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| The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power |
| 2008-08-13 |
| By George Friedman The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This, as we have argued, has opened a window of opportunity for the Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power. The balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did that Aug. 8. Let’s begin simply by reviewing the last few days. On the night of Thursday, Aug. 7, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia that has functioned as an independent entity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The forces drove on to the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border. Georgian forces got bogged down while trying to take the city. In spite of heavy fighting, they never fully secured the city, nor the rest of South Ossetia. On the morning of Aug. 8, Russian forces entered South Ossetia, using armored and motorized infantry forces along with air power. South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia, and Russia acted to prevent the region’s absorption by Georgia. Given the speed with which the Russians responded — within hours of the Georgian attack — the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, Aug. 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia. On Monday, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper, attacking on two axes. One was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian city of Gori. The other drive was from Abkhazia, another secessionist region of Georgia aligned with the Russians. This drive was designed to cut the road between the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and its ports. By this point, the Russians had bombed the military airfields at Marneuli and Vaziani and appeared to have disabled radars at the international airport in Tbilisi. These moves brought Russian forces to within 40 miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and resupply of Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to undertake it. In this simple chronicle, there is something quite mysterious: Why did the Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had been a great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian villages for the previous three nights, but while possibly more intense than usual, artillery exchanges were routine. The Georgians might not have fought well, but they committed fairly substantial forces that must have taken at the very least several days to deploy and supply. Georgia’s move was deliberate. The United States is Georgia’s closest ally. It maintained about 130 military advisers in Georgia, along with civilian advisers, contractors involved in all aspects of the Georgian government and people doing business in Georgia. It is inconceivable that the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to forward positions. The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could the United States not be aware of the Russians? Indeed, given the posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed the possibility that the Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian invasion to justify its own counterattack? It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s intentions. The second is that the United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion. If this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region. They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United States and Europe could not respond. As for risk, they did not view the invasion as risky. Militarily, there was no counter. Economically, Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well — indeed, the Europeans need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to them. Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more than the Russians needed the Americans. Moscow’s calculus was that this was the moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for months, as we have discussed, and they struck. The Western Encirclement of Russia To understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of view, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of democracy and Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear, the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the encirclement of Russia. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union empire. That promise had already been broken in 1998 by NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — and again in the 2004 expansion, which absorbed not only the rest of the former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union. The Russians had tolerated all that, but the discussion of including Ukraine in NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national security. It would have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion — publicly stated — was that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break Russia. The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. The Russians were friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The principle of Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts — including demands by various regions for independence from Russia — might follow. The Russians publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in practical terms. Russia’s requests were ignored. From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia. Moscow had two motives, the lesser of which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more important. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical disaster. This didn’t mean that he wanted to retain the Soviet state; rather, it meant that the disintegration of the Soviet Union had created a situation in which Russian national security was threatened by Western interests. As an example, consider that during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was about 1,200 miles away from a NATO country. Today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, a NATO member. