Commentary by Russian military blogger Kotenok
[ColonelCassad] Answers to questions about the course of the SVO for the military correspondent Kotenok's channel.
- Is there a possibility that the escalation of the topic of "attack on Kherson" is disinformation on the part of Kyiv in order to divert attention from another direction in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine really plan to strike?
- The Zelensky gang just announced that all this is “disinformation”. This became "disinformation" after the failed attempts to attack on the Ingulets River and near Vysokopolie, which ended in heavy losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We also saw over the past week the transfer of reinforcements to the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, which made the attempts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to conduct serious offensive operations even more dubious.
In addition, systematic attacks on Nikolaev made it practically impossible for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to effectively advance on Kherson from Nikolaev due to heavy losses in people and equipment.
All this does not negate the fact that, under the cover of chatter about an attack on Kherson, the Armed Forces of Ukraine can prepare offensive operations in the Zaporozhye or Kharkiv regions, hoping to mislead the command of the RF Armed Forces.
- How do you assess the authenticity of the excerpts from the "Zaluzhny report" that appeared on the Web, in which the colossal losses of the Ukrainian side appear? Is this not a fake, the purpose of which is to lull the vigilance of the Russian side?
- It is difficult to assess its reliability, but it is quite obvious that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have suffered enormous losses since February 2024, and according to minimal estimates, they have lost up to 50-70 thousand only killed, not counting the wounded, prisoners, deserters, missing.
As for disinformation, the Russian Defense Ministry is unlikely to rely on such publications in assessing the actual combat capability and strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
- Are the possible poisoning of Saldo and the murder of Vitaly Gur links in the same chain? If so, who could be the next target of the Bandera underground?
Vitaly Gur was the Ukrainan official in Novokakhovka who was killed in an armed attack. Volodymyr Saldo is the Ukrainain official in Kherson appointed by the Russians as Kherson's administrator. Supposedly, he is in a hospital because of a poisoning attempt.
- It is important to understand that such attacks, as well as other terrorist acts, will continue for a long time as part of the campaign of terror, which is being launched by the SBU and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense in the liberated territories. The targets of the attacks will be CAA officials, civilian experts and the Russian military.
It is necessary to work with this in exactly the same way as with the terrorist underground in the Caucasus, and also use the positive Soviet experience in combating the Bandera movement of the 40s and 50s.
Of course, the Security Service of Ukraine and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense must be officially recognized as terrorist organizations, and all employees and persons interacting with them must be a priori subject to the article “terrorism”. In carrying out CTO over the next few years, it is important to be methodical and systematic.
- Armed Forces of Ukraine are increasing the intensity of shelling of the Zaporozhye NPP. Kyiv seeks to damage at least one of the reactors, or is it more likely psychological terror?
- The station has already suffered some damage, so this is, of course, not only a matter of psychological terror.
The Zelensky gang and its masters clearly demonstrate that the creation of a nuclear catastrophe zone is an acceptable scenario for them. This should be taken into account in the future.
Of course, these attacks are aimed at spreading panic and disrupting the referendum on the accession of the Zaporozhye region to Russia. Therefore, they are trying to intimidate people with the threat of a second Chernobyl.
- What settlements should be liberated so that the shelling of Donetsk, if not stopped, then reduced to a minimum?
- To reduce the shelling of Donetsk, it is necessary to liberate the Slavic-Kramatorsk agglomeration, take the Ugledar fortified area (including Marinka), as well as Avdievka.
By pushing the enemy to Krasnoarmeysk, it is possible to reduce the intensity of shelling of the city, although long-range MLRS and OTRK will be able to strike for a long time, but this is not as critical as the situation when the city can be covered with artillery fire of 122mm and 152mm caliber.
- In the first days after the start of the mass use of Hymars, serious damage was done to the headquarters and warehouses of the allied forces. Have we learned lessons?
- Obviously, in response, we use the tactics of dispersal of forces.
Plus, adjustments have been made to the work of air defense, as a result of which the effectiveness of the use of heavy MLRS by the enemy has slightly decreased, although they still cause damage to our infrastructure and logistics. It is obvious that the RF Armed Forces are adapting to this type of enemy weapons.
- In theory, is there any conventional weapons, the hypothetical transfer of which to Ukraine could temporarily tip the balance in favor of the Ukrainians? What should we prepare for if the conflict continues until at least 2023?
- I don’t think that the Zelensky gang can count on some kind of military victory in 2022 or 2023, given the current pace and range of arms transfers by Western countries. By 2023, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be completely dependent on Western supplies, which, in turn, will depend on how the EU can get through the upcoming energy crisis with all its economic consequences. Among the weapons that can really cause problems are long-range tactical missiles (OTRK), medium and long-range air defense systems, modern armored vehicles, modern artillery systems, as well as modern aircraft.
- Special operations will soon be six months. I still believe that Russia lacks funds, primarily manpower, for the full implementation of the task of denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine. I'm not talking about UAVs and the WTO. How can the tasks of the NMD be solved, taking into account the limited forces and means attracted by the Russian Federation for the operation?
- From my point of view, the current course of the NMD shows the need for a further increase in the number of groups in the Ukrainian direction, as well as a further increase in the number of both conventional quadrocopters and army reconnaissance and strike drones in the troops.
It is necessary to further increase the production of missiles of various types in order to intensify strikes against the military infrastructure of Ukraine. The solution to these problems, in the event of a fundamental rejection of mobilization, is to attract additional volunteers, a general increase in the size of the armed forces, as well as to increase the efficiency of the military-industrial complex enterprises with an emphasis on the types of weapons most needed by the front.
As for the targets, as it was said back in March, the situation has “become Syrian”, so we will continue to see many fronts with successive limited offensive operations.