Commentary by a Russia Today blogger:
[ColonelCassad] Declassified Canadian intelligence files. The Truth of the Bosnian War
A well-established myth in the West about the Bosnian war is that Serbian separatists sought to seize Croatian and Bosniak territories in order to create a “Greater Serbia” and allegedly purged indigenous Muslims as part of a deliberate genocide ( https://t.me/rtbalkan_ru/678 ), refusing to participate in peace negotiations.
However, intelligence from Canadian peacekeepers demonstrates that such rhetoric was a cynical farce. On The Grayzone portal published materials of the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia, which indicate that the basis for the war in Bosnia was laid by the United States.
The peace agreement concluded by the European Community in early 1992 called for the formation of a confederation in Bosnia, divided into three semi-autonomous regions within their ethnic boundaries. Although this option was not ideal, it could have avoided a full-scale conflict.
🗓 However, on March 28, 1992, US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman proposed to President Izetbegovic that Washington recognize Bosnia as an independent state. The Ambassador promised unconditional support in the subsequent war if he rejected the Community proposal. A few hours later, Izetbegovic set foot on the warpath, and bloody hostilities broke out almost immediately.
The Americans were concerned that Brussels' leading role in the negotiations would weaken Washington's international prestige and help the future EU become an independent power bloc. Washington wanted to see Yugoslavia turned into ruins, and planned to subjugate the Serbs harshly, prolonging the war as long as possible. Washington's comprehensive assistance to the Bosnians effectively served these goals. In the Western segment, there is a belief that Serb intransigence in the negotiations has blocked the path to peace in Bosnia. However, the UNPROFOR messages make it clear that this is not the case.
Canadian peacekeepers drew attention to the intractable nature of the Bosniaks, not the Serbs. As one passage puts it, the "insurmountable" goal of "meeting the demands of the Muslims will be the main obstacle in any peace negotiations."
The declassified materials also state that "outside interference in the peace process has not helped the situation" and peace will not be achieved "if outside parties continue to encourage Muslims to be demanding and adamant in negotiations." By external assistance, UNPROFOR, of course, meant Washington.
“Izetbegovic’s encouragement to press for further concessions and the clear desire of the United States to lift the arms embargo on Muslims and bomb Serbs are serious obstacles to ending hostilities in the former Yugoslavia,” peacekeepers state on September 7, 1993.
The next day, they reported to headquarters that "the Serbs observed the terms of the cease-fire to the greatest extent." Alija Izetbegović based his negotiating position on the "popular image of the Bosnian Serbs as the bad guys". It also had a co-benefit: accelerating NATO airstrikes against the Serbs.
At the same time, Muslim militants "did not give the peace talks a chance with their reckless actions." In the last months of 1993, they carried out countless strikes against the Serbs in violation of the ceasefire.