WASHINGTON — Iraq's Baath Party, once the machine of Saddam Hussein's tyrannical rule and now a key player in the country's civil war, has been divided by an internal power struggle pitting one of Hussein's top aides against a former general, U.S. and Iraqi government officials say.U.S. military and intelligence officials are still debating whether to welcome the power struggle or fear it. But they agree the outcome could strongly influence the course of the Sunni-led insurgency against Iraq's U.S.-backed government.
On one side of the power struggle is Izzat Ibrahim, the highest-ranking member of Hussein's inner circle to evade capture. The king of clubs in the Bush administration's "deck of cards" that depicted the most wanted members of Hussein's regime, Ibrahim was Hussein's chief deputy and has been viewed as a ringleader in the insurgency.
| Who can't show his face in public. |
U.S. officials learned of the infighting after a meeting in the northwestern Syrian town of Halab that military and intelligence officials believe involved Baath Party leaders. The meeting in January, shortly after Hussein's hanging, led to an apparent split in the movement. Some U.S. commanders in Iraq believe that was a welcome development. They see Ibrahim and his followers as intransigent elements of the Hussein regime who are trying to regain control of Iraq. The American commanders hope that Yunis' faction is more willing to seek peace with the country's U.S.-backed government.
Others, including U.S. intelligence officials and some Iraqi officials, are more wary, viewing the internal battle as an attempt to put a new face on a Baath movement that remains a threat. "These guys, No. 1, are very capable. They know how to lead, they know how to control, they know how to dominate, and they know how to execute a coup," said a U.S. military official, explaining why Iraq's Shiite Muslim majority remains fearful of a Baath resurgence. The official, like others, spoke on condition of anonymity when discussing intelligence assessments.
| They know how to lead? What they know is how to put a gun to someone's head and compel that person on pain of death. That's not leadership, and in turn that suggests a solution: you peel away their potential followers by making them safer to be with you than with them, you offer their potential followers a chance for a better life, and -- oh -- you kill these bastards if you possibly can. |
| There you go: if Yunis can be turned, fine (you still watch him like a hawk). That leaves you Izzy. |
| He knows the access numbers for all the secret bank accounts. |
Although accounts of the meeting in Halab vary, U.S. military and intelligence officials said partisans loyal to Yunis "hijacked" the session and expelled Ibrahim and others affiliated with him, declaring the ex-general the new party head.The U.S. military official said Ibrahim, who was not at the meeting, quickly responded by issuing a communique denouncing Yunis and declaring that he was no longer a member of the party. "Yunis orchestrated this meeting and did so without what appears to be the consent of Ibrahim," the military official said. "There was a walkout at the meeting, and clearly Ibrahim's camp and his followers, or those who thought that the meeting was going to do harm to Ibrahim and their interests, walked away from it. Hence you have the split."
The officials declined to provide details on how they learned of the meeting and its aftermath, citing the need to safeguard intelligence methods.
Those U.S. officials who see the divisions within the Baath Party as a positive development believe the split reflects a recognition by Baathists that the current Iraqi government would never reconcile with Ibrahim, given his close ties to Hussein, said a Pentagon consultant who was briefed by military intelligence officers during a recent trip to Baghdad. "It is the Baath Party's realization that the Shia-dominated Iraqi government would never make a deal with the former Saddamists, who have so much Shia blood on their hands," said the consultant.
But the U.S. military official expressed the views of others in the intelligence community and the Pentagon who are more skeptical about Yunis. These officials worry that Yunis' group could be plotting an effort by the Baath Party to regain power. "Why do the Shia have such problems with this? They don't want the Baath Party anywhere close to them because they've seen what happened in 1963, and 1968, and 1979," the official said, referring to coups orchestrated by Iraqi Baathists.
Ibrahim has headed what U.S. officials believe is the "political arm" of the Baath movement. Yunis' role is less clear. Some U.S. officials believe he has headed the party's military arm and has been an active player in the Sunni insurgency. But some Iraqi officials and insurgent spokesmen dispute that, although many of them remain wary of Yunis.
As early as February 2004, U.S. commanders put Yunis at the top of their list of 32 insurgent leaders. They offered $1 million for his capture and described him as a main organizer of guerrilla cells in Iraq.
A year later, the Treasury Department moved to block his assets, calling him a "financial facilitator and operational leader" of the Baath Party. That move was backed by other international organizations, including the European Union.
| Because he also has access to bank accounts -- perhaps he's been spreading the cash around to favored Y'urp-peons? |
Iraqi officials also are concerned about Yunis' ties to Syria. He has long been based in Syria, and Iraqis believe he operates there with the tacit approval of the Syrian government, which also influences his actions.The Iraqi government official said Ibrahim was less dependent on Syria than Yunis was because he had access to Baath Party financial assets while Yunis lacked an independent financial base.
| That counters what was said above. |
| Of course if there was a new Syrian government ... |
| A reminder of the days when Syria and Iraq didn't get along. |
More recently, supporters of Ibrahim have used Internet sites linked to Baath Party loyalists to criticize Yunis. One site noted that the meeting at which the ex-general attempted to seize power occurred around the time Hussein was executed and Maliki launched an effort to revise de-Baathification laws — an apparent attempt to link Yunis' moves to the Shiite government.