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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| IBD editorial: Underestimating Tehran And Moscow |
| 2007-12-30 |
| Axis Of Evil: If Iran has suspended its nuclear weapons program, what are the Russians shipping advanced air defense systems to protect? The National Intelligence Estimate didn't predict the Cuban missile crisis, either. Earlier this month, in a move oddly hailed by the Bush administration, Russia announced that it had delivered the first of 80 tons of enriched uranium to fuel the soon-to-be-completed nuclear reactor at the Iranian port city of Bushehr. Iran also announced it was building a second, 360-megawatt nuclear plant. Putting the best light on the Russian sale, President Bush made the point that if the Iranians are buying enriched uranium from Russia, they don't need to enrich it themselves. But the fact that they are doing both should raise red flags, particularly with respect to the recent National Intelligence estimate that said Tehran had shut down its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Another red flag should be raised by a statement Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najar read on state radio last Wednesday. Though Moscow has since denied it, Najar said Tehran had contracted for the purchase of Russia's state-of-the-art S-300 air defense system. The S-300 is a much more powerful and versatile weapon than the Tor-M1 missile systems that Moscow supplied earlier this year and which are capable of hitting airborne targets at altitudes up to 20,000 feet. The S-300 is capable of downing aircraft, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles at a distance up to 95 miles and at altitudes up to 90,000 feet. Russia completed delivery of 29 mobile Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) short-range surface-to-air missiles in January, part of an arms deal worth $700 million. The Tor-M1 is part of a nationwide air defense system clearly designed to prevent a repeat of Israel's 1981 strike against Iraq's French-built Osirak reactor. That's an awful lot of firepower to protect a peaceful nuclear power program. The Bushehr deal supposedly has safeguards: Iran would return spent fuel rods to Russia, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has surveillance cameras at various Iranian nuclear facilities. But as noted by Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center who served under Bush 41, the deal brings Tehran frighteningly close to a nuclear warhead. "At any time while it is loading the fuel," he told the Washington Times, "Tehran could seize it and have enough uranium to fuel its centrifuges at Natanz to make up to 150 crude nuclear weapons." A year after Bushehr is brought on line, a third of its fuel in the form of near-weapons-grade plutonium is scheduled to be removed from the reactor — enough to make 20 nukes. For a single bomb, Iran would simply have to divert just 5% of the spent fuel. Along with its continued large purchases of Russian air defense systems, Iran continues with a robust missile program that is probably not meant to put an ayatollah on the moon. While everyone made nice concerning Middle East peace at the recent Annapolis conference, Iran tested a new missile, the Ashoura. The Ashoura uses solid fuel, meaning it has an easier and quicker launch sequence that is harder to detect. Its 2,000-kilometer range is capable of reaching Israel, U.S. bases in the Middle East and eastern Europe. Oddly enough, that's where we plan to deploy 10 missile defense interceptors and a tracking radar — in Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively — over strenuous Russian objections. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted in a Washington Post op-ed, the NIE focused narrowly on the building of warheads, perhaps the easiest and shortest part of developing a nuclear capability. Clearly Tehran has continued with the other two parts: production and acquisition of fissile material and development of missile delivery systems. National Intelligence Estimates have been wrong before. On Sept. 19, 1962, a NIE reassured us that while it would give the Soviets a military advantage, "the establishment of Soviet medium- and intermediate-range missiles in Cuba . . . would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it." Let's not underestimate either Moscow's intentions or Iran's. |
| Posted by:Steve White |
| #1 Since the assassination of Czar Alexander II, history has shown the most accurate assessments of Russian intent are those framed in the light of worst case scenarios. Iranian intent is much more obvious. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2007-12-30 02:23 |