Russian military operations in Crimea have increased the prestige of serving in the Armed Forces, which has been a welcome boost to MoscowÂ’s on-going efforts to recruit larger numbers of contract personnel. This drive to strengthen military manpower is accompanied by considerations of the technological needs of re-equipping and modernizing the force structures. Thus, due to inherent problems within the Russian defense industry, compounded by existing international sanctions and the prospect of more to follow, the Kremlin is being compelled to find new ways to support military modernization; but it is not proving easy to reconcile such contradictions (http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/05/18_a_6038377.shtml).
While the challenge of instituting a new branch of service based on technically proficient troops has been shelved, this pales in comparison with the longer-term tasks of rearming the Russian military. Faced with a sanctions regime already targeting the high-technology sector, the Kremlin is clearly concerned about such problems. On May 14, President Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting on the issue of defense procurement and adopted a grim line. He noted, “We have new circumstances to address now—the need to replace imports. I asked the government two or three weeks ago to have ready for today an overall analysis of everything related to this area and to calculate the additional funds needed and the timeframe in which we can resolve these new tasks” (kremlin.ru, May 14).
Burenok explains that his Academy conducted its own threat assessment. He refers to “relentless” efforts by the West to increase its influence in the world and in close proximity to Russia’s borders. Burenok then detailed the main threats to Russia’s security as follows:
• The creation of a full-fledged United States ballistic missile defense system and the basic elements of missile defense in China;
• Adoption by the US military of hypersonic cruise missiles by 2025;
• The creation of NATO high-tech kinetic weapons, laser systems, precision board control means of destruction, combined weapons guidance systems, precision strap down inertial navigation systems, new explosives, etc.;
• Intensive development in the advanced countries of space technology, including on the basis of mini- and nano-satellites of various functions (combat, reconnaissance, electronic warfare);
• Expanding the use of information warfare and cyber operations against the Russian Federation;
• Development and implementation of sixth-generation warfare technologies, including technical solutions based on nano-technology (technology of alternative energy sources, etc.), biotechnology (chemical and information technology, robotics, genetic engineering methods, etc.), information and cognitive technologies (technologies related to “biological element base” solutions and weakly formalized creative tasks);
• Creation and actual replacement of traditional weapons systems and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for various purposes, terrestrial and marine robotic systems developed on the basis of fundamentally new technologies, autonomous energy sources, artificial intelligence, and the ability to independently perform combat tasks in any environment.
Burenok is in no doubt about the identity of Russia’s “hypothetical opponent” behind almost all of these threats: the United States. However, he admits that Russia lacks the capacity to develop forces and equip them to respond in parity. Therefore, he reiterates the idea that Moscow develop asymmetric responses (http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/20234). Burenok understands that the formation of an “innovative army” in Russia is no easy task, and he admits the modernization will be arduous. Nonetheless, he is clear about the basis of innovation strategy rooted in equipping the Armed Forces with high-tech weaponry and “a new generation of weapons” based on “new physical principles,” perfecting the intelligence system under a single command, establishing automated command and control, and building a force to combat an adversary that uses non-contact and information warfare. Indeed, the identification of the US as the potential enemy, coupled with the post–Crimean annexation sanctions, may serve as stimuli to promote internal military transformation.