Commentary from the Telegram channel of military correspondent "Voenkor Kotenok"
[ColonelCassad] Answers to questions for the channel "Voenkor Kotenok" on the topic of some aspects of the SVO.
1) At the level of rumors, information about Kyiv's plans to create a "dirty bomb" has reappeared. How long can it take to create this device and what is the purpose of the project - blackmail, provocation, or detonation of a bomb in one of the Russian cities?
This is a very realistic scenario, especially with the help of the US and Britain. Such a bomb can be used for provocation on the territory of Ukraine or for a strike on the border areas of Russia, as well as for blackmail by the threat of such a strike. It was the fact of such a threat that was one of the well-known reasons for the start of the NWO. And that threat still persists.
2) The fact that both threads of SP-1 were damaged, but only one branch of SP-2 - is this a flaw or a conscious step on the part of the enemy in order to preserve the field for negotiations?
The real extent of the damage is still unclear, as well as the nature of the explosion of the pipelines. It is obvious that the United States will seek to cut Europe off as much as possible from Russian energy sources in order to consolidate the economic enslavement of Europe. We can expect further steps in this direction.
3) On the eve of the referenda, many expected that it was during the referenda that Kyiv might attempt a breakthrough. That did not happen. APU exhausted? Or afraid of the answer?
As you can see, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and NATO were focused on developing the success associated with the breakthrough near Balakleya. And this plan was quite successfully implemented in the Krasny Liman area, which the RF Armed Forces were forced to leave due to the threat of encirclement. Yes, they failed to disrupt the referendums, which, however, did not prevent them from achieving operational success.
4) Is it timely to join the territories, some of which are still occupied by the Armed Forces of Ukraine? Or is it more reasonable to wait for their release within the administrative boundaries?
Territories must be legally fixed for themselves, and the sooner the better. They form a political irreversibility, while the accession in no way interferes with the liberation of the remaining territories and other areas. Therefore, as it was said in the summer, the referendums were held in the second half of September.
5) In your opinion, will conclusions be drawn from the recent story of the exchange of "Azov" in the sense that even unpopular decisions need to be covered? Isn't it time to reverse the situation in which we learn about such events from the enemy, which enhances the negative effect?
There are no serious changes in the state approach to information coverage of the issues of exchanges of prisoners of war. For unknown reasons, the costs of the current approach are not considered critical. Accordingly, no major "changes" in this matter are expected.
6) When should the effect be expected from the arrival of mobilized people in the NMD zone? And in general, how adequate is the figure of 300,000 people for the current situation?
In a strategic sense, the attraction of the masses mobilized to the front will begin to tell on the nature of the hostilities in December-January. At the current stage, the role of the mobilized will be rather stabilizing - they will fill the voids at the front and replenish the existing units. As for the declared figures, everything depends on the tasks that will be set, because one group strength is needed for defensive operations, and another for offensive operations. However, I am sure that the issues of partial mobilization in Russia will not be limited to 300,000.
The partial mobilization itself is a recognition of the fact that the stake on the voluntary-contract principle of recruiting a grouping for Ukraine could not fully ensure a sufficient number of groups to solve the tasks of the NWO.
7) Why haven't we started knocking out bridges and critical infrastructure yet? Is this due to the fact that in this case the Armed Forces of Ukraine can destroy the oil and gas pipelines through which the transit of hydrocarbons takes place?
The reasons for the lack of strikes on some infrastructure facilities and "decision-making centers" are not clear to me. From the point of view of achieving the goals of the NWO, the destruction of critical infrastructure facilities is seen as necessary.
8) After the Pentagon announced the allocation of another 18 Hymars to Kyiv, it was clarified that they would arrive in Ukraine within 2 years. Are such terms associated with a decrease in the effectiveness of MLRS data?
No, the US is quite happy with the current results. Therefore, they will try to maintain the number of such MLRS in Ukraine, both as part of compensation for losses and to replace failing machines. Of course, the supply of missiles for them will continue.
9) How do you evaluate the effectiveness of Shahed-136 purchased from Iran? Are these devices a serious tool or a temporary solution?
The effectiveness of these drones was expectedly high, especially when assessing the price/ quality ratio. Like HIMARS, this is not a superweapon, but it successfully fulfills its tasks, which causes hysteria about "flying mopeds" in Ukraine. Given the length of the front, it is unlikely that the enemy will be able to do anything about this in the medium term, except for building up the protection of some objects of particular importance to him, pulling anti-aircraft guns and other means of combating UAVs there.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/65847 - zinc
Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin:
Krasny Liman.
The situation after the withdrawal of the RF Armed Forces from Krasny Liman remains difficult. Fighting continues in the area of ​​Terna, Torskoye and in the forest near Kremennaya. The command of the grouping in this direction now needs to solve the problem of stabilizing the front on the Kremennaya-Svatovo line. The solution of this problem after the replenishment of the units and the saturation of the battle formations at the expense of the mobilized will make it possible to resume offensive operations in the winter, including with the aim of liberating Krasny Liman. But for the time being, tasks of a defensive nature are on the agenda and they must be solved.
The only positive around Krasny Liman against the backdrop of obvious negative, the troops were able to avoid encirclement. The mistakes of the enemy in holding Mariupol, which led to the destruction of the entire Mariupol grouping, are not in a hurry to repeat in our country, for obvious reasons. But the problem of securing the flanks is still very acute.