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| Iraq |
| Iraq: The Facts On The Ground & The Politics |
| 2006-10-25 |
| Courtesy of John Toranto "Best of the Web There's been a lot of discussion back home about the course of the war, the righteousness of our involvement, the clarity of our execution, and what to do about the predicament in which we currently find ourselves. I just wanted to send you my firsthand account of what's happening here. First, a little bit about me: I'm stationed slightly northwest of Baghdad in a mixed Sunni/Shia area. I'm a sergeant in the U.S. Army on a human intelligence collection team. I interact with Iraqis on a daily basis and I help put together the intel picture for our area of operations. I have contacts with friends, who are also in my job, in every are of operations in the Fourth Infantry Division footprint, and through our crosstalk I'd say I have a pretty damn good idea of what's going on in and around Baghdad on a micro and intermediary level. I wrote heavily in favor of this war before I enlisted myself, and I still maintain that going into Iraq was not only the necessary thing to do, but the right thing to do as well. There have been distinct failures of policy in Iraq. The vast majority of them fall under the category "failure to adapt." Basically U.S. policies have been several steps behind the changing conditions ever since we came into the country. I believe this is (in part) due to our plainly obvious desire to extricate ourselves from Iraq. I know President Bush is preaching "stay the course," but we came over here with a goal of handing over our battlespace to the Iraqis by the end of our tour here. This breakneck pace with which we're trying to push the responsibility for governing and securing Iraq is irresponsible and suicidal. It's like throwing a brick on a house of cards and hoping it holds up. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)--a joint term referring to Iraqi army and Iraqi police--are so rife with corruption, insurgent sympathies and Shia militia members that they have zero effectiveness. Two Iraqi police brigades in Baghdad have been disbanded recently, and the general sentiment in our field is "Why stop there?" I can't tell you how many roadside bombs have been detonated against American forces within sight of ISF checkpoints. Faith in the Iraqi army is only slightly more justified than faith in the police--but even there, the problems of tribal loyalties, desertion, insufficient training, low morale and a failure to properly indoctrinate their soldiers results in a substandard, ineffective military. A lot of the problems are directly related to Arab culture, which traditionally doesn't see nepotism and graft as serious sins. Changing that is going to require a lot more than "benchmarks." In Shia areas, the militias hold the real control of the city. They have infiltrated, co-opted or intimidated into submission the local police. They are expanding their territories, restricting freedom of movement for Sunnis, forcing mass migrations, spiking ethnic tensions, not to mention the murderous checkpoints, all while U.S. forces do . . . nothing. For the first six months I was in country, sectarian violence was classified as an "Iraqi on Iraqi" crime. Division didn't want to hear about it. And, in a sense I can understand why. Because division realized that which the Iraqi people have come to realize: The American forces cannot protect them. We are too few in number and our mission is "stability and support." The problem is that there's nothing to give stability and support to. We hollowed out the Baathist regime, and we hastily set up this provisional government, thrusting political responsibility on a host of unknowns, each with his own political agenda, most funded by Iran, and we're seeing the results. In Germany after World War II, we controlled our sector with approximately 500,000 troops, directly administering the area for 10 years while we rebuilt the country and rebuilt the social and political infrastructure needed to run it. In Iraq, we've got one-third that number of troops dealing with three times the population on a much faster timetable, and we're attempting to unify three distinct ethnic groups with no national interest and at least three outside influences (Saudi Arabian Wahhabists, Iranian mullahs and Syrian Baathists) each eagerly funding various groups in an attempt to see us fail. And we are. If we continue on as is in Iraq, we will leave here (sooner or later) with a fractured state, a Rwanda-waiting-to-happen. "Stay the course" and refusing to admit that we're screwing things up is already killing a lot of people needlessly. Following through with such inane nonstrategy is going to be the death knell for hundreds of thousands of Sunnis. We need to backtrack. We need to publicly admit we're backtracking. This is the opening battle of the ideological struggle of the 21st century. We cannot afford to lose it because of political inconveniences. Reassert direct administration, put 400,000 to 500,000 American troops on the ground, disband most of the current Iraqi police and retrain and reindoctrinate the Iraqi army until it becomes a military that's