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| Zakaria: Rethinking Iraq: The Way Forward |
| 2006-10-31 |
| To avoid total defeat, the United States must reduce and redeploy its troops and nudge the Iraqis toward a deal. Here's how. Didn't know we were on the brink of total defeat. But perhaps that's the disadvantage of not having a seat at the all seeing Newsweak. Something like the close of the Korean War is, frankly, the best we can hope for in Iraq now. One could easily imagine worse outcomes—a bloodbath, political fragmentation, a tumultuous flood of refugees and a surge in global terrorist attacks. But with planning, intelligence, execution and luck, it is possible that the American intervention in Iraq could have a gray ending—one that is unsatisfying to all, but that prevents the worst scenarios from unfolding, secures some real achievements and allows the United States to regain its energies and strategic compass for its broader leadership role in the world. The outlines of the deal that needs to be made are by now obvious. Iraq would end up a loose confederation, but would divide its oil revenue so that all three regions were invested in the new nation. A broad amnesty would be granted to all those who have waged war, which means mainly the Sunni insurgents, but also members of Shia death squads. Government and state-sector jobs, the largest share of employment in Iraq, would be distributed to all three communities, which would entail a reversal of the postinvasion purges that swept up, for example, schoolteachers who happened to be members of the Baath Party. Finally, and perhaps most urgently, the Shia militias must be disbanded or, if that becomes impossible, incorporated and tamed into national institutions. What is equally obvious is that such a deal does not seem to be at hand. So what should the United States do? First of all, Washington has to make clear to the Iraqi leaders that its continued presence in the country at current troop levels is not sustainable without some significant moves on their part. Iraqi leaders must above all decide whether they want America there. Iraq's Parliament should publicly ask American troops to stay. Next, Iraqis must forge a national compact. The government needs to make swift and high-profile efforts to bring the sectarian tensions to a close and defang the militias, particularly the Mahdi Army. There is one shift that the United States itself needs to make: we must talk to Iraq's neighbors about their common interest in security and stability in Iraq. Unfortunately, there's a strong possibility that these changes will not be made in the next few months. At that point the United States should begin taking measures that lead to a much smaller, less intrusive presence in Iraq, geared to a more limited set of goals. Starting in January 2007, we should stop trying to provide basic security in Iraq's cities and villages. U.S. units should instead become a rapid-reaction force to secure certain core interests. Currently we have 144,000 troops deployed in Iraq at a cost of more than $90 billion a year. That is simply not sustainable in an open-ended way. I would propose a force structure of 60,000 men at a cost of $30 billion to $35 billion annually—a commitment that could be maintained for several years, and that would give the Iraqis time to come together, in whatever loose form they can, as a nation. The core national-security interests of the United States in Iraq are now threefold: first, to prevent Anbar province from being taken over by Qaeda-style jihadist groups that would use it as a base for global terrorism; second, to ensure that the Kurdish region retains its autonomy; third, to prevent or at least contain massive sectarian violence in Iraq, as both a humanitarian and a security issue. President Bush is fond of warning, "If we leave Iraq, they will follow us home." This makes no sense. Does the president really believe that because we're in Iraq, terrorists have forgotten that we're also in America? Here's what we really need to worry about doing: Battle Al Qaeda. In fact, the fight in places like Anbar is largely not a jihadist crusade against America, but a Sunni struggle for control of the country. The chances of Iraq's being taken over by a Qaeda-style group are nonexistent. Secure Kurdistan. Prevent a bloodbath. Draw down troops and ramp up advisers. This plan might not work. And if it does not, the United States will confront the more painful question of what to do in the midst of even greater violence and chaos. The lesson of Korea, where more than 30,000 U.S. troops are stationed to this day, is not that America should withdraw from Iraq completely. But to have any chance of lasting success, we must give up our illusions, scale back our ambitions, ensure that the worst does not happen. Then perhaps time will work for us for a change. |
| Posted by:Nimble Spemble |
#1 President Bush is fond of warning, "If we leave Iraq, they will follow us home." This makes no sense.Makes perfect sense to me, but I've forgotten to take my meds for over a week, that must be it. The chances of Iraq's being taken over by a Qaeda-style group are nonexistent.The chance of Iran taking over the Shia part of Iraq is rather high, however. It seems to have already happened. The author semi-contradicts himself when he warns about the danger of "Anbar province ... being taken over by Qaeda-style jihadist groups that would use it as a base for global terrorism" Secure KurdistanThis is so critically important, so obviously necessary that only the most incompetent strategists could ignore the need to be making these preparations now. Uh-oh... Prevent a bloodbath.Choose one and only one. A mini-bloodbath is the current situation. |
| Posted by: Slaviger Angomong7708 2006-10-31 12:02 |