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had left Russia surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in various degrees and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and, in some cases, China. Putin did not want to re-establish the Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at least in the context of its region. Second, he had to establish that Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the United States, had U.S. support, aid and advisers and was widely seen as being under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice. By invading Georgia as Russia did (competently if not brilliantly), Putin re-established the credibility of the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their security. The Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are, the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk. The Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the United States, the Middle East is far more important than the Caucasus, and Iran is particularly important. The United States wants the Russians to participate in sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they do not want the Russians to sell weapons to Iran, particularly the highly effective S-300 air defense system. Georgia is a marginal issue to the United States; Iran is a central issue. The Russians are in a position to pose serious problems for the United States not only in Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria. Therefore, the United States has a problem — it either must reorient its strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in Iran. Even if the United States had an appetite for another war in Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in Iran — and possibly in Afghanistan (even though Moscow’s interests there are currently aligned with those of Washington). In other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are dependent upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear weapons and an economy that isn’t all too shabby at the moment. It has also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear ready to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily, that is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they have demonstrated it. The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public return to great power status. This is not something that just happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and short on resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality, but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being rectified. |
| Posted by:john frum |
| #17 Correction, Read all of my comment then. I'm not assuming Russia does not have nukes (it has considerably less of them than it used to, as do we, but only about 1/3rd of Russia's ICBM silo's and missiles are capable of firing due to the deterioration of their infrastructure and disarmament since the end of the Cold War - that's not to say that the two countries would not destroy one another however. I did say that the talk was foolish and made the statement to point out that Georgia simply isn't worth 100 million dead in the US alone and that anyone who says something as foolish as we should threaten nuclear war is simply dumber than a stump). |
| Posted by: FOTSGreg 2008-08-13 23:43 |
| #16 rjschwarz, in 1812 Napoleon took Moscow (and burned it to the ground) yet the rest somehow did not fall apart. Same is 1941, although Moscow was almost taken, most of the industry was already evacuated elsewhere. It stays "elsewhere" since then. Anyway, it's just silly to talk about the nukes (where it is all leading to?) that was my point. |
| Posted by: Correction 2008-08-13 23:35 |
| #15 Same as General Comment. |
| Posted by: Correction 2008-08-13 23:29 |
| #14 Correction, the funny thing about Russia is you take out Moscow and the rest will fall apart. |
| Posted by: rjschwarz 2008-08-13 23:28 |
| #13 Correction. Welcome to Rantburg. Any relation to "General Comment" or "McZoid"? |
| Posted by: Halliburton - Blogosphere Welcome Division 2008-08-13 23:23 |
| #12 Nice analysis by George Friedman, and reads well. |
| Posted by: Correction 2008-08-13 23:17 |
| #11 Georgia simply isn't worth a hundred million lives lost in the US alone or the complete and utter destruction of the US as a strategic power (and I believe that's what a full-on nuclear war between the US and Russia would result in - Russia a devastated wasteland and the US reduced to 3rd world status with our greatest cities, our industry, infrastructure, communications, and capabilities equally reduced). Is there a hidden assumption here? I would suggest that it is US which would be a "devastated wasteland", and Russia would merely suffer an infrastructure loss. For two reasons. First, Russia is 1.8 times larger than U.S. And second, it has more stockpiled nukes (you can check some websites for the numbers, including wiki) |
| Posted by: Correction 2008-08-13 22:55 |
| #10 Ruble crash, and someday it will dawn on the EU to create a monopsony to buy Russian energy. |
| Posted by: Halliburton - Asymmetrical Reply Division 2008-08-13 22:18 |
| #9 F: I've seen other people around the web venting and saying that we ought to do stupid crap like threatening nuclear war against Russia for this. I think we can stop well short of threatening a nuclear war and still punish Russia to the point that its presence in Georgia becomes too expensive to sustain. We could resupply the Georgians - the way the Russians resupplied the North Vietnamese and the North Koreans. We could supply American "volunteers" to help the Georgians fight the way the Russians had "volunteers" flying North Korean and North Vietnamese aircraft against our flyboys. We could take a whack at its economy by imposing unilateral economic sanctions on Russia. There's a lot of things we could do to remind the Russian public why it's a bad idea to elect someone like Putin to power, ranging from body bags without end to a ruble crash. |
| Posted by: Zhang Fei 2008-08-13 21:52 |
| #8 A big OH PULEEEEZE to most of the analysis in this article. Let's start and end with the basically undefined issues of eactly what is Russia/CCCP/Tsarist Empire's "national security"? What is their "nation" and how or when has it ever been "secure"? I suppose Brazil would be the least of Russia's worries, but the US is a close second. Kissinger is only the most recent analyst to emphasize this point, but he's neither the first nor will he be the last. "Russia has been an empire for centuires"! Correct, and empires have been going out of style since at least 1776, arguably since 1215 - you'd think Marxists, of all people, would recognize the dialectics at play, but I suppose they're stuck repeating history out of habit. That, and for all their scientific prowess they still are stuck in remedial economics class. |
