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| India-Pakistan |
| Lal Masjid as logic of Islamic rejectionism |
| 2007-07-12 |
| By Khaled Ahmed Muslims all over the world withhold legitimacy from the Muslim nation-state. Muslim states respond by using the mithridatism of sharia – take a bit of poison every day for immunity from actual poisoning – only to discover that the clergy continually posits a more stringent sharia whose enforcement is not possible without theocratic rule. The Islamic state describes a familiar trajectory of rejectionism till it becomes internally secure under direct clerical rule, as in the case of Mullah Umar’s Sunni caliphate of Afghanistan and Imam Khomeini’s Shia imamate of Iran. Isolation, indoctrination, rejectionism: The madrassa and the mosque act as nurseries of Islamic rejectionism. The mosque is the place of employment of the graduate of a seminary. The seminary socially insulates its acolytes through its dars nizami syllabus, ensuring that its graduates can only be employed in a mosque. (This is at the root of the proliferation of mosques in Pakistan.) The residential madrassa is the locus of three functions: isolation, indoctrination and rejection. The burden of its message to society is an exhortation to vigilantism based on the Quranic concept of amr (encourage good) and nahi (oppose wrong). In a Muslim state, a majority of the population possesses a rejectionist mind – rejection of ‘the incompletely Islamic state’. This is not a negative trait; it is an honest expression of allegiance to the utopia of the sharia. The clerical message about the backsliding of the state targets internal non-enforcement of literalist edicts. It also attacks foreign policy whose avoidance of international isolation is interpreted as compromise of national honour. Honour-based societies such as Pakistan focus on foreign policy as a device of repossession of lost honour. In this sense, Islam becomes an instrument of re-tribalisation. Madrassa as centre of cult following: Lal Masjid encapsulates the Muslim mind. The TV channels in Pakistan have woken up to the parallels Lal Masjid has in other parts of the world, but they still deliberately ignore the cultic aspects of these comparisons. Not all the comparisons have been correctly defined. For instance, comparisons with the Chechen attacks on a school in Beslan in Russia (2004) and a Moscow theatre (2005) do not take into account the charisma of Abdul Aziz. However the reference to 1979 Makka revolt by a rebel preacher Juhaima was more to the point because of the central figure in it of Imam Mehdi pretender. Reference to the siege of Golden Temple after the Bhindranwale revolt (1984) in India is also an acceptable analogy. Why did the TV channels avoid reference to the fact that Juhaima had put up his nephew Qahtani as the promised Mehdi? One can only say that there is a reluctance to compare cultism with the Lal Masjid phenomenon. Reference was indeed made to the 300 ‘prophetic’ dream visions of Maulana Abdul Aziz in the Urdu press, but the theme was not pursued further. Was this non-reference meant to avoid comparison with religious cults in the West that manifested the same syndrome of isolation-indoctrination-rejection as the Islamabad seminary? Divine inspiration and cult figures: If Maulana Abdul Aziz had received his orders directly from Allah, and had a cult following he himself described as ready to commit suicide for him, David Koresh and his suicide squad of devotees at Waco, Texas (1993) also clashed with state troops because ‘messages from God’ did not allow surrender. His cult followers accepted suicide the same way as the cult followers of California’s Jim Jones in British Guiana (1978). The Swiss group suicide (1994) was also ordained by a divine message. The fanaticism of the male and female acolytes of Maulana Abdul Aziz would have resulted in mass suicide had he not himself abandoned them by fleeing. The Lal Masjid founder Maulana Abdullah was killed in 1998 at the height of the sectarian war unleashed by Deobandi madrassas in 1986 after the issuance of apostatisation fatwas. Abdullah was a graduate of Jamia Banuria like Maulana Masood Azhar of Jaish Muhammad whose trained terrorists are now found entrenched within Lal Masjid together with Maulana Abdur Rashid Ghazi. Ghazi echoed his father’s sectarian worldview when he told a TV channel that the government might have brought out Shia warriors against his besieged acolytes. The Aziz-Rashid duo began with a clear anti-Shia intent when they abducted a Shia lady in Islamabad after accusing her of running a brothel. Only the BBC website recorded the charge made by the lady that, while they were dragging her family out, the Lal Masjid vigilantes had referred to the Shia sect as a ‘sect of prostitutes’. The duo had climbed to the top of