by Kamran Hasanov
[REGNUM] When it comes to the growing conflict between Palestine and Israel, four countries come to mind first. Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
Of all the players, the Islamic Republic has the highest potential for conflict. After all, it is in hostile relations with both Israel and its ally the United States. At the beginning of the year, the IDF even launched a direct attack on a munitions plant in Isfahan. In addition, over the years, pro-Iranian proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah, Shiite groups in Syria) have engaged in direct battles with the Jewish state.
Egypt is more limited in maneuvers. 40 years ago, he recognized the State of Israel, regained Sinai and kept the border with Gaza closed.
Although Saudi Arabia did not agree to recognition, it was moving towards it. Informal contacts have always been maintained against the backdrop of the common Iranian threat.
Now KSA’s ties with Iran are improving, but the Saudis will not fight together with the Iranians against the Jews. Including so as not to tease their overseas partners. The Arab street may force tough measures to be taken, but they are more likely to be of a political or maximum economic nature, but not of a military nature.
That leaves Türkiye. Like Iran, with the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power, Turkey presented itself as almost the main defender of the Palestinian cause.
De facto, the ideology of both the AKP and Hamas is based on the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization whose activities are banned in the Russian Federation). The only difference is in the methods - Hamas does not deny terrorist ways of solving political problems.
During these twenty years in power, Erdogan has constantly accused Israel of occupying Palestinian lands. At one of the UN meetings, he even showed a map of which lands he was talking about.
At the Davos Forum in 2009, Erdogan got into a skirmish with Israeli President Shimon Peres , accusing his country of killing children on the beaches of Gaza. And when the presenter tried to stop him, Erdogan defiantly left the hall. The promise “I will never come to Davos again!” the Turkish leader still holds it.
The head of the AKP supported the Palestinians not only with words.
The year after Davos, he decided to break the blockade of Gaza by sending the Freedom Flotilla to the shores of the Palestinian enclave. The IDF suspected that instead of humanitarian aid, the Mavi Marmara was trying to deliver weapons to Hamas. The ship was ordered to undergo inspection, the passengers resisted, nine of them were shot.
Since then, relations between Turkey and Israel have remained tense.
| Though they were tense before, too. |
Economic relations, unlike diplomatic ones, were not interrupted, although the two countries were not key trading partners for each other. But in terms of geopolitics, Ankara and Tel Aviv have been in a state of cold war since the early 2010s.
The crisis has worsened during the Trump administration. When the White House recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Erdogan gathered leaders of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation countries in Istanbul and tried to put pressure on Israel.
Other regional issues also contributed to the crisis. Israel secretly supported the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Ankara's number one enemy) and sided with the anti-Turkish coalition (Greece - Cyprus - Egypt - UAE) in the dispute over gas in the Mediterranean.
With the onset of the lira crisis and the “change of winds” in the region, Turkey began to realize the pointlessness of continuing the conflict with its neighbors. Because of Erdogan’s ambitions, there are almost no countries left in Syria, Libya and the Mediterranean with whom Turkey does not have problems.
Therefore, Erdogan returned to the “zero problems with neighbors” strategy. Along with the UAE, KSA and Egypt, he went to war with Israel.
In 2022, the countries returned ambassadors, and Ankara was visited by Israeli President Isaac Herzog for the first time in 15 years . Improving ties with Israel could provide bonuses in military-technical cooperation, bring closer the creation of a Turkish gas hub through Israeli supplies and increase Turkey’s credit rating.
When talking about Ankara's current reaction to events in Gaza, two variables need to be kept in mind: commitments to defend the Palestinian cause and the current trend towards normalization with Israel.
Actually, this is where the indecisiveness and dualism in Erdogan’s reaction to the current escalation come from.
On the first day of the Hamas attack, when thousands of rockets were fired at Israeli cities and militants made incursions, Erdogan adopted a conciliatory line. This is what he said at his party congress on October 7:
“Turkey, in light of this morning’s events in Israel, calls on the parties to exercise restraint and refrain from impulsive steps that will lead to an escalation of tensions.”
No clear support for Palestine. No harsh accusations against Israel. Moreover, knowing how skillfully he can perform it.
On the first day, Israel was the injured party. Hundreds of its citizens became victims of attacks. Dozens of women and several IDF officers were taken captive to Gaza. Therefore, Erdogan, in light of normalization with his neighbor, could not openly support Hamas’s aggression.
When the next day the IDF launched decisive counterattacks in the Gaza Strip, the Turkish president began to “butter up” the Arabs:
“The establishment of an independent Palestinian state, within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, is an irreversible necessity that can no longer be delayed.”
He pointed to the root causes of the conflict, supported Palestine, but there was nothing decisive or fundamentally new in the statement. Even at the time of the Duke’s visit,
| Eh? What duke is that? |
In fact, Ankara took an equidistant position in the conflict between Hamas and Israel. Having ideological sympathies for Palestine, the AKP cannot allow “genocide” in Gaza. On the other hand, pragmatism does not allow us to break with Israel again.
The next stage of activity, in addition to calls for peace, could only be mediation. Erdogan contacted the leaders of Israel and Palestine and personally asked them to stop the violence. Ankara, as in the Ukrainian crisis, is ready to become a negotiating platform. But, as in Ukraine, the parties in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are not yet ready for negotiations. The escalation is only gaining momentum.
Israel has already begun a ground operation. Dozens of houses have been destroyed in Gaza and members of the Hamas government have been killed. The IDF announced that it was no longer a matter of “surgery.”
With further deterioration of the situation and an increase in the number of Palestinians killed, Ankara's rhetoric may become harsher. Demand from the AKP, especially in the run-up to municipal elections, will grow.
However, to have any impact on the situation, Erdogan will have to coordinate his efforts with other strong players. The day before, he called Vladimir Putin. Russia is not trying to play first fiddle, but the visit of the Prime Minister of Iraq and the upcoming trip of the Palestinian leader to Moscow confirm the importance of Russia.
Turkey will have to work with Iran and Saudi Arabia. A consolidated response from the troika, with Russia's consent, may have an effect, but does not guarantee success. It is unlikely that anyone will now decide to declare war on Israel. Türkiye alone - even more so.
In such realities, when everyone understands, but no one can change something, everyone thinks about their own benefit. And Türkiye is no exception.
After the terrorist attack in Ankara, Erdogan again took up the Kurdish case. While the world is consumed by Ukraine and Palestine, Türkiye can quietly solve its problems. Turkish artillery units have already begun striking YPG positions in the village of Sheikh Isa in the Tel Rifat region. The longer the conflict in Gaza lasts, the more time Erdogan will have to complete this task, which is more significant for Turkey.