| Posted by: Halliburton - Asymmetrical Reply Division 2008-08-13 21:34 |
| #7 Perhaps NATO isn't the issue. Perhaps we should suggest to the Chinese that we are going to push for Japan to change their consitution to rearm if they don't help us contain the Russians. If that doesn't work get the Japanese to change their constitution. I think the threat is better than the reality but the Russians don't want that crap going on in the East. |
| Posted by: rjschwarz 2008-08-13 21:11 |
| #6 I actually agree with your attitude on the state of European culture, which is why NATO has to end. Europeans have become like welfare queens, no longer assuming responsibiliy for their defense, but believing they are entitled to repect. The cycle of dependency must be broken. Europe will cozy up to, and cave in to, Russia whether the U.S. is there or not. Moreover, they will seek to curtail U.S. actions as part of their appeasement (as they did with our missiles in the 80's and do with our missile defenses today) and they will resent us for being there. If there were no U.S. presence in Europe, the Europeans will have no one to blame for their trouble other than those responsible (themselves). You may be right and withdrawing our troops will not fix their mental attitudes; however, it is the only hope they have, because remaining as their protectors surely will not. I also don't believe Russia will be quite as rich and powerful as you think. It has a declining population and an economy based on commodities. As they try to re-grow their empire they will begin to remember why it fell last time: 1) empires are expensive and tend to bleed the imperials and 2) your new serfs hate your guts. #2 already applies to eastern Europe and I believe it will also aplly to will also apply to western Europe if we give them the chance. |
| Posted by: DoDo 2008-08-13 17:15 |
| #5 As much as I hate to admit it, Russia sneaked through with an end-around on this one. The US simply isn't in a position to defend Georgia for its strategic foulup and it's just not worth the potential cost in American lives to attempt to do so no matter how badly that hurts. I've seen other people around the web venting and saying that we ought to do stupid crap like threatening nuclear war against Russia for this. That's extraordinarily stupid IMO not to mention shortsighted. Georgia simply isn't worth a hundred million lives lost in the US alone or the complete and utter destruction of the US as a strategic power (and I believe that's what a full-on nuclear war between the US and Russia would result in - Russia a devastated wasteland and the US reduced to 3rd world status with our greatest cities, our industry, infrastructure, communications, and capabilities equally reduced). I'm sorry, truly I am. Georgia and Saakashvili screwed the pooch and are going to be left holding the bag. We can help with humanitarian aid and reconstruction, but we've gotten hurt here strategically and have egg on our face. We need to hold Russia's feet to the fire and completely punish them for this, but it must be done in other ways - keeping them out of the G6/7/8 or whatever, making sure the value of the ruble is reduced somehow, reducing their markets for Russian investments, especially here in the US and in western Europe (if the western Europeans have the guts), and anywhere else (especially Cuba and Venezuela) they try to raise their heads. If a new Cold War is the result, well, we won the last one and there are a whole lot of other ways we can hrt Russia where it really counts - in their pockets. I do hope that this does instill in people the fact that Russia is not, and never has been and probably never will be, our friend or a friend to freedom and democracy anywhere. |
| Posted by: FOTSGreg 2008-08-13 16:54 |
| #4 Agreed. They have neither the will nor the means. |
| Posted by: lotp 2008-08-13 16:31 |
| #3 Sorry, DoDo, that just doesn't fly. If the US were to pull out of NATO and redeploy US troops in Europe elsewhere (like back home which is something I'd love to see happen) it would force a strategic realignment of NATO and the eastern European countries. Russia is right on their doorstep. If the US pulled out, they'd be faced with either cozying back up to Russia or trying to face off with it in a game of military buildup and brinksmanship that, without US backing with troops, NATO and eastern Europe could not hope to counter. So, faced with the likely response of western Europe which would likely be to stand by and do nothing, the eastern European countries would have no choice IMO than to cozy back up to the Russian bear to keep it appeased. That means the dissolution of NATO and the re-emergence of the Warsaw Pact eventually and a strategic realignment of major proportions. Russia eventually regains its allied buffer countries and, rich with its oil wealth and growing ever-richer, reasserts itself on the world stage as a counterweight to US strategic objectives, policy, and power. All as a result of the US pulling out of NATO and redeploying its troops elsewhere. The chances that wetern European countries would actually step up to the plate, increase defense spending and actually stand up to Russia in defense of eastern Europe is, IMO, virtually nil. |
| Posted by: FOTSGreg 2008-08-13 16:28 |
| #2 The counter move against Russia should be the U.S. pulling out of NATO. As long as the Europeans look to the U.S. as the counterweight to Russia they will continue to neglect their own military capabilities. Furthermore, the U.S. will have forces tied down in Europe. If the Europeans are forced to provide for their own defense then they will upgrade their continental forces. The U.S. can focus it's efforts in Central Asia. Russia is not the Soviet Union and they do not have the eastern bloc. Poland, East Germany, Hungary, etc., have all switched sides. A Euro/Russian war would be no contest if the the Europeans were serious about their own defense. |
| Posted by: DoDo 2008-08-13 12:28 |
| #1 Russia is going to back Iran no matter what. They are already building them a goddamned heavy water reactor that will produce plutonium. What's a lousy S-300 defense system going the do to change the balance of power? There must be a counter move against russia or they will keep advancing. |
| Posted by: Pancho Angomoger4770 2008-08-13 09:40 |