Commentary by Russian military logger identified as Kotenok. Questions by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin in bold.
[ColonelCassad] - APU is hitting the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, threatening a "second Chernobyl". How high is the probability of a nuclear catastrophe and what could be its scale?
- A catastrophe is more than likely in 3 cases - a direct hit on the reactor as a result of targeted missile strikes on the reactor block, the failure of the station's mechanisms, which will lead to abnormal operation of the reactor and a possible catastrophe, as well as as a result of strikes on the nuclear waste storage site .
Depending on the type of damage to the plant, the damage radius will depend - in the event of a reactor explosion as a result of a missile hit, the damage radius will affect several regions of Ukraine. In the case of local contamination as a result of damage to containers with radioactive elements in an open area, the radius of damage will be tens of kilometers.
In any case, all these scenarios can definitely be interpreted as scenarios of a nuclear catastrophe, which the United States and Britain are now manipulating with the hands of Ukraine.
- The West is increasing pressure on Russia, blaming the Russians in advance for any incident that may occur at the ZNPP. What threatens the situation if Russia decides to create a demilitarized zone around the station?
- In this case, the West is deliberately trying to blackmail with the threat of a nuclear catastrophe in order to force Russia to bend and force it to make some concessions, such as transferring the ZNPP under international control or even under the control of Ukraine. Obviously, these are unacceptable options for Russia, but the West, cultivating fear of the nuclear threat, is trying to force it to make such concessions.
The West will certainly turn a blind eye to any actions of Ukraine, even if Zelensky’s gang shoots directly at the ZNPP from the other side of the Dnieper online.
- The media is discussing the topic of shifting the referendum in the DPR, in Kherson and in the liberated territories of the Zaporozhye region. If such a decision is made, to what extent will it meet the interests of Russia?
- Referendums in the DPR and LPR are tied to the completion of the liberation of the territories of Donbass. Accordingly, they will pass as quickly as our army can liberate the territory of the DPR. We have already coped with the task of liberating the LPR.
In the case of Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, the timing of referendums depends on the ability of the CAA of the regions to establish the structure of state power and ensure the work of election commissions. Therefore, referendums in the LDNR and other liberated regions can be held separately. In my opinion, the sooner their accession to Russia is fixed, the better - this will ensure the irreversibility of their withdrawal from Ukraine.
- The Ukrainian side continues to use Haimars, sometimes successfully. Is there a universal "cure" for this type of MLRS? What is the set of measures that should be taken to completely eliminate this threat?
- At the moment, our air defense systems partially shoot down missiles of this complex, but during mass launches they periodically break through our defenses and cause some damage.
How to deal with it? More carefully disguise our headquarters and logistics infrastructure, deal with the dispersal of warehouses. To reduce the effectiveness of strikes against warehouses, it is necessary to improve the operation of air defense systems against missiles of these complexes, plus to hunt for them and methodically destroy them.
There is no recipe for a quick victory here - long and painstaking work is needed to minimize the effectiveness of this weapon system and improve work to counter them and their subsequent destruction.
- In my personal opinion, specialists in anti-terror and special operations are urgently needed in the NVO zone. The experience of the same Igor Girkin could be useful. In this regard, was it worth it to detain him at the entrance to the Kherson region, and what generally caused such a decision and its advertising in the media?
- From my point of view, any person who willingly wants to go to fight the Nazis in Ukraine should get such an opportunity, because now there is no more important task for the country than the destruction of the Nazi regime in Ukraine and its sponsors.
I don’t know all the reasons for this story, but I repeat, if a person wants to go to war, he should be provided with such an opportunity. This is especially important in conditions when the emphasis is on the contract-volunteer format of warfare, and not on the mobilization one.
— Western sources write that Russia has ordered at least 1,000 UAVs from Iran. How realistic are these numbers, and how could the supply of Iranian drones affect the course of hostilities?
- Officially, this information has not yet been confirmed. Regarding 1000 UAVs, obviously, they mean their production for some time. Obviously, here we are not talking about a one-time purchase of 1000 cars, especially since in the Russian Federation there simply aren’t so many operators for new cars.
Therefore, if the UAVs are really purchased, then they will be delivered in parts, as the calculations are produced and trained. Taking into account the well-known quality of Iranian drones, they will become a serious help for our gunners, supplementing, for example, well-performing drones of the Orlan-10 type and other rarer specimens.
- In a few weeks, the transition of hostilities from the spring-summer to the autumn-winter period will begin. How will the seasonal factor affect the confrontation in specific sectors of the front?
- In mid-autumn, offensive operations will be limited by worsening weather and autumn thaws. On the other hand, the descent of the "green" will make it difficult for both sides to hide from artillery, which is somewhat more beneficial for us, since we have an advantage in artillery, and it will become more difficult for the enemy to hold positions outside the cities. However, this will create many difficulties for us.
It can be expected that in October-November the intensity of hostilities in some directions will decrease and tendencies towards positioning will prevail, although, for example, this is unlikely to interfere with the assault on large settlements, as the example of the assault on the same Mariupol or Volnovakha showed.
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39305 - zinc