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| Will Russia be able to further increase sales of liquefied gas to Europe |
| 2023-09-03 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Georgy Bovt [REGNUM] Against the backdrop of filling European underground gas storage facilities by more than 90%, calls were again made to abandon not only Russian pipeline gas (the share of the Russian Federation in European imports of such gas fell from more than 40% to less than 10%, or less than 15 if combined with LNG), but also from LNG. The import of which, after the start of the NWO, was growing all the time. What is happening and what to prepare for? Formally, unlike oil and coal, pipeline gas has not yet come under European sanctions. The rupture of relations, which were formed back in the 1960s and 1970s, occurred due to a complex of reasons and mutual actions, including the unilateral refusals of Gazprom's former main importers to continue to deal with it. However, LNG, apparently, in this sense "does not smell" or "smells less", being perceived as if impersonal. Therefore, already in the past, in 2022, the export of Russian LNG to the EU against the backdrop of a collapse in exports through the pipeline increased by 33% compared to 2021, to 14.1 million tons (19.4 billion cubic meters). This year, the trend has intensified: in the first half of this year, the EU has already imported 22 million tons of Russian LNG, a year-on-year growth of 40%, paying about 5.3 billion euros to the hated Russian treasury. By the way, it is worth noting that Russia receives payment for LNG in dollars or other convertible currency, and not in rubles, as was prescribed (with conversion through Gazprombank) for pipeline gas, which became a reason for many European importers to abandon such a scheme and , respectively, gas imports through the pipeline. So let's consider this as another reason for the growth of LNG exports to the EU from the Russian Federation. Against the backdrop of LNG exports from the United States, however, Russian volumes still look modest. Thus, the United States, which has long dreamed of ousting Russia from the gas market in Europe - and now, dreams come true - increased LNG exports to Europe last year by 2.5 times, coming out on top. The LNG market is generally highly diversified, much more flexible, and this is its main “charm” for buyers. Although so far one has to pay a much higher price for it than for the relatively “cheaper” pipeline gas. But here, from the beginning of the NWO, politics, and not economics, unconditionally "steers". As a result, total EU spending on LNG imports increased by 3.3 times last year, with imports coming from 27 countries, including Russia, a striking exception to the overall sanctions policy. In the EU, Spain (slightly less than 20% of total Russian LNG sales) and Belgium (17%) are the leaders in terms of Russian LNG imports, two countries that are not distinguished by soft approaches to relations with the Russian Federation at all. In Spain, by the way, this made it possible to sharply bring down electricity prices by the end of last year, from which consumers moaned. Other major importers of Russian LNG last year included France (up 44% in imports by 2021) and the Netherlands. Among the small importers were the UK (this year refused completely), as well as Portugal, Italy, Greece and even Lithuania. Although now political pressure is growing in some countries in favor of unilaterally (without any sanctions) renunciation of Russian liquefied gas. And the government of the same Spain (it hardly retained power following the results of the June parliamentary elections) is trying to persuade importers not to enter into new LNG contracts with the Russians. The European Commission, without sanctions, gave the EU member states the right to unilaterally refuse Russian LNG supplies. However, since the LNG market is much more flexible than the pipeline gas market, the positions of Russian LNG producers in this area look much more secure. And so far, export opportunities, unlike oil, coal and the same pipeline gas, are limited not so much by direct and/or indirect sanctions as by the production capacities of Russian companies. The main export potential of LNG is provided by the Yamal LNG plant (17.4 million tons per year), a controlling stake in which belongs to the Russian company Novatek (50.1%). The remaining shares are distributed between the French Total Energies (20%), the Chinese CNPC (20%) and the Chinese state Silk Road Fund (9.9%). Yamal is based on Western technologies. The second large-tonnage producer Sakhalin-2 (11 million tons, 51% of Gazprom's shares), the project was created on the basis of the technologies of the Anglo-Dutch Shell, which withdrew from the project by selling its stake to Novatek, but Japanese Mitsui and Mitsubishi remained in it (12.5% and 10% respectively). Now Novatek is building a second Arctic LNG-2 plant. There are several other medium-tonnage projects in operation (by Gazprom and Novatek), but the volumes there are much smaller. There are currently no free LNG production capacities in Russia. Even last year, against the background of a sharp increase in prices and demand, it was possible to increase LNG production in Russia by only 8%, and this was mainly due to a reduction in the volume of repairs against the backdrop of a good start made earlier. With small-tonnage LNG plants, the picture is better, their capacity is planned to be increased by 2.5 times already in 2025, but these will be relatively small volumes anyway (638 thousand tons). Now more than 60% of the production volume of small-tonnage LNG plants is exported, the rest goes to the domestic market. The growth of exports is hindered to a certain extent by the monopoly of Gazprom: it is allowed to sell only through it, Novatek has the right to independently export, as an exception, only LNG produced at its facilities (at Yamal). On the other hand, small-tonnage LNG production is based on domestic technologies. However, as now and medium-tonnage. A significant increase in large-scale LNG production, also using domestic technologies, is planned from about 2030. For example, the new Murmansk LNG plant for the production of liquefied natural gas will operate exclusively on the Russian large-capacity Arctic Mix technology. Its planned capacity is up to 20 million tons of LNG per year. In 2023–2026, three more Arctic LNG-2 lines will be launched with a total capacity of 19.8 million tons per year. The construction of the complex in Ust-Luga has begun, the planned volume is 13 million tons of LNG. As a result, instead of the current approximately 30 million tons of LNG, by 2030 production may increase to 80 million tons. The target government indicator, as always, is round - 100 million tons per year. Even in the worst case, in the next couple of years, unless something else extraordinary happens, the EU will not completely abandon LNG imports from Russia, but will focus on the goal of completely stopping gas imports through the pipeline. Next - how will it go. However, in this case, by increasing the capacity for the production of liquefied gas, Russian producers will find a market in other parts of the world. First of all, the Northern Sea Route will be adjusted for its export. In principle, the development of LNG technologies should have been taken care of earlier, including for the sake of gasifying the sparsely populated regions of Russia itself, without relying only on mega-projects for the construction of more and more new pipelines such as the same Nord Stream, where billions as a result literally ended up thrown into the pipe. |
| Posted by:badanov |
| #2 Wonder hoe the Israel projects are advancing. RETRO: Israel ramping up gas output, looks to help supply Europe |
| Posted by: Skidmark 2023-09-03 07:43 |
| #1 I have to think very hard about this one. It's such a difficult question. |
| Posted by: Grom the Reflective 2023-09-03 04:02 |