Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin.
Please note that Rozhin only recent came from a Russian ministry of defense briefing conference for bloggers in Moskva. This all is straight from them.
[ColonelCassad] Regarding the questions about the prospects for more or less large-scale offensives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the summer of 2022.
Given the current trends, the Armed Forces of Ukraine seem to have two realistic options.
1. Krivoy Rog-Nikopol direction. The task is to squeeze out a piece of the bridgehead of the RF Armed Forces on the right bank
(west bank of the Dnepr River)
, remove the threat to Krivoy Rog and Nikopol, and push the RF Armed Forces directly to Kherson. Of course, the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not have the strength to storm, just as the attack on Kherson from Nikolaev does not promise success. But you can already try to sell the reduction of the foothold on the right bank as a victory.
2. Zaporozhye direction. They may try to take Vasilievka, advance to the Pologi and, with a successful development of events, to Tokmak.
Relying on Zaporozhye, the accumulation of forces can be carried out on the Orekhov-Gulyaipole front. Such an offensive would show a willingness to challenge the claims of the Russian Federation for control of the Zaporozhye region.
3. Local counterattacks are possible in the Kharkov, Izyum or Donetsk directions, but the Armed Forces of Ukraine can hardly count on significant successes there due to the serious superiority of the RF Armed Forces in artillery and aviation.
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation may benefit from such counter-offensives if they are detected in a timely manner, since in this case it is possible to inflict serious losses in people and equipment on the most combat-ready units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a short time.
The main difficulties for any counter-offensive attempts by the Armed Forces of Ukraine are that most of the aid from the West and the available units are sent to the Donbass to hold the front, which makes it difficult to accumulate reserves that could be used for counterattacks. However, work is underway in this direction, and the stated dates - the second half of July - August, are quite realistic, so you should not underestimate the readiness of the enemy for such actions, especially since, for political reasons, the United States needs at least some kind of military victory before the midterm elections this fall. of the year.
The lack of victories will have consequences not only and not so much for the Zelensky gang, but also for the Biden administration, which will be criticized, including for the lack of effectiveness of military support for the Zelensky gang, and this is already a domestic political factor. Therefore, there will certainly be a Ukrainian offensive in the summer, regardless of whether the Armed Forces of Ukraine are ready for it or not. Therefore, reconnaissance plays an important role, which should uncover preparations for such an offensive in advance and provide the necessary time to stop such enemy efforts.