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| New Iraq War Study Faults Both Bushes |
| 2008-06-30 |
| A nearly 700-page study released Sunday by the Army found that U.S. commanders prematurely believed their goals in Iraq had been reached and did not send enough troops to handle the occupation. President George W. Bush's statement on May 1, 2003, that major combat operations were over reinforced that view, the study said. Hundreds of commanders and other soldiers and officials were interviewed for the report released Sunday. The Army ordered the study to review what happened in the 18 months after the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime. A report on the invasion was released earlier. It was written by Donald P. Wright and Col. Timothy R. Reese of the Contemporary Operations Study Team at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., who said that planners who requested more troops were ignored and that commanders in Baghdad were replaced without enough of a transition and lacked enough staff. Gen. William S. Wallace, commanding general of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, said in a foreword that it's no surprise that a report with these conclusions was written. 'One of the great and least understood qualities of the United States Army is its culture of introspection and self-examination,' he wrote. The report said that the civilian and military planning for a post-Saddam Iraq was inadequate, and that the Army should have pushed the Joint Chiefs of Staff for better planning and preparation. Retired military leaders, members of Congress, think tanks and others have already concluded The report said that after Saddam's regime was removed from power, most commanders and units expected to transition to stability and support operations, similar to what was seen in Bosnia and Kosovo. Commanders with the mindset that victory had already been achieved believed that a post-combat Iraq would require 'only a limited commitment by the U.S. military and would be relatively peaceful and short as Iraqis quickly assumed responsibility,' the study said. Then all the Saddamites, with all the responsibility, were removed, for 'de-baathification'. 'Few commanders foresaw that full spectrum operations in Iraq would entail the simultaneous employment of offense, defense, stability, and support operations by units at all echelons of command to defeat new, vicious, and effective enemies,' it added. The report said the first Bush administration and its advisers had assumed incorrectly that the Saddam regime would collapse after the first Gulf War. This is relevant to the purpose of the study in what way? When Saddam was so quickly defeated in 2003, there was an absence of authority that led to widespread looting and violence, the report said. Soldiers initially had no plan to deal with that. The administration's decision to remove Saddam's followers entirely from power caused governmental services to collapse, 'fostering a huge unemployment problem,' it said. Planners in the Iraq headquarters said 300,000 troops would be needed for the occupation. Even before the invasion, some planners had called for 300,000 troops to be sent for the invasion and occupation. I blame Clinton. Had he not gutted the military, we might have had enough troops to send 300,000. During an April 16, 2003, visit to Baghdad, coalition commander Gen. Tommy Franks told his subordinate leaders to prepare to move most of their forces out of Iraq by September of that year, the report noted. 'In line with the prewar planning and general euphoria at the rapid crumbling of the Saddam regime, Franks continued to plan for a very limited role for U.S. ground forces in Iraq,' the report said. The report said it wasn't until July 16, 2003, that Franks' successor, Gen. John Abizaid, said coalition forces were facing a classic guerrilla insurgency. The authors said the Army had considerable experience and training for guerrilla wars but had not been in one like Iraq since 1992 in Somalia. They said former Secretary of State Colin Powell warned Franks 'that he thought too few troops were envisioned in the (invasion) plan.' Some commanders told the authors they asked about plans for making the country stable and got no answers. The 'post-war situation in Iraq was severely out of line with the suppositions made at nearly every level before the war,' the report said. Its writers said it was clear in January 2005 that the Army would remain in Iraq for some time, the writers concluded. The report covered the period from May 2003 to January 2005. Except for the reference to the first President Bush and his mistake in the 1991 war. 720-page, 103-megabyte report |
| Posted by:Bobby |
| #10 Demanded, JM. There was a very real danger that the coalition would have fractured then and there, if not worse. |
| Posted by: Pappy 2008-06-30 23:26 |
| #9 "Saddam regime would collapse after the first Gulf War" > the key to this was the destruction of the IRGC as a whole + US capture of specific Iraqi cities-towns of historical-cultural significance. REMINDER > BUSH 1's MUSLIM ALLIES in DESERT SHIELD/STORM DEMANDED OR CONDITIONED ONLY THAT SADDAM BE REMOVED FROM KUWAIT, NOT REMOVED FROM POWER. |
| Posted by: JosephMendiola 2008-06-30 22:14 |
| #8 Gen. William S. Wallace, commanding general of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command I mean damn, we should be winning all the time. Opps, wait a second. |
| Posted by: .5MT 2008-06-30 15:06 |
| #7 Not all is lost, tho, since we're developing a cadre of officers and NCOs who are adapting spec ops competancies to regular army operations -- no small accomplishment. Agreed, lotp, in fact a very major accomplishment. It's true, the men need a break, but the forces in Iraq are the state of the art in warfare at this moment. We are proud. Anyone who isn't is a bitter commie pinko queer. |
| Posted by: wxjames 2008-06-30 14:41 |
| #6 Rummy wanted to get in, depose Saddam, dissolve the Ba'athist party and get out, leaving the Iraqis with the motivation to move up the J curve quickly. He had no desire to be an occupying force and no illusions about what that would entail, IMO. Powell led the chorus saying if we broke it we owned it - but we could only fix it his way and if anyone tried to break it again we couldn't do anything to stop them other than to retreat in guilt and defeat. Clinton's generals were pissed at Rummy well before 9/11 and seemed to be stuck either in WWII or in Vietnam mode, failing to learn the appropriate lessons from either but being damned sure they didn't want Rummy to appear to succeed at any thing. Meanwhile a whole bunch of more junior and mid-grade officers slowly made alliances, learned the culture, developed information sources, brought water and power to people and made friends. Eventually there were enough friends and info sources for the Anbar Awakening and the surge to be possible. And Petraeus leveraged his considerable brainpower and leadership to make it happen. Despite the holdovers. And Congress. Meanwhile, what Rummy feared happened: we got stuck doing counterproductive things that have eroded equipment, people and morale and slowed down transformations that we need for future conflicts. Not all is lost, tho, since we're developing a cadre of officers and NCOs who are adapting spec ops competancies to regular army operations -- no small accomplishment. |
