliances of interests and pragmatic goals will occur even without any targeted Russian action. Simply because in a multipolar world, where the interests of countries become diverse and relations are not black and white, rigid ideological alliances (like NATO) are not needed. They will disappear on their own, giving way to multilateral cooperation based on interests. Cooperation on a pragmatic basis.

Posted by:badanov

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