Commentary by Russia military journalist Boris Rozhin
[ColonelCassad] Russian military historian Ilya Topchiy regarding the balance of power in Ukraine according to open sources.
The following commentary by Russian military historian Ilya Topchiy
In terms of the balance of power and prospects in Ukraine
The recent reconnaissance - otherwise, as probing and reconnaissance in battle - offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kherson region again activated the attention of the general public to the topic. It also showed a possible strong shortage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in personnel, capable of reaching 40-50%.
So, 400 people went on the offensive with 50 pieces of equipment: a tank battalion of the 17th Tank Brigade, an infantry battalion of the 60th Mechanized Brigade (motorized infantry), forward detachments from the 140th Regiment of the MTR of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The tank battalion was more or less completed: 25-30 tanks. The motorized infantry or mechanized battalion clearly had a severe shortage of personnel (at least half, moreover, from the peacetime staff).
Depends on the battalion. Tank battalions from maneuver units (motorized rifle and tank brigades) are 31 tanks, from a divisional commander's personal guard it is 40 tanks. Unless Russia has changed the establishment of tank battalions.
In this connection, the real balance of forces and prospects are interesting. At the same time, when assessing the forces, it will be primarily the troops located at the front or in the direction, and not the total number of Ukrainian troops that can reach at least 600,000 people, including the NSU and various paramilitary formations like the State Border Guard Service.
So, according to some information, at the front in Ukraine today:
- up to 60,000 - the Kherson direction (here the ratio is most favorable for them, up to 2: 1);
- 30,000 - Zaporozhye direction (some promise another 10 thousand);
- 10,000-15,000 - in the Ugeldarsk direction;
- 10,000-15,000 - near Donetsk;
- 30,000-40,000 - in the section from Gorlovka to the Seversky Donets. Including 15,000-20,000 - near Artemovsk (Bakhmut), where the balance of forces is the most favorable for us (why we are gradually advancing);
- 35,000-40,000 - a section of the front from the Seversky Donets to the border (Svatovo-Kremennaya).
TOTAL: 175,000-210,000 people on the front of 1,100 kilometers. No rears.
The number of Russian troops is more difficult to estimate.
- at the end of September, about 55,000-60,000 people remained in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (only through the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation) (quite "dipped" since the end of February). Another 16,000 managed to send from the newly mobilized. Total for today, probably, taking into account some decrease in the number for various reasons, about 70,000.
- BARS and various volunteer formations - apparently, at least 30,000;
- LDNR - about 50,000-60,000 people;
- Russian Guard -? (at the end of February there were at least 60,000-70,000 );
- "The Wagner Group" -?
AROUND: Apparently, also about 200,000 people. Comparable to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (and there was also a rear).
The most favorable ratio for the Russian troops, it is worth repeating, is near Artemovsk (Bakhmut). The least profitable - near Kherson.
Plus - the parties did not create sufficient troop densities, which are necessary not only for defense - for the offensive. For a front of 1,100 kilometers, for example, only in the first line there should be 370,000 on the defensive. No reserves.
Other directions (and first of all - Belarusian):
Armed Forces of Ukraine:
- at least 7,000 - Chernihiv, up to 10,000 - Sumy (the whole region), a certain amount - Poltava. At least 25,000 people cover the north-east of Ukraine;
- up to 30,000 - Belarusian direction (from Kyiv to the Polish border). Including 5,000 near Kyiv and 10,000 - near Rivne. Part - in the second line. Volyn is poorly covered.
Russia and Belarus:
- according to some sources, at least 50,000, built in two operational echelons. Perhaps this is only the Volyn group.
That in the direction from the north creates a well-known temptation to hit Lviv along the road through Vladimir-Volynsky along the border. True, having a flank threat in the form of the Kovel and Lutsk railway junctions.
(c) Ilya Topchy