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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
About the course of the NWO. 07/31/2022
2022-08-01
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Questions and answers provided by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin:

[ColonelCassad] - The advertised attack on Kherson of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is not visible. Except for him an attempt to expand the bridgehead on the left bank of the Ingulets. What does the dynamics look like on this sector of the front?

- Positional battles continue here with periodic attempts by the Armed Forces of Ukraine to attack with small forces in the Krivoy Rog and Nikopol directions. The latest attempts ended not very well for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but they will certainly be repeated. A direct attack on Kherson from Nikolaev looks unlikely.

As a maximum, they can try to reduce the bridgehead of the RF Armed Forces on the right bank of the Dnieper.

The RF Armed Forces are accumulating forces in the Nikolaev direction, in view of which the enemy started talking about a possible offensive of the RF Armed Forces on Nikolaev.

Attacks on bridges have not yet made a fundamental change in the dynamics of hostilities.

- The positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Avdievka are being ironed by artillery and VKS for several days. Activation near Krasnogorovka, Maryinka, Sand. How to release the specified n.p. will it affect the shelling of the Donetsk-Makiyivka agglomeration, taking into account the fact that the enemy with Western supplies has expanded the geography of shelling?

- The release of these settlements will prevent the enemy from using part of the artillery systems to shell the city, but it should be borne in mind that the presence of heavy MLRS and OTRK retains the ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to shell Donetsk even from the Krasnoarmeysk region.

Nevertheless, advancement in these areas will certainly reduce the overall intensity of shelling of Donetsk and other settlements. Donetsk agglomeration.

- Channels report on the concentration of forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Bryansk and Kharkov directions (except for Kherson). What can the enemy do here, given that the activity is stopped by the artillery of the RF Armed Forces?

- In the Kharkov direction, the enemy, on the one hand, provides the defense of Kharkov, Chuguev and Zolochev and the retention of the current front line, for which reserves are needed.

On the other hand, local offensive actions may follow in order to recapture several settlements previously occupied by the RF Armed Forces. In the direction of the Bryansk region, one can expect an intensification of shelling and actions of the enemy's DRG.

If we talk about the risks of an offensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, then more likely (in addition to Kherson) are the Zaporozhye direction (Vasilyevka, Tokmak, Pologi) and Balakleya in the Izyum direction.

- According to my information, the enemy is trying to advance in the Volnovakha direction. What is he counting on?

- With its activity in this direction, the enemy is trying to improve his tactical position, as well as to divert our command from operations in the Donetsk and Artemovsk directions, forcing additional forces to be transferred here to stabilize the front.

In the current realities, a serious advance of the enemy to Volnovakha is not possible. The offensive at Ugledar showed that the price of even one occupied settlement, like the same Pavlovka, turns out to be too high with minimal tactical benefits.

- The provocations of recent days with the "castration" of the "Ukrainian prisoner", the shelling of the colony in Yelenovka by Khaimars and the death of the captured "Azov" testify to the information war from the West to a new level. What else can we expect? Attacks on the ZNPP?

- I would expect not only new attacks on infrastructure facilities in the liberated territories and on ammunition depots/fuel and lubricants, but also further intensification of terrorist activities on the territory of the Russian Federation.

This activity will receive the full and unconditional support of the West, which will support any terrorist attacks against the Russian Federation, if necessary, facilitating them.

Hence the need to consider the issue of stigmatizing our opponents as terrorists at the official level - this applies to both perpetrators,

- Is it true that Ukraine is refraining from strikes on Sevastopol, the Crimean bridge, Belgorod and Kursk because of fears of the safety of the government quarter in Kyiv?

- As we can see from today's terrorist attack in Sevastopol and the ongoing shelling of the border areas, Zelensky's gang is not particularly worried about the government quarter in Kyiv. The voiced threats of strikes against decision-making centers do not particularly impress the Zelensky gang, much less impress its sponsors. Therefore, in my subjective opinion, more targeted and demonstrative strikes are needed on the centers of the Nazi regime in Ukraine, ranging from regional regional state administrations to the buildings of the SBU and GUR MOU in Kyiv and other cities - in fact, they are no different from the regional offices of ISIS in Syria and Iraq in 2014-2018 From my point of view, these are now legitimate military targets.

- How can the escalation of the situation in Taiwan affect the fighting in Ukraine?

- In the event of a hypothetical outbreak of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait, this will obviously affect the volume of arms supplies to Ukraine, since the United States will, in fact, be forced to fight on two fronts. Plus, the economic tsunami after the start of the war in Taiwan will hit Europe very hard, which threatens it with even more terrible consequences than the rejection of Russian gas.

Therefore, from the point of view of the operation in Ukraine, the aggravation of the crisis around Taiwan is objectively beneficial for the Russian Federation, since it diverts part of the enemy’s forces to another theater of operations.

- What will the mobilization of women give the Kyiv regime? When will the mobilization famine begin in Kyiv?

- It will give some more cannon fodder.

With the continuation of hostilities at the current intensity of manpower, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will have enough to compensate for the large losses for many more months to come, with a general decrease in the quality of personnel. The mobilized women will allow the release of men for the front.

The war strategy to the last Ukrainian assumes that everything that is possible will be raked to the front without a trace. Victims for the organizers of this conveyor are not fundamental. This is a consumable item.

- Why are we not working on the combat control centers and key figures of the enemy's military leadership?

- So far, the most high-profile strikes of this kind are the strike on the headquarters of the Sever OTG and the strike on the command of the Ukrainian Air Force in Vinnitsa.

From my point of view, such strikes are desirable and necessary much more often.

- Will there be any result from the agreements with Iran in terms of deliveries of strike UAVs to Russia?

- I think it's very likely. Deliveries, most likely, will be legalized through the organization of a joint production of drones in Russia.

- According to the military, the logistics of the warring factions, to put it mildly, leaves nothing to be desired. Will the situation in this regard change in almost six months with the beginning of the SVO, and what needs to be changed first of all?

- The situation has improved somewhat compared to the first months, but in matters of supply there are still a lot of problems that help to partially close civilian humanitarian organizations.

There is still a lot of work to be done to increase the systemic state accumulation of funds, increase the efficiency of procurement of the necessary and the speed of delivery of the necessary to the troops. The society here is ready to fully help the state - the main problems are seen in the sluggishness of various elements of the bureaucratic machine and the unpreparedness of logistics structures to conduct combat operations in such a vast theater of operations, which requires a more complex and extensive logistics system than, say, in Syria, not to mention the general volumes needed.

This is an objective problem and it is being solved, albeit not as quickly as I or you would like.

Posted by:badanov

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