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| India-Pakistan |
| War against Pakistan |
| 2008-03-30 |
| By Cyril Almeida AS the transfer of power to the incoming coalition government nears completion, there is troubling evidence that the country’s new civilian leaders are not gearing up to face the threat that Islamic militancy poses to the state. While the incoming coalition does consider militancy a problem it appears to view the threat as a law and order issue rather than a creeping challenge to the state. Away from the politics of Islamabad, however, there is a consensus amongst security analysts that the wave of suicide bombings across the country is part of a growing challenge to the writ of the state originating from the tribal areas. The difference between the views of the politicians and analysts appears to boil down to the role of the intelligence agencies. The evolution of Afghan jihadists of the 1980s to today’s suicide bombers via the Kashmir insurgency and the Taliban regime is an open secret and few question the role of the intelligence apparatus in nurturing that progression. Today, the problem is that neither the civilian elite nor the general public is convinced that suicide bombers are no longer under the control of intelligence ‘handlers’ who have guided the activities of militants for over two decades now. This scepticism of the intelligence agencies is perhaps a paradoxical result of the state’s success in the recent past in reining in militants operating in Kashmir. It is, however, a false comparison. Crossing the Line of Control and operating in Indian-occupied Kashmir required coordination with the Pakistani military apparatus. Operating inside Pakistan does not require the state’s complicity. The militants are already here and able to blend in easily with the local population, especially the ‘Punjabi Taliban’. Containing ‘rogue’ elements within this militant structure from operating inside Pakistan is more difficult and there is mounting evidence that elements within these groups are no longer under the control of their handlers. Consider the case of perhaps the most well-known Punjabi Taliban, Qari Saifullah Akhtar. The former Amir of the Harkatul Jihad al-Islami (HJI) is indelibly linked in the public mind to Benazir Bhutto. In the mid-1990s he was a suspect in a plot to topple and kill the prime minister, while more recently he has been posthumously accused by Ms Bhutto of orchestrating the Oct 18 attack on her caravan in Karachi. Behind this public image, however, Qari and HJI are firmly linked to the intelligence apparatus. Qari’s organisation, which stretches from Kandahar to Azad Kashmir and from Chechnya to Myanmar and is linked to seminaries in Sinkiang (China), Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Karachi, has been nurtured by the intelligence apparatus since its formation in 1980. Writing in 2002, Khaled Ahmed, an expert on militant groups, stated: “[HJI] has branch offices in 40 districts and tehsils in Pakistan, including Sargodha, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan, Khanpur, Gujranwala, Gujrat, Mianwali, Bannu, Kohat, Waziristan, Dera Ismail Khan, Swabi and Peshawar.” In the wake of the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, HJI was dislodged from its base there and its militants were scattered across the globe. Some settled in Waziristan, while others sought space in the NWFP to continue training for raids in Indian-held Kashmir. The problem was that even as HJI was put into cold storage by its intelligence handlers, Al Qaeda and the Taliban had an eye on the militants of HJI and similar groups. HJI in particular had old links to Al Qaeda. In 1992, Osama bin Laden is believed to have aided the setting up of the Bangladeshi chapter of HJI under the leadership of Shaukat Osman. In 1998, HJI joined bin Laden’s International Islamic Front upon its formation. Similarly, Qari was close to Mullah Omar of the Taliban and his forces fought alongside and trained the Taliban in camps in Kotli, Kandahar, Kabul and Khost. In seeking now to take its battle against the state beyond the tribal areas, Al Qaeda has capitalised on its HJI connections and recruited the organisation’s militants, the Punjabi Taliban, to launch suicide attacks in Pakistan’s urban centres. The intelligence apparatus, at least, is aware of this development and is quietly working to capture these militants. The Asia Times has reported that a Special Investigation Authority (SIA) has been set up jointly by Pakistani and US intelligence to track down Al Qaeda’s latest recruits. The suicide attack on a house in Model Town, Lahore, is believed to be a botched attempt by the militants to strike at one of the SIA’s safe houses. Publicly, however, there is no discussion of these developments. The problem that the intelligence apparatus faces in exposing Al Qaeda’s new henchmen is straightforward: they are the same elements nurtured to fight in Kashmir and alongside the Taliban. Exposing the new threat is, to put it mildly, awkward. There is, however, one significant person who is alert to the militant threat: Gen Kayani. According to a report in The New York Times, Gen Kayani’s immediate priority as army chief is to reorient the army towards counter-terrorism. The general is, however, facing stiff resistance from senior officers who believe that the primary role of the Pakistan Army is to counter the Indian threat. The incoming government must act decisively to support Gen Kayani’s counter-terrorism efforts. Indeed, alert minds in the coalition government will see a unique dovetailing of civilian and army interests. Support the army chief in his bid to take on the militants and two benefits will be apparent. One, politicians will earn the gratitude of the army chief, a significant bonus in this time of transition. Second, if the security situation deteriorates alarmingly Gen Kayani may be reluctant to consider a takeover when the civilian government is solidly behind him. The PPP must also act cautiously in pursuing the link between Qari Saifullah and the attacks on Ms Bhutto. Given the association between the intelligence apparatus and HJI, a media trial will make many in that apparatus squeamish. While it is imperative that sympathisers of militants in intelligence circles be weeded out, this must not be at the cost of institutional demoralisation. By fighting yesterday’s battles, the incoming government could lose today’s war. It may be galling but it is a legacy of state interference. The incoming government must instead focus on altering the public perception that there is no real threat to Pakistan from Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Countering this perception is difficult but more openness would be a start. The ban on reporters in the tribal areas and other trouble spots must be lifted. The government fears that images of death and destruction caused by US and Pakistani military action will inflame public sentiment. This is true to an extent; however, blocking access to the area has simply allowed the enemy to shape public opinion. The government can take a page out of the US playbook and embed journalists with troops operating in the region. The regular attacks troops come under and the views of pacifist indigenous tribes will portray a more complex situation than that of a ‘foreign’ military killing the local population. Whatever course of action the incoming government takes will be fraught with difficulties. The key though is to act decisively. If the incoming government dithers, the coming crisis will almost make people yearn for the simpler days of a tussle between the presidency and the judiciary. |
| Posted by:john frum |