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| Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | |
| Analysis of Russian/Eastern Ukraine Rail lines for Strategy | |
| 2022-09-19 | |
[Twitter-Tom Warner]
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| Posted by:3dc |
| #7 Don't forget the OSS and their coal torpedoes in WW-II. They learned that from the Confederates. |
| Posted by: 3dc 2022-09-19 15:29 |
| #6 Yes, The Mighty 8th. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2022-09-19 08:34 |
| #5 ^ I think our own 8th Air Force contributed to the lack of readily available rail lift. |
| Posted by: Procopius2k 2022-09-19 08:30 |
| #4 Patton did without it for the most part as well, relying heavily on his "Cannonball Express." |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2022-09-19 08:26 |
| #3 Somehow we did without the rail line along to Gulf in Saudi up to Kuwait in the first war. Then again we also had massive a logistic lift that other nations lack. |
| Posted by: Procopius2k 2022-09-19 07:50 |
| #2 Yes SP, Gen. Sherman had identified this dynamic in '64. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2022-09-19 07:13 |
| #1 Some logistics issues are constants. To adequately support a static position of a brigade you need a minimum of one fully functional rail line. The volume of material (POL, ammunition, food & water, etc.) is inefficient to be moved solely by road. A unit in contact / moving forward needs two lines (preferably not parallel). For a basic introduction to logistics see the classic “Supplying War” by van Creveld. |
| Posted by: Slenter Panda4300 2022-09-19 06:11 |