 | See that silver lining? That won't do, we need a black cloud. |
By Colin Kahl, Shawn Brimley
Backing Sunni groups is reaping big gains on the ground in Iraq, but it may be unleashing forces the U.S. military cannot control.
When the two most powerful Americans in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, testify before Congress next week, expect a lot of debate over whether Iraq has met Congress’s benchmarks for success. But don’t be fooled. The most important improvements in Iraq have little to do with the U.S. troop surge and even less to do with the central government. In Anbar province, once the focal point of Sunni rebellion, tribal and insurgent leaders are cooperating with U.S. forces. This so-called “Anbar Awakening” has resulted in a dramatic reduction in attacks and has raised the prospect that large numbers of U.S. troops may be able to leave the province in the near term. But although it’s true that backing Sunni groups is reaping big gains, the success of that strategy has little to do with the surge and, more importantly, if poorly managed may unleash forces that undermine the ultimate goal in Iraq.
| Poor Iraq, it's doomed, just as it was in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 ... |
It is fast becoming conventional wisdom, even among leading Democrats, that the surge is helping bring large numbers of Sunni sheikhs and former insurgents into the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq.
| Of course not, it would be better if they were still shootin' at us ... |
But this grassroots progress is not the result of extra troops. Instead, it is the result of Sunni outrage over atrocities committed by al Qaeda in tribal areas—grievances that predate the surge.
| We don't have to take credit for turning the Sunnis, we just have to use it intelligently. |
Sunni groups also want to reverse their current marginalization and position themselves vis-Ã -vis their Shiite counterparts, and Iran, in the event of a U.S. withdrawal. It is enemy-of-my-enemy logic, not a change of heart or U.S. troop increases, that is driving Sunni cooperation.
| The smart people driving policy know this, and they don't bother with Newsweek ... |
Nevertheless, the United States is now applying the Anbar model in Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Salah al-Din, and elsewhere across the country. The hope is apparently that local cease-fires and new “auxiliary” security forces charged with going after terrorists and sectarian death squads will produce political reconciliation from the bottom up, even as national efforts from the top down have stalled. Or, as U.S. President George W. Bush recently put it, “As reconciliation occurs in local communities across Iraq, it will help create conditions for reconciliation in Baghdad.”
| That's the plan, and one that has worked in most successful counter-insurgency plans. The amazing part isn't that this is working, the amazing part is the stupidity we displayed in 2005 and early 2006 thinking that 'search and destroy' would work. Never has, never will. 'Clear and hold' worked in Malaya, Kenya, Algeria and Vietnam even when the politicians failed. |
Any opportunity for improved security in Iraq should of course be seized.
Engaging Sunnis provides one possible bridge to a substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces. But this strategy also comes with risks. U.S. cooperation with Sunni groups is already fueling Shiite fears in ways that may compromise the overall reconciliation effort. Thanks to a long history of repression under Saddam Hussein and an endless series of large-scale bombings by Sunni insurgents since 2003, Iraq’s Shiites are a majority with a minority complex. They blame the Sunnis for Iraq’s ongoing violence and fear a return to Sunni tyranny despite their demographic dominance. And a troubling number of them downplay sectarian murder by Shiite militias as “self-defense.”
| Which we can use. We tell the Sunnis: 'behave and work with us or we'll let the Shi'a have at you'. We tell the Shi'a: 'behave and work with us or the Sunnis will slip out of control and back to the old ways'. We tell the Kurds: 'behave and work with us or the others will come at you again'. |
When the United States courts Sunni militants, this fear and hyperbole only becomes magnified. Even if Shiite fears are misplaced, perception in Iraq is reality. By exacerbating Shiite anxieties, the U.S.-Sunni lovefest jeopardizes the United StatesÂ’ ability to get Shiite politicians to take steps toward political reconciliation.
| Which is why we're implementing a magic word: 'balance'. We're working with all sides, and we're making it clear to the moderate Shi'a the advantages of going along with us. Seems to be working, as the middle south of the country, heavily Shi'a, is increasingly quiet. |
It is also conceivable that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki will judge U.S. aid to Sunni militias so intolerable that he demands a U.S. departure and turns to Iran or Syria for patronage.
| In which case he'll be the ex-prime minister in about five minutes. One of the advantages of being the 'Great Satan' is that every so often you can act like one. |
And this is to say nothing of another danger: Sunni blowback. The U.S. militaryÂ’s desperate effort to destroy al Qaeda in Iraq also empowers Sunni groups that may one day further escalate the civil war, topple the current government, or turn their guns against the United States. TodayÂ’s saviors could very easily become tomorrowÂ’s enemy.
| The authors fail to notice one condition for the Sunni tribes to get our help: biometrics. Every single new Sunni soldier, police officer, auxiliary officer and gun-boy is fingerprinted, photographed and genotyped. Who do you think has full, complete control of that database? |
Any successful strategy in Iraq must ensure that the sum of local initiatives will add up to a stable and lasting peace. Pulling this off will be tough.
| If it were easy we'd be done already. |
Efforts to build up local Sunni militias must be calibrated so that tribal leaders are strong enough to feel secure and fight al Qaeda, but weak enough to ensure they cannot topple the central government.
| Hence our effort with biometrics, and that we're giving Sunni tribal auxiliaries rifles but not howitzers. |
Similar caution should be exercised when applying the Anbar model in mixed Sunni-Shiite areas or within stranded islands of Sunni minority populations, including several neighborhoods in Baghdad.
| The authors miss how important tribal affiliations are even in the urban areas. If the chiefs go along, their members in Baghdad will cooperate. |
Nonsectarian divisions of the Iraqi Army, rather than local Sunni militias, should police these areas. And the number of embedded American advisors mentoring Sunni forces and monitoring human rights abuses must increase.
| So we need more troops? And for a longer time period? |
Money will be another key factor to any successful strategy. Currently, most payments to Sunni groups come from the U.S. military. ThatÂ’s a mistake. Arrangements to pay Sunnis through IraqÂ’s central government are a vital next step to assuaging Shiite fears and deterring Sunni troublemaking.
| Except that the central government couldn't buy an egg from a henhouse. That's been one of their major problems. We'll be the paymaster for now, thanks, with the ability to control when and to whom the money is disbursed. |
Reconciliation in Iraq will remain a distant star well into the foreseeable future. In the meantime, progress toward that goal requires seizing the enormous opportunity presented by engaging Sunnis, while navigating the danger this very strategy poses. How this delicate balancing act will be achieved is the central question that should be posited to Petraeus and Crocker. And their answer is the true benchmark against which the current U.S. strategy in Iraq should be measured.
Colin Kahl is assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University.
Shawn Brimley is the Bacevich fellow at the Center for a New American Security. |