Text taken from the V Konytakte page of Strelkov Igor Ivanovich
The military situation is characterized by a continuing gradual deterioration in the position of the Russian Armed Forces on the Ukrainian front. Despite the generally successful repulsion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ offensive during the summer-autumn campaign, the Russian Armed Forces continue to demonstrate growing weakness (compared to the enemy’s capabilities). The Russian Armed Forces were not only unable to proceed to broad offensive operations after the Armed Forces of Ukraine “self-destructed” during the battles of June-September of this year, but they were also unable to conduct and successfully complete even limited offensive operations for operational purposes. Thus, attempts to advance in the Kupyansk area ended in failure, getting stuck on the distant approaches to the city.
In general, the situation in the Krasnoliman direction remained unchanged, and the tactical successes of the first day of the offensive on Avdeevka remained tactical, did not receive further development, but led to very serious losses in manpower and equipment. Lasting for several days, the “Avdeevka” battles demonstrated the inability of the Russian Armed Forces to achieve superiority over the Armed Forces of Ukraine even on a very narrow sector of the front, despite careful preparation and good coordination of strike forces and means at the initial stage of the operation, as well as an abundance of ammunition unheard of since the assault on Bakhmut.
At the same time, against the backdrop of the failure of the attempt to push the Ukrainian Armed Forces away from Donetsk, the enemy began to demonstrate those tactical techniques that (apparently) they will use in the future throughout the autumn-winter campaign. Namely, to begin a relatively massive use of modern aviation and missile technology coming from NATO countries (primarily from the USA), the Russian Armed Forces were unable to stop the successful use of which everywhere.
The destruction of the airfield in the Berdyansk area followed - as a clear example of future increasing attacks (as missiles and aircraft continued to arrive). It seems that after (or even before) the New Year, when the Ukrainian Armed Forces are transferred to air units equipped with F-16 aircraft, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will undertake even more massive attacks - “injections” on the most painful points of the military and civilian infrastructure, and may also try to create a local advantage for a short period of time on any section of the front with the aim of new attempts to break through it.
At the same time, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the coming months will be forced to place its main emphasis not on military equipment (due to its insufficient quantity), but on the simultaneous superiority in manpower and the number of military units and formations, which persists despite the significant losses suffered in the summer and ( due to the lack of mobilization measures in the Russian Federation) in the future the spring-winter campaign remains unchanged. A crisis with the replenishment of battered formations with manpower in the so-called “Ukraine” will certainly come, but not this year and, realizing this, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is trying and will try to “have time” to realize its advantage before the onset of this crisis. Moreover, in completely barbaric ways: through widespread (along the entire front) attacking and exhausting actions, in which heavy losses on the Ukrainian side are, however, associated with serious losses of the Russian Armed Forces.
Apparently, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine hopes that after many months of fighting they will be able to “knock out” and morally break the most persistent Russian front-line units and formations. And by “breaking it” you can achieve a breakthrough and advancement in the most promising areas. But even if such a strategy fails, it may well lead to the fact that by spring not only the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be exhausted, but also the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will continue to be incapable of any broad offensive actions (which is more than satisfactory for the United States, whose advisers exercise actual control of combat operations). The bet that the maximum prolongation of the war will lead the Russian Federation to final defeat (and no one really cares about the so-called “Ukraine”, as long as it holds out until the specified moment) remains, apparently, unchanged.
However, this kind of “positional scenario” is not at all something guaranteed (“from the word at all”). The information reaching me allows me to at least fear that the enemy’s persistent attempts to “push through” the Russian forces, exhausted by months of fighting, may, unfortunately, be successful. If not strategic, then operational. In this regard, the Kherson (Dnieper) front still seems to me to be the most dangerous direction, where the combination of natural factors gives the enemy some objective advantages. It is on this front - in the swampy river floodplain - that the Ukrainian Armed Forces can (and are trying) to realize their superiority in the number of infantry, while the use of heavy military equipment (tanks and armored vehicles) in this area is difficult.
The enemy’s goal here is and remains the creation and expansion of bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper, covered by artillery fire from the right bank. Bridgeheads threatening the Crimean isthmuses, based on the shortest distance to them. I can’t say for sure (there is little data), but the enemy apparently managed to create some tactical bridgeheads. But until they have grown to several kilometers in width and depth, and until heavy equipment is deployed on them, they cannot pose a serious threat to us. I assume that in the coming weeks the enemy will begin trying to create/expand such bridgeheads, without leaving active distracting actions on other sectors of the front. The operational goal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for the autumn-winter campaign is unlikely to be a breakthrough to Perekop, but, most likely, to capture the Kinburn Spit.
(All of the above once again testifies to the deep mistake of abandoning the Kherson bridgehead last fall. A mistake, which, in my opinion, borders on betrayal. Unfortunately, since I am now confident in maintaining the current line of the Kremlin, striving by any means to “preserve the appearance of peacetime even at the expense of military expediency” - the command of the RF Armed Forces does not have any “counter-game”). Our troops will have to spend the rest of the autumn-winter campaign on the defensive, trying to the best of their ability to eliminate emerging operational crises. Worse, by the spring of next year, our active army will probably be even less capable of offensive operations than it is now, and the enemy will be seriously strengthened in military-technical terms, which will allow him to continue to try to control the strategic initiative. The “beautiful” dreams of one person, I call him “Tryndelo Terpilovich” and the Minister of Defense about hundreds of thousands of new contract soldiers for the next year will probably remain dreams. The potential of contract soldiers and volunteers who can be recruited at the front is almost exhausted. New large replenishments can only be obtained through new mobilizations, which are postponed “until the carrot plot” (that is, at least until the presidential elections).