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| Africa Subsaharan |
| African Union Mission in Sudan (Amis) success story as told by Abdul Mohammed |
| 2008-01-15 |
| On January 1 the African Union Mission in Sudan (Amis) handed over to the “hybrid” United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, known as UNamid. The transfer marked the end of the African Union’s (AU) biggest, most challenging and, some say, most controversial and ambitious peace observation and peacekeeping operation. To appreciate the significance of Amis one must think back to the moment of its birth, early in 2004. The AU had been constituted barely 18 months earlier and its first full chairperson, President Alpha Omer Konare, had been in office for just six months. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which mandates intervention in cases of humanitarian crisis or grave human rights abuses, was to herald a new era in which Africa would not hesitate to act decisively to solve African problems. While the world debated what to do about Darfur and focused on humanitarian activities, Africa acted. The AU dispatched diplomats to N’djamena to negotiate a ceasefire and organised the troops necessary to monitor it. The first Amis troops arrived barely six weeks after the ceasefire was signed, surpassing the speed of any peacekeeping operation in recent years. While the UN has to follow complex, time-consuming procedures before sending peacekeepers, the AU won immediate commitments of troops from Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa. AU troops walked into a difficult situation. The N’djamena ceasefire was violated by both parties from day one and the agreement itself did not contain essential provisions, such as maps of the parties’ positions, vitally important for effective monitoring of the ceasefire. Nonetheless, in the first months of the Amis deployment, morale and energy were high and its influence was appreciable. The first Amis force leadership was vigorous and creative, constantly bending the rules to warn the warring parties against military actions and flying across Darfur at a moment’s notice to show that the AU meant business. Within a few months the Amis mandate was revised to allow its troops to protect civilians -- but only if, during the course of their regular monitoring activities, they encountered civilians under immediate threat. The mandate was still much too restrictive. Other problems surfaced too. Amis lacked sufficient translators. It lacked sufficient civil affairs officers and sufficient political liaison officers. It was short of equipment and increasingly short of funds and the troops often didn’t get paid on time. Darfur in 2004 was the world’s toughest peacekeeping assignment because it amounted to keeping the peace in the middle of a continuing war. Thrown on to the front line of this challenge, African soldiers responded with bravery and steadfastness. They operated in conditions of danger and lived in conditions of hardship. In the early months the level of atrocities in Darfur dropped and the humanitarian operations were ramped up. By late 2005 Amis faced mounting problems and came under frequent attacks. The AU troops were easy game -- insufficiently armed and unable to defend themselves effectively against the highly mobile, well-armed and determined groups operating in their own terrain. Troops that could not defend themselves were not able to protect the civilian population of Darfur. The small but effective activities undertaken by Amis in its early months, such as conducting patrols to protect women gathering firewood, were overshadowed by a general deterioration in the mission’s capacity. Balance of this kak at the linkie. |
| Posted by:Besoeker |