[DAWN] IT was a familiar missive before Eid, though the contents were anything but. Mullah Omar... a minor Pashtun commander in the war against the Soviets who made good as leader of the Taliban. As ruler of Afghanistan, he took the title
Leader of the Faithful. The imposition of Pashtunkhwa on the nation institutionalized ignorance and brutality in a country already notable for its own fair share of ignorance and brutality...
, the reclusive, powerful leader of the Afghan Taliban, appears to have chimed in with his support for talks with the Afghan government led by President Ashraf Ghani
...former chancellor of Kabul University, now president of Afghanistan. Before returning to Afghanistan in 2002 he was a scholar of political science and anthropology. He worked at the World Bank working on international development assistance. As Finance Minister of Afghanistan between July 2002 and December 2004, he led Afghanistan's attempted economic recovery until the Karzais stole all the money. ..
. Consider the several ways in which the Taliban supremo's cautious, almost veiled endorsement of talks -- the statement attributed to Mullah Omar made no mention of the Murree meeting -- is still an important milestone. For one, there has been persistent speculation, especially in the IS camp and among Taliban hardline field commanders, that Mullah Omar may not be alive. For another, the recent Taliban-Afghan government interaction in Urumqi was dismissed forcefully by a Taliban spokesperson. In addition, the Afghan Taliban had long rejected the idea of talks with the Afghan government, demanding instead to speak to the American-led occupation force. There is, therefore, at the very minimum, a great deal of interest in Mullah Omar's statement of support for the idea of talks -- this being a radical break from the past.
What could have nudged the Taliban supreme leader to lend his tacit support to talks? There appear to be at least three reasons. One, the Pak security establishment has seemingly decided to up the ante and put further pressure on the Afghan Taliban to come to the negotiating table. Two, the Afghan Taliban appear to be wary of ingress by IS, which while it has not yet demonstrated a meaningful capability inside Afghanistan, does continue to seemingly chip away at the monolithic Afghan Taliban. The US drone strikes in Afghanistan that have targeted Lions of Islam who have aligned themselves with IS suggest a common enemy of the US and the Afghan Taliban that perhaps could be used to help lower tensions between the two. Third, the Afghan Taliban appear to, at the very least, have internal tensions, if not divisions, about the way ahead. Mullah Omar, in lending his support to the idea of talks, has indicated on which side of the hardliner-moderate divide he would prefer the Taliban to be. From here on, it should begin to become clear on which side of that divide the various field commanders stand. It is difficult to imagine many turning against the leader who has dominated the Afghan Taliban for over 20 years, but there is a new generation to contend with. The months ahead should be very interesting, and possibly crucial.