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| India-Pakistan |
| How Pakistan settled an al-Qaeda score (maybe...) |
| 2007-05-01 |
| This is an Asia-Times article so get your salt shakers ready. That said there is lots of juicy conspiracy theory here involving Pakiwakiland, Talibunnies and AQ. Internal squabbling between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and exploited by Pakistan forced many al-Qaeda leaders to move from the tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan to Iraq in search of new headquarters from which to operate. Senior al-Qaeda member Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, 46, was one of these men - and he paid dearly for the move after being fingered by Pakistan. On Friday, the Pentagon announced that Hadi had been arrested late last year and handed over to the US CentralIntelligence Agency. Describing Hadi as "one of al-Qaeda's highest-ranking and experienced senior operatives", the Pentagon said he had been sent to the US Defense Department-run prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Pentagon did not say exactly where and when Hadi was arrested, but it is believed to have been in Iraq. Asia Times Online contacts confirm that he was exposed by Pakistani intelligence after it received news of Hadi's movements from Taliban sources close to the Pakistani establishment. Hadi, as a hardcore takfiri, [1] was seen as an enemy of Pakistan. Although the date of Hadi's departure from the Waziristan tribal areas is not known, it was about the time that several powerful Taliban field commanders, including Jalaluddin Haqqani, Mullah Dadullah and the Taliban leader himself, Don't miss this: Mullah Omar, affirmed their support for the Pakistani establishment as a "Muslim state with a Muslim army". They stressed that instead of investing energy to destabilize Pakistan, the focus should be on the jihad in Afghanistan against foreign troops. The one-legged Taliban commander of southwestern Afghanistan, Mullah Dadullah, had been sent to Waziristan with a letter from Mullah Omar early last year and he played a pivotal role in stopping the internecine strife between the Pakistani Taliban/al-Qaeda and the Pakistani armed forces. In the months after this, Mullah Dadullah and the Pakistani establishment agreed to a deal to support the Taliban in Afghanistan (see Pakistan makes a deal with the Taliban, Asia Times Online, March 1). This re-emergence of a soft corner in the Taliban's leadership for the Pakistani establishment was the beginning of the end of al-Qaeda's effective operations in Pakistan, and al-Qaeda leaders felt that it was time to move from Waziristan. Al-Qaeda adherents were not prepared to serve as foot soldiers under the command of the Taliban. They saw themselves as warriors with a much broader strategy aimed at bringing down US military might. Why Pakistan was after Hadi Pakistan's alliance in the US-led "war on terror" turned a whole generation of Arab fighters into foes. More than 700 Arab fighters were arrested by the Pakistani government after September 11, 2001, and handed over to US custody. This prompted a segment of al-Qaeda to take revenge against the administration of President General Pervez Musharraf. A special cell was established in Waziristan, Jundullah (entirely different from the Iranian Jundullah), to carry out attacks, which it did on several occasions, against Musharraf. This placed Jundullah and takfiris like Hadi clearly in the Pakistani establishment's crosshairs. In 2003, al-Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri spoke for the first time against the Pakistani establishment, calling Musharraf a "traitor" and urging Pakistanis to stand up against his rule. (For more on Hadi and his role in a conspiracy to attack Musharraf, see Pakistan and the al-Qaeda curse, ATol, October 1, 2003, and Al-Qaeda cell caught in US squeeze, June 15, 2004.) Pakistan isolates al-Qaeda By late 2003, the Pakistani military operation against al-Qaeda in South Waziristan had left the group somewhat battered, with its training camps destroyed, but at the same time this created lot of anger against the Pakistani forces. This helped al-Qaeda spread its takfiri and anti-establishment ideology among local tribes and led to the formation of the Pakistan Taliban, which by last year had formed the Islamic State of North Waziristan and the Islamic state of South Waziristan. In this context, Mullah Dadullah's arrival in South Waziristan as Mullah Omar's envoy early last year was aimed at building bridges between the Pakistani establishment and these renegade Pakistani Taliban who were becoming imbibed with takfiri ideology and who were bloodthirsty for the Pakistani armed forces. Suicide attacks were rampant on troops in the tribal areas, as well as in Pakistani cities. another troubling paragraph: Dadullah's role paved the way for the Pakistani Taliban to sit with the Pakistani establishment to negotiate a ceasefire, and Pakistani Taliban commanders such as Haji Omar and Haji Nazir talked to Islamabad. Soon, a peace deal was agreed for the two Waziristans, but on the sole condition that all militants who were at loggerheads with the Pakistani establishment would take a back seat, leaving the lead to political faces Pakistan's priorities were crystal-clear: it did not want anti-establishment elements thriving under the garb of takfiri ideology, although it had no problem with the Taliban regrouping and carrying out actions in Afghanistan. really? no problem? Leaders such as Haji Omar, Baitullah Mehsud, Sadiq Noor - all close to al-Qaeda - and other prominent commanders were put in the background and Haji Nazir became the most powerful Taliban commander in South Waziristan. Nazir, who was little known only a year ago, was the one who ordered the recent massacre of takfiri and anti-Pakistani establishment Uzbeks in South Waziristan. These developments, including the infiltration by the Pakistani establishment of the rank and file of the Taliban, rattled al-Qaeda, which realized that its ideology was no longer acceptable in Waziristan and Afghanistan, and that the only way it could stay in Afghanistan was if it agreed to fight under Taliban commanders. This was intolerable for operators such as Hadi, and dozens of them began the move to Iraq from Waziristan and Afghanistan. And Islamabad swooped on the chance when its intelligence learned of Hadi's movements and passed on the information to the US, thereby closing a powerful chapter of al-Qaeda's operations. |
| Posted by:3dc |
| #4 It is a frigging chess game. And I suspect that the US is quietly advising Perv on what pieces to move next. Ain't gonna do us shit if Perv's ISI keeps telegraphing our moves to the enemy. |
| Posted by: Zenster 2007-05-01 18:07 |
| #3 However, I'd like to point out that Perv got all kinds of shiat for making his deal with the Wazoo in the first place. However, in the long run what he and the US gets out of the deal is a return to the old status quo, but without the foreign al-Qaeda, which is a clear win for us. And there is no guarantee that once the al-Qaeda are gone, Perv isn't going to eventually squash the Taliban in the Wazoos, as well--to split them apart from the tribals. It is a frigging chess game. And I suspect that the US is quietly advising Perv on what pieces to move next. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2007-05-01 12:54 |
| #2 good catch 3dc. The constant amongst the whole lot of Pashtoon Tribals is the constant change of allegiances. |
| Posted by: RD 2007-05-01 12:24 |
| #1 This shows how close the Taliban is to the establishment!!!! Could be handy if true that Al Qaeda are dispersed but i doubt Bin Laden and his no 2 are in Iraq! |
| Posted by: Paul 2007-05-01 11:57 |