fighting for a nation, not simply some sect or faction. Reassure the Iraqi people that we're going to provide them security and then follow through. Disarm the nation: Sunnis, Shias, militia groups, everyone. Issue national ID cards to everyone and control the movement of the population. If these three things are done, you can actually start the Iraqi economy again. Once people have a sense of security, they'll be able to leave their houses to go to work. Tell your American commanders that it's OK to pass up bad news--because part of the problem is that these issues are not reaching above the battalion or brigade level due to the can-do, make-it-happen culture indoctrinated into our U.S. officers. While the attitude is admirable, it also creates barriers to recognizing and dealing with on-the-ground realities. James, there's a lot more to this than I've written here. The short of it is, the situation is salvageable, but not with "stay the course" and certainly not with cut and run. However, the commitment required to save it is something I doubt the American public is willing to swallow. I just don't see the current administration with the political capital remaining in order to properly motivate and convince the American public (or the West in general) of the necessity of these actions. At the same time, failure in Iraq would be worse than a dozen Somalias, and would render us as impotent and emasculated as we were in the days after Vietnam. There is a global cultural-ideological struggle being waged, and abdication from Iraq is tantamount to concession. |
| Posted by:Captain America |
| #16 Oops, forgot my smiley, lol. ;-) |
| Posted by: .com 2006-10-25 22:48 |
| #15 You could make your number if we withdrew forces from the Blue States... |
| Posted by: .com 2006-10-25 22:47 |
| #14 Well, we do still have 70,000 troops in Germany for no appreciable reason. And 39,000 in South Korea. So that cuts the deficit of troops to 291,000 - if we take the 400,000 as the floor number. |
| Posted by: Shieldwolf 2006-10-25 22:44 |
| #13 "put 400,000 to 500,000 American troops on the ground" And just where are all these troops going to come from? Somebody have a magic wand? Anybody? |
| Posted by: FeralCat 2006-10-25 21:54 |
| #12 He starts from the preimse that preventing the creation of ethnically and religously moreorless homogenous regions should be the objective or at least a non-negotiable condition. Many would argue that the route to a stable Iraq requires ethnically/religously homogenous regions that can then take reposibility for their own internal security (ref the Kurds and in early centuries most of Europe) rather than focus on ethnic/religous conflicts, since there are not enough of the other ethnic group around to constitute a threat. And note, those who do not wish to negotiate where the borders of these regions lie (read the Sunnis) will find others impose borders on them by force (read the Kurds), precisely becuase they already have internal security and stability. |
| Posted by: phil_b 2006-10-25 21:16 |
| #11 Good points, A-Moose, but perspective cuts both ways. I suspect the sergeant knows a hellofalot more about what happening amongst the Iraqi populace and the Iraqi version of catch a thug/killer and release program gives everyone pause. The PM is owned by Tater, etc., etc., what else is there to disagree with? |
| Posted by: Captain America 2006-10-25 20:42 |
| #10 I fully disagree with the sergeant, but I understand where his perspective comes from. To explain: in a stratified organization like the military, where you are in the chain of command determines what you see. Bluntly speaking, this is why the movie "Patton" is very different in character from "Saving Private Ryan". But even if you have the perspective from the smallest combat unit all the way up to the highest theater command, you still have the problem of only seeing things from the military point of view. And while it's very important, it is not the only point of view. For example, as much as you or I (and we do) criticize the State Department, there are an s-load of State employees all over Iraq, attending endless meetings, briefing and being briefed by Iraqis, wheeling and dealing with bureaucrats on a million and one deals. They know things they military has no clue about. Yet another perspective is more like the militaries, but very different in character from the line units: the SOCOM and CIA perspectives. If you talk to them, you see the negative image of what happens during the day: Baghdad at night. Espionage, sabotage, intrigue, surveillance, assassination, treachery. The smiling politician who the military and State believe is their great ally, is instead known as a corrupt traitor, working to undermine and destroy his nation. Just a different point of view, though. Eventually he will be killed in a "terrorist" bomb blast, along with his Iranian spy handler. Then there is the point of view of private concerns, corporations and investors, all of whom have a vested interest in knowing what is going on. They too have their sources, and will pay top dollar for good information. Finally, you have the points of view of the Iraqis themselves. They have few idealists, and if anything, they are pessimists and a little paranoid. But it is wise to listen to them, because a pessimist is never disappointed; and it's very hard to sneak up on a paranoid. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2006-10-25 20:25 |
