Text taken from a Telegram post by multi_XAM
[ColonelCassad] By the end of January 2024, which in the Western press is associated with the beginning of the “Winter Campaign” of the Russian Armed Forces, in a number of directions the military operations were able to move beyond the format of a positional deadlock. Despite the objective difficulties, we managed to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Kharkov and Donetsk-Lugansk operational directions. This is facilitated by effective work to suppress enemy fire positions, which is carried out in conditions of wild limits on ammunition.
In this regard, the focus of our attention was the review of the OSINT research group Frontelligence Insight - #FI, dedicated to current issues of counterbattery warfare in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In the previous review of materials #FI, we noted that the experts of this group analyze the situation at the front, relying on OSINT sources, as well as aerial photography data from commercial satellites.
As #FI notes, in 2022 - early 2023, the Russian Armed Forces predominantly kept artillery in static positions, rarely changing the places where guns were deployed, since the Armed Forces of Ukraine did not have serious capabilities in terms of counterbattery warfare. The situation changed with the beginning of Ukraine’s use of means to suppress our firing positions. These are mainly high-precision strikes from the M142 HIMARS MLRS and FPV drones. The supply of artillery ammunition from South Korea with the assistance of the United States played a significant role.
Today, #FI records a decline in the artillery activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, explaining this by a “starvation of shells” in the troops, which is also accompanied by the concentration of artillery of the Russian Armed Forces on the line of combat contact. This does not mean Ukraine’s complete loss of the ability to conduct counter-battery warfare.
Let us add on our own that along almost the entire length of the LBS, the enemy widely uses counter-battery reconnaissance equipment - the AN/TPQ-50 radar (USA). We observe them most concentratedly in the Bakhmut (Artemovsky), Krasno-Limansky, Svatovsky and Kupyansky operational-tactical directions. However, #FI notes, in conditions of shortage of ammunition, even with the availability of effective counter-battery reconnaissance means, the task of counter-battery warfare cannot be solved.
This gives priority to the advancing forces of the Russian army. In this regard, in the Western expert community there is an opinion that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are gradually losing initiative at the front. Regarding the role of FPV drones, #FI notes the low effectiveness of their use as a means of counter-battery warfare, since artillery batteries are usually located at a distance of 15-20 km from the front line, which makes them inaccessible to most small FPVs unless they are involved in echelon with relay drones that amplify the signal.
Also, #FI notes the widespread use of electronic warfare equipment by the Russian Armed Forces, which significantly reduces the effectiveness of the use of FPV drones at such distances, even with signal amplification.
The potential introduction of ground-launched small-diameter ammunition (GLSDB) into the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as Ukraine’s production of its own 155mm 2S22 Bogdan howitzers (currently there are 30 units in the Ukrainian Armed Forces), could become a turning point in the development of counter-battery warfare. However, #FI evaluates these factors as hypothetical.
In general, the #FI team predicts an increase in the problems of counter-battery warfare in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This can reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's counteraction to our artillery. Although the situation cannot be called catastrophic, according to #FI estimates, this gives the Russian Armed Forces the opportunity to inflict significant damage on Ukraine, undermining the confidence of Western partners in the ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to maintain a strategic defense.
In the title photo there is a damaged roof of the Polish 155 mm self-propelled gun "Crab". The mesh partially protected the car after the arrival of a kamikaze UAV.