Operational situation at the front.
It is characterized by the final completion of the Second ("concrete") stage of the so-called. NWO. The offensive of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the LDNR (who are completely subordinate to the command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, if someone has not yet understood this) in the Donbass has completely fizzled out.
Apparently, our troops have reached the limit of their offensive capabilities and now the maximum that can be expected is that they will be able to "torment" the industrial zone of Severodonetsk and the remnants of the bridgehead of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the Seversky Donets in this area.
There was an operational pause in the remaining areas in active hostilities.
During the battle, which lasted almost two months, both sides suffered huge (in relation to the total number of manpower and equipment involved) losses. In terms of manpower, the Ukrainians lost noticeably more, but they are able to quickly make up for the losses, and even being "on a string" from defeat, they did not use their main strategic reserves here, firmly adhering to the defensive tactics chosen in this operation.
In general, if we evaluate the past operation from a military-theoretical point of view, then it is incorrect to talk about "victory" on both sides:
- Russian troops failed to achieve the set strategic goals, or even to get much closer to them (the complete liberation of Donbass is almost as far away as in early May). At the same time, they managed to liberate a number of important territories and large settlements (Popasnaya, Krasny Liman, Severodonetsk), push the Armed Forces of Ukraine behind the Seversky Donets and defeat a number of units and formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine almost "to the ground".
- the Ukrainian command, in general, managed to solve its main task - to stay in the area of ​​Donetsk and Gorlovka, prevent the defeat of the main forces of its Donetsk group and gain time to create new reserves. At the same time, this result was worth heavy losses and a drop in the morale of part of the troops.
In general, therefore, the result of the May-June battle in the Donbass can be called a "draw". However, in general, the scales (in my subjective opinion) leaned slightly towards Kyiv. Why? - The answer is elementary: the very gain of time.
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation failed to defeat the Armed Forces of Ukraine, even partially "on the last homemade pies." "Pies" are almost completely "eaten up" and need to be re-formed and large replenishments to restore combat capability.
This, of course, does not mean that the Russian General Staff no longer has reserves at its disposal. There are reserves - they have been prepared "urgently" since April or early May. New units and formations are being knocked together - moreover, their replenishment (according to the idiotic-ostentatious desire "a la Hitler in 1944" - to have "as many units and formations on paper as possible") is carried out due to the lack of replenishment for those already at war and carrying large loss of shelled military units. The result is that "completely raw" units will again fall to the front, mixed with those withdrawn and replenished after the "first-stage run to the border."
However, the picture of the Ukrainians is approximately the same: many new units from recruits + some ahead of time replenished personnel who have avoided the "Donetsk meat grinder".
How long the operational pause will last and when the summer battle for the initiative will begin (from a great mind, everything was "announced" by the same R. Kadyrov as a "rapid and effective stage") - I do not know.
Terms can be from a week to a month and a half. Hardly any longer. It is unlikely that our military will be able to delay until autumn with the start of a new offensive operation, enduring continuously growing attacks on Donetsk and the territory of the Russian Federation itself. Or rather, it is unlikely that the political leadership will tolerate such restraint. Similarly, the Armed Forces of Ukraine - after heavy losses at the front, their military-political leadership urgently needs a major (or at least looking like such) military success.
I still assume that the battle may have a "counter-multidirectional character." That is, Russian troops can attack in one region, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine - in another. Moreover, both sides will try to "catch" the enemy on a successful defense in combination with counterattacks. The Donetsk front is likely to become "quiet" for some time (which does not at all mean an end to terrorist shelling by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and fighting of local significance). I cautiously assume the main battles in the area of ​​​​Kherson and Kharkov. At least, it is in the Kherson direction behind the front that a fairly large strike force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is concentrated.
To what extent my predictions will come true - time will tell. It is difficult for me to claim high accuracy in the field of "event / time of event" without having ANY information from headquarters military sources and drawing conclusions based on a very rare "mosaic" and my own thoughts.