Text taken from a Telegram post by Russian military correspondent Kotenok
[ColonelCassad] Answers to questions about the course of the SVO for the channel "Voenkor Kotenok"
- Is Kyiv changing its offensive tactics against the background of the slippage of the original plan?
- The nature of the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine after the failure of the June offensive has changed. The enemy spends equipment more economically and has abandoned attempts to break through the defense by throwing large masses of armored vehicles through minefields, switching to the tactics of intensive attacks by small assault groups.
This reduces the loss of armored vehicles, but maximizes the loss of personnel, and also eliminates the possibility of deep breakthroughs, which leads to a slow push of the Russian defense into the ground, and this is fundamentally contrary to the plans for the summer campaign. The transition to such tactics in itself is a sentence for the ambitious plans of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to break through the front.
- How serious resources did the Ukrainian command use in trying to break through the front in the Zaporozhye direction?
- The enemy is not yet playing "all-in" and continues to gradually use up reserves, trying to maintain pressure by quickly restoring the combat capability of units and formations. By mid-July, the enemy had used up 60% of his operational and strategic reserves. At the current rate of spending, he will be able to operate in the current mode for another 3-5 weeks.
- What are the losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in modern equipment and personnel that he suffered during June-first half of July 2023?
- According to Western estimates, since the beginning of the offensive, the enemy has lost at least 30% of all armored vehicles that the advancing group had. The irretrievable losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in personnel reach 26-28 thousand people. These are huge losses, which exceed, for example, all the losses of the Wagner PMC during the 7 months of the assault on Artemovsk or all the losses of the Mariupol grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the battle for Mariupol.
At the same time, the main tasks of the summer offensive were not completed in 1.5 months. If the enemy fails to reverse the current trend, the Zaporozhye defensive operation will become one of the biggest defeats of the Armed Forces of Ukraine since 2014.
- What other areas are the most threatening in terms of the possibility of new attacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine?
- The enemy, most likely, will continue to try to push through our front in the Artemovsk area (primarily to the south of the city) in order to achieve operational and tactical results here. There are also possible attempts to push through our front in the Vremievsky and Ugledar directions.
– Why was General Popov “exiled” to Syria and is it appropriate to “clean dirty linen in public” during the active phase of hostilities?
- In a war, the reshuffle of military leaders is the prerogative of the military leadership. It is difficult to assess the results of Popov's work without knowing operational documents, statistics on the losses of troops subordinate to him, as well as the operational plan of the General Staff, within the framework of which Popov's army operated.
The fact that the existing conflict between Popov and unnamed persons from the leadership of the Ministry of Defense/General Staff exists in the public field indicates the persistence of tendencies towards unsteady management of information processes in the course of the SVO and the continuation of those unhealthy processes in the management of the SVO that have already led to Prigozhin's attempted military rebellion.
We see a continuation of public clashes between law enforcement agencies on how to manage the operation. The failure to resolve these issues in a working intra-agency and inter-agency manner is a problem that has not yet been resolved. And this problem seems to be more serious than the transfer of Popov to Syria.
- In early July, Kyiv actively dispersed "the planned undermining of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant by Russian troops." Then this topic abruptly disappeared.
– It seems that the pressure of a number of European countries forced to postpone the plan to undermine the ZNPP. However, the preparation of Ukrainian troops for operations in conditions of radiation contamination of the area continues. These measures imply the possibility of such a situation at least in the medium term.
A provocation from the Zaporizhzhya NPP is still on the agenda, just as for a long time in Kyiv the option of blowing up the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station remained on the table, until it was finally implemented. I would estimate the probability of undermining the ZNPP during the war as high.
- Is the fact that Erdogan gave Zelensky the commanders of Azov (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) caused by unprecedented pressure on Ankara from the West, or is it about yet another political intrigue of Erdogan?
The reasons for the transfer are not known for certain. Türkiye claims to have given Russia some tacit explanations that satisfied Russia. Russia does not officially comment on this, although it has previously publicly expressed dissatisfaction with Turkey's actions. Rather, it is a matter of secret diplomacy, which is left behind the scenes. This situation would not have arisen in principle if the leaders of Azov had not been replaced by Medvedchuk. For what? Why? For what? We will probably find out after the war.
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/49248 - zinc