| #9 Well if you look at the media and dem whining this is the exact same playbook as Vietnam. Internal opposition that actually wants us to fail. Thank the effective infiltration of the Soviet doctrine into our culture for this. |
| Posted by: remoteman 2006-10-25 19:18 |
| #8 I hate to keep kicking the horse when he's down, but I've seen this movie before. It was called "Vietnamization" then. It failed miserably. Once we pulled out, there was a lot of D&D. It's gonna happen again. It seems beyond comprehension that we could do virtually the same thing inside a 50 year window. |
| Posted by: SpecOp35 2006-10-25 19:11 |
| #7 The US military is not capable of putting 500,000 troops anywhere, and this guy knows it. So at some level this sergeant who does intelligence is not being very intelligent. He can wish all he wants but that is not going to make it happen. We would need to double the size of the military in order to do this effectively. Not going to happen until something major occurs stateside. |
| Posted by: remoteman 2006-10-25 18:54 |
| #6 I've been apprehensive about more troops in Iraq. The rationale being that more troops would, by presence alone, build a false dependency by Iraq's government thereby slowing their progress. Given the poor performance by the police and by major Iraqi troop units, we are left with two choices: (1) abide by a timetable or a non-sense set of benchmarks, then leave due to non-performance, or (2) surge sufficient troops to tear down the rotting indignant security forces and start anew. It's interesting that the sergeant pointed to post-war Germany and the long-term but successful US administration. For all the added complexity that Iraq poses, combined with an absolute requirement that we succeed, it's time to reshuffle the deck and deal the strong suit. |
| Posted by: Captain America 2006-10-25 18:45 |
| #5 The "We will withdraw if you don't behave!" strategy is based on Sunni naked self-interest : they do NOT control the military, the police, or the militias. They do have some major control over a lot of the terrorist groups. All of which means that Sunnis die in large and impressive numbers, once the US is out of the way. Remember, the Kurds and Shias owe the Sunnis big time for Saddam's era and Al-Q terrorism; and right now, even with the US looking over their shoulders and busting up their death squads when we can, the Kurds and Shias are slaughtering the Sunnis. Imagine how bad it will become if we were to suddenly withdraw to the bases and leave all internal security work to the present Iraqi Army and Police. That is why the Sunnis are suddenly so cooperative : it keeps us in play, and tones down the revenge killings by the Kurds and Shias. |
| Posted by: Shieldwolf 2006-10-25 18:38 |
| #4 This is one guys opinion. It may be informed, but its still just an opinion. Another route is to declare the experiment a partial failure and put a Kurdish dictator in charge to clean house and bash heads. There is a theory (backed by a lot of statistics) that shows that once a nations wealth per person hits a certain point democracy becomes if not inevitable at least a reasonable chance. Beneath that point its a longshot. Tell the Kurdish dictator we'll be watching for abuse, we'll be expecting him to concentrate on getting the economy going, and we'll be in bases along the borders covering his flanks. Either that or make scary noises about withdrawing so that the Iraqis step up to the plate. Which is the plan we've been following and judging by the Sunni tribal leaders siding with us it seems to be working. |
| Posted by: rjschwarz 2006-10-25 17:33 |
| #3 He's probably exactly right about what's needed, and about the consequences. But until someone figures out where the half million troops are going to come from, he might as well add a pony to the list. |
| Posted by: just sayin 2006-10-25 17:13 |
| #2 -I think he makes some good points I can attest to: I still maintain that going into Iraq was not only the necessary thing to do, but the right thing to do as well. -I agree, absolutely necessary based on 17 UN ceasefire violations over a 12 year period. Said Ceasefire agreement written in the blood of 300 Americans in 1991. "A lot of the problems are directly related to Arab culture, which traditionally doesn't see nepotism and graft as serious sins."-I've beat this dead horse. Arab tribal bedouin culture needs to be eradicated - that's the hardest part of the whole thing. Their reasoning is so a skew to the western mind it is almost surreal. -A lot of people may disagree w/the more troops on the ground theory but I think he makes a good argument for it. During the war we had a the right troop strength imho. It's the occupation afterward that's the bitch. |
| Posted by: Broadhead6 2006-10-25 16:51 |
| #1 Sorry, today's Best of the Web contains the letter from the Intelligence sergeant. linky http://www.opinionjournal.com/best/?id=110009148 |
| Posted by: Captain America 2006-10-25 16:46 |