the already dominant position of the Deobandi seminaries in Islamabad by establishing contacts with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Musharraf and proliferation of madrassas: The madrassas in Pakistan have proliferated after 9/11 and under Musharraf. This makes clear the intent of the new religious seminary in Pakistan. In the old radical madrassas ready to face America and its allies, induction of acolytes has doubled, as was shown by admissions at Jamia Banuria in 2002. In Islamabad too, the proliferation of madrassas has taken place under Musharraf after 2001, not under General Zia after 1979. Today, there are 88 seminaries in Islamabad imparting religious education to more than 16,000 students. It is not for nothing that every second male in Islamabad keeps a jihadi beard and looks scary to foreigners. Research has revealed that the number of students of the Deobandi seminaries, including Jamia Hafsa and Jamia Faridia, doubled during the last one year. The students to these seminaries – many of them residential – have flocked from all parts of the NWFP and the tribal areas. Madrassa dominance of Islamabad: The breakdown of madrassas in Islamabad is as follows: Deobandi (5,400 students); Barelvi (3,000 students in 46 seminaries), Ahle-Hadith (200 students in two seminaries); Shia (700 students in eight seminaries) and Jamaat-e-Islami-led Rabita al-Madaris (1,500 students in 18 seminaries). According to a newspaper investigative report, ‘the present number of 10,700 seminarians in the federal capital is almost equal to the combined strength of the seminary students from Balochistan (6,374 students) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (2,835 students)’. Who has tried to change the character of Islamabad through a proliferation of extremist seminaries? One could quickly claim that President Musharraf could not have been involved in this proliferation because of his exhortations against extremism. But that would be incorrect: During the rule of General Zia (from July 1977 to August 1988), 7 new seminaries were established in the federal capital; under President Musharraf, the number went up to 14! Mithridatism will not work. The commander of the Rangers besieging the Lal Masjid madrassa had a flowing beard just like the ones sported by Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdur Rashid. Almost all the troops brought out to confront the terrorists inside Jamia Hafsa were bearded and looked more like the Taliban than Pakistan army soldiers. Pakistan is firmly set on the trajectory beyond all dreams of democracy as the panacea for collective derailments. Utopias of rejectionism: At the end of the parabola of Islamic reform is the theocratic state, ruled and secured against de-legitimisation by the clergy through punishment of dissent with death on the basis of the doctrine of fasad fil ard (turmoil on earth). But after the establishment of theocracy as the acme of state evolution, comes the international assault. The Sunni caliphate of Afghanistan was invaded under a chapter-seven UN Security Council resolution number 1373. It was found that the caliphate had endangered its Muslim neighbours before endangering the world. The same kind of international movement is developing against the imamate of Iran which also endangers its Muslim neighbours equally as it endangers the world. The seminary is the symbol of Islamic rejectionism. This rejectionism is achieved through isolation which international investigators often condone as dars nizami, thinking that insulation of the acolyte has nothing to do with violent rejection of society and state. At the subconscious level, we are all waiting for the Sunni caliphate in Pakistan. We all know what will happen after that. |
| Posted by:John Frum |
| #2 You either accept the world as it is, or you embrace the fallacious concept of making a world as you wish it would be. Eventually idealism (ignorance) will be the ultimate capital crime... |
| Posted by: M. Murcek 2007-07-12 18:57 |
| #1 The madrassas in Pakistan have proliferated after 9/11 and under Musharraf. This makes clear the intent of the new religious seminary in Pakistan. In the old radical madrassas ready to face America and its allies, induction of acolytes has doubled, as was shown by admissions at Jamia Banuria in 2002. In Islamabad too, the proliferation of madrassas has taken place under Musharraf after 2001, not under General Zia after 1979. One could quickly claim that President Musharraf could not have been involved in this proliferation because of his exhortations against extremism. But that would be incorrect: During the rule of General Zia (from July 1977 to August 1988), 7 new seminaries were established in the federal capital; under President Musharraf, the number went up to 14! |
| Posted by: John Frum 2007-07-12 12:16 |