For those who analyze the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, the events of the last year have been remarkably revealing. The drive towards consolidation of power and influence by predominant insurgent organizations has created unprecedented internal friction and has demonstrated—quite vividly at times—that the Sunni militants at war with the U.S. and Iraqi governments are far from a monolithic threat. Indeed, these groups often are markedly distinct from each other—structurally, ideologically, and politically. Under public pressure from fellow Sunni insurgents, Al-Qaida’s network in Iraq has been forced into constantly attempting to justify and defend its use of suicide bombings and foreign fighters. The growing backlash against Al-Qaida’s network in Iraq represents the first real crack within the Sunni insurgency, and is likely the best available opportunity to leverage homegrown Iraqi Sunni nationalism against the countervailing forces of transnational Salafi jihadists. Yet, at least as of now, it is still not clear if the U.S. and Iraqi governments fully understand this opportunity, nor if they are doing their utmost to take advantage of it. To successfully end the insurgency in Iraq, the U.S. must reach an understanding with not only tribal elements, but local Sunni political and religious forces as well.It should be understated that while there is currently strong animosity between Al-Qaida and the IAI, they still share enough in common that—albeit under limited circumstances—the two groups could nonetheless reconcile in the future and even resume cooperation with each other. The IAI has taken pains to limit its criticisms to Al-Qaida’s regional franchise in Iraq and emphasize its continuing political support for Usama Bin Laden and the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. On May 14, the IAI-led Reformation and Jihad Front issued a statement paying their respects to the “martyred” military commander of the Taliban, Mullah Dadullah. Dedicating poetry in his honor, the RJF called Dadullah a “knight among knights” and “blessed Afghan lion”: “he fought well and [his life] represents a wonderful example in sacrifice and jihad.”133 A week after declaring its June truce with Al-Qaida in Iraq, the IAI issued a second statement reassuring its supporters, “the peace agreement between us and Al Qaida in Mesopotamia is still standing and effective and we are holding fast in safeguarding the blood of the mujahideen.”134 As long as Sunni insurgents in Iraq face an existential external threat, either in the form of encroachment from the U.S. or neighboring Iran, they will tend consolidate their joint efforts together with Al-Qaida. The IAI has complained bitterly about the U.S. “handing… control over the whole region to the Persian [Shiite] monster… Yes, Bush has achieved remarkable success for the Persian Iranian strategy and the area has become an easy prey for the Persians!”135 Facing an impossible choice between Iranian domination or else a distasteful partnership with Al-Qaida, even the IAI would likely feel compelled to make certain compromises for the sake of Sunni unity.
Conversely, once that external threat becomes overshadowed by the typical fanatical excesses of Al-Qaida, then the focus will gradually turn back towards internal Iraqi politics. Even the most trivial of issues can become potential fodder for heated words and sharp divisions. A former faction of the 1920 Revolution Brigades known as “Hamas in Iraq” (nominally associated with the Muslim Brotherhood) has recently attracted the ire of Al-Qaida supporters by issuing an official statement congratulating the Iraqi national soccer team in their victory in the Asian Cup in late July 2007.136 In an open letter to the American people, the IAI has emphasized the comparatively “reasonable” nature of its political demands and has insisted, “our message to the [U.S.] Congress was clear a long time ago: to pass a law requiring the withdrawal of your forces within a specific duration, making it an obligation… and hand over the country to its real people, not to Iran and its agents… The American administration has deceived its nation and has claimed that Iran is a strong country, but the truth is that [Iran]… was helped by Bush instead of weakening it.”137
Regardless of its ultimate outcome, the recent infighting between Al-Qaida and more mainstream Sunni insurgents has shed significant light on the debate over the “fictionality” of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and the extent to which the “Islamic State of Iraq” is nothing more than a “virtual organization on the Internet.” Despite harsh language and specific public warnings, both the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) and the 1920 Revolution Brigades continue to refuse to refer to Al-Qaida by its self-appointed title as the “Islamic State.” The same two groups have repeatedly shown little personal respect whatsoever for ISI “Amir al-Mumineen” Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, despite his “elite” sanctified status. The IAI’s repeated allegations about the ISI should be considered as admissions against their own natural interests and have arguably caused irreversible damage to Al-Qaida’s reputation and credibility in Iraq. Yet even the actions of Al-Qaida’s own professed allies create doubt over the legitimacy of the “Islamic State of Iraq.” Despite having ample opportunities to do so, the Ansar al-Sunnah Army continues to uneasily—and seemingly inexplicably—abstain from officially joining the ISI. In the face of this mounting evidence, one cannot help but conclude that the ISI still represents more of an aspirational political cover for Al-Qaida’s terrorist operations than a functioning reality on the ground.
Resolving the Sunni insurgency and returning peace to Iraq will require a more nuanced solution than either simply increasing levels of military forces or, conversely, an unconditional withdrawal from Iraq. Above all else, there must be an energetic effort to coopt local Sunni leaders and negotiate their participation in a thoroughly-reformed and more equitably-shared Iraqi government. As long as a majority of Sunnis continue to suspiciously regard the regime in Baghdad and its litany of security services as corrupt beyond redemption, it will be nearly impossible to convince Sunni fighters to lay down their weapons as a basic matter of self-defense. Needless to say, withdrawing from Iraq without first achieving a stable balance of power between Sunnis and Shiites will not only lead to the collapse of the current Iraqi government, but moreover, it could potentially spark a desperate and bloody sectarian war pitting Sunni insurgents against Shiite militiamen—a war in which only the ruthless fanatics from Al-Qaida would stand to gain.