| Posted by: lotp 2008-06-30 10:22 |
| #5 This is relevant to the purpose of the study in what way? It isn't. ..who said that planners who requested more troops were ignored.. Ask the authors to name at least three American commanders of any time (1776- ), who've said - 'We don't need anymore troops. We already have enough.' The administration's decision to remove Saddam's followers entirely from power caused governmental services to collapse.. And George Bush's failure to fire all the Clintonistas in his own administration demonstrated that no good deed goes unpunished either. George's back resembles a big slice of swiss cheese from all the knife marks. "One of the great and least understood qualities of the United States Army is its culture of introspection and self-examination," Then why have you continued to ignore the first hundred years of your own history of nation building, dealing with tribes and insurgents, civil military government, and playing the political game? Anyone come across in the witting that the Army's own obsession with the 'Big War' [aka Central Europe] has created an institutional mind set that lead to the poor follow through planning? Back up through the early 90's I know the Army's Center for Army Lesson Learned charter charge it with examining ops from 1939 on. Note well the implication of WWII and conventional warfare. Any good military historian knows that in 1808 Napoleon destroyed the standing Spanish Army and then would spend the next 6 years dealing with the Spanish Ulcer. However, one Marshal of France, Suchet, would establish control and avoid the fight that would plague the others. Instead of looking at what he did [which is remarkably similar to what Petraeus would do], we have to learn all over again, because we're too modern to grasp basic human behaviors. "Few commanders foresaw that full spectrum operations in Iraq would entail the simultaneous employment of offense, defense, stability, and support operations by units at all echelons of command to defeat new, vicious, and effective enemies," Assume - makes an ASS out of U and ME. Some commanders told the authors they asked about plans for making the country stable and got no answers. The 'bingo' 'light goes on' moment when you need leaders not managers. So, whatcha doing about McMaster's promotion? Anyone perusing the report find anything castigating the peacetime promotion and selection system being used during wartime? An army exists to conduct war. It's promotion and selection system should be aligned with that one reality. Peacetime systems need to be suspended. |
| Posted by: Procopius2k 2008-06-30 09:29 |
| #4 Several points were first, that both Bush's followed the advice and conclusions of the military command, and that if there was any fault, it lied not with the Pentagon, or the civilian reconstruction apparatus created by the administration, but with the State Department, whose performance was inadequate under Colin Powell. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2008-06-30 09:20 |
| #3 From Page 38-39 (Overview)The Caldron Boils Over: April–June 2004 While the CPA and CJTF-7 were attempting to reestablish control in Fallujah, Coalition leaders found themselves facing a potentially larger threat in the form of Muqtada al-Sadr’s forces. In late March 2004 al-Sadr’s virulent rhetoric and anti-Coalition actions prompted the Coalition to take action. The CPA ordered al-Sadr’s newspaper, al-Hawza, to be shut down, and on 5 April Bremer declared al-Sadr an outlaw.24 At the same time, an Iraqi judge issued an arrest warrant for al-Sadr in connection with the murder of Shia cleric Abd Al-Majid al-Khoei on 10 April 2003. Al-Sadr reacted by ordering his forces to move against the Coalition. Beginning on 4 April violence erupted in Sadr City and in the Shia-dominated cities of An Najaf, Kufa, Al Kut, and Karbala. In Al Kut the arrest of one of Muqtada al-Sadr’s lieutenants, Mustafa al-Yacoubi, prompted the Mahdi Army to take over the local television and radio stations and overwhelm the CPA compound, the local government buildings, and the Iraqi police station. Mahdi Army militiamen launched attacks on local police stations and government buildings in other cities as well.25 In Sadr City the attacks against American units were particularly deadly. |
| Posted by: Bobby 2008-06-30 07:05 |
| #2 But Clinton did it just right because he kept the Army out of combat and wore the Air Force out with useless no-fly zones and precision bombing in the Balkans from 15,000 feet. It would be a more impressive report if the Army had displayed its culture of introspection instead of a whitewash with finger pointing. Reading this excerpt makes me think the Army wants to be only knuckle draggers who go in and break things and kill people then leave to come home. It's not hard to get inside their OODA loop because they don't have one. I know better and can smell a political hatchet job. They'd better be careful about getting into domestic politics. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2008-06-30 07:03 |
| #1 From Page 19, in the Prologue: The Coalition’s plan to oust Saddam had been an overwhelming success. Its rapidity and audacity moved military historian John Keegan to describe the offensive as “a lightning campaign” that was “unprecedented” in its speed and decisiveness. This stunning victory led President Bush, with the encouragement of his top military leaders, to announce the end to major combat operations on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln. While viewed by some as tantamount to a declaration of victory, in reality, this announcement merely marked the point where the campaign transitioned from combat to the next phase of operations focused on the reconstruction of Iraq. The US Government and Coalition military forces alike found themselves unprepared for what came next. At this point, policy formulated in Washington, DC, and in London began to shape operations far more than plans made by CENTCOM or even the actual conditions on the ground in Iraq. |
| Posted by: Bobby 2008-06-30 06:57 |