by Petr Akopov
[RIA] In anticipation of the Ukrainian offensive in the West, they are increasingly beginning to discuss what will happen after it - negotiations on a truce with Russia. Yes, the mainstream in the United States - and partly in Europe - is practically confident in the success of the strike of the Ukrainian army prepared with their help, they argue only about its scale.
Almost no one even among the Anglo-Saxon hawks believes in the coming "liberation of the Crimea", but in any case they expect some kind of, albeit tactical, defeat of Russia. And after that, negotiations on a truce, to which, according to many Western analysts, Moscow will be forced to agree. Thus, the long-awaited Ukrainian offensive itself is seen by Western strategists as a kind of form of "forcing Russia to peace", that is, creating favorable conditions for Kyiv and the West to start negotiations.
Very indicative in this sense is the recent article by Richard Haas and Charles Kupchan "The West Needs a New Strategy in Ukraine" in Foreign Affairs. Haas is not an ordinary analyst, but the president of a key American think tank, the Council on Foreign Relations, that is, his reasoning is not abstract, but more than similar not even to a recommendation, but to an approximate plan of action for the American leadership.
The essence of the "Haas Plan" is that, although Ukraine and the West as a whole are winning, the strategy must be changed. Yes, Haas supports the demands for Kiev to be pumped with weapons, but he is sure that "the most likely outcome of the conflict is by no means a complete victory for Ukraine, but a bloody stalemate", and therefore we need to prepare to "then, when at the end of the year the peak hostilities will pass, withdraw Moscow and Kiev from the battlefield and sit down at the negotiating table. At the same time, Haas is one of those hawks who are not afraid of the escalation of the conflict - and in general "the West should in every possible way belittle Russia's nuclear ambitions."
Therefore, Ukraine can and should be pumped up with weapons, and sooner or later Moscow will abandon the military solution.
The logic is deadly in the sense that it proceeds from the possibility of forcing Russia to come to terms with Ukraine's departure to the Atlantic camp by force. And from the fact that Russia can still be forced to negotiate about it. But now it's not about that, but about why Haas nevertheless proposes to change the American strategy.
Because Kyiv will also have to be forced to a truce! That is, to refuse the promises made to him: "Peace in Ukraine cannot be a hostage to Kyiv's military goals, which, no matter how morally justified they may be, are most likely unattainable...
Even from the point of view of Ukraine, it would be unwise to persevere in achieving a complete military victory, which may turn out to be Pyrrhic ... Kyiv should not risk self-destruction in the pursuit of unattainable goals ... "
When the "season" of hostilities ends, the United States and Europe will also have a good reason to abandon their declared policy of helping Ukraine "for as long as it takes."
And even so: “For more than a year, the West has allowed Kiev to determine the success of the Ukrainian campaign and set military goals for the US and Europe. This policy, regardless of whether it made sense at the beginning of the conflict, has now exhausted itself.” What happened, why do we need new installations? It turns out that the old policy "becomes unreasonable because the goals of Ukraine are in conflict with other interests of the West," and continued large-scale support for Kyiv comes with broader strategic risks.
What are these risks? According to Haas, the West cannot supply weapons to Ukraine at the same pace, it is afraid of a direct conflict with Russia (this slightly contradicts the previous theses of the article, but we will not find fault), and the States cannot continue to be so distracted from containing China . But there is also the risk of a split in the West, and the fact that "US policy towards Ukraine may change dramatically if the Republicans win the White House in the 2024 elections."
That is, the more than globalist and Atlantic-minded Haas actually recognizes all those problems of the West that critics and opponents of the global Anglo-Saxon project talk about, and offers to refer to them when explaining to Kiev the reasons for the change in American policy and the need for a truce and negotiations. But the problem is how the Americans are now going to convince Kyiv - and what will it cost Zelensky?
Haas admits that "convincing Kyiv to accept a ceasefire and vague diplomatic solutions can be no less difficult than getting Moscow to agree to it."
The states, of course, will do their best to force Kyiv to negotiate, but the main Ukrainian problem of the West now is that it is simply impossible for Zelensky to refuse the demand to return to the "1991 borders". And if it happens, then the supporters of the war will demolish it to the bitter end. In an interview with Anatol Lieven (a British analyst who recently returned from Ukraine) published recently, this is stated directly.
What happens? The current American strategy on Ukraine proceeds from the fact that it is necessary to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine inflict at least a relative defeat on Russia, and then enter into negotiations and fix a freeze, the status quo: Russia is leaving what it already controls, and the rest of Ukraine actually becomes an unofficial member of NATO.
Russia thus suffers a geopolitical defeat - it wanted to prevent the atlantization of Ukraine, but instead was forced to settle for a land corridor to Crimea, resigned to Ukraine's withdrawal to the West.
But within the framework of this strategy, the West constantly publicly spoke about supporting the plans to "liberate" the entire territory of Ukraine, while Zelensky built everything on this.
If now, even without any hint of Russia’s readiness to abandon its goals, we start convincing Kyiv that we need to accept the cessation of hostilities and actually give up the lost territories, this will lead to Zelensky’s political suicide. Well, if the West puts forward such proposals to Kiev after the Ukrainian offensive, then, as they say, there is a fork in the road - if it suddenly achieves some success, Zelensky will not agree, counting on more (and the army will be against it). And if it fails, then he will not be able to even hint at a ceasefire without the risk of being overthrown.
And it's not about Zelensky. And the fact that the American approach is initially based on the erroneous belief that in the end they will be able to take Ukraine for themselves, and nothing can be fixed here by changing tactics and even strategy.