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| Israel-Palestine-Jordan |
| Belmont Club Speculation |
| 2006-07-27 |
| What is the most important component of Hezbollah's power in the south? It is the Hezbollah cadres themselves. Hezbollah's most precious possession isn't Katyushas, long-range rockets, night vision goggles or antitank missiles or electronic equipment. It is the trained core of its military force. Equipment can be replaced but Hezbollah's cadres represent an expensive, almost irreplaceable investment. In them resides the organizational knowledge of Nasrallah's organization. It embodies man-decades of operational experience against Israel. Rockets can be replaced. The stars of Hezbollah's operational force are less expendable. From this observation I'm going to say that despite the received wisdom of the newspapers to the contrary, the fighting at Maroun al-Ras and Bint Jbeil have been and continue to be an unmitigated defeat for the Hezbollah. The Hezbollah are doing the single most stupid thing imaginable for a guerilla organization. They are fighting to keep territory. Oh, I know that this will be justified in terms of "inflicting casualties" on the Israelis. But the Hez are probably losing 10 for every Israeli lost. A bad bargain for Israel you say? No. A bad bargain for Hezbollah to trade their terrorist elite for highly trained but nevertheless conventional infantry. Guerillas should trade 1 for 10, not 10 for 1. Reduced to its essentials, the IDF strategy may be ridiculously simple: fix the Hezbollah force in Southern Lebanon while detaching its command structure from the field by simultaneously striking Beirut. One of the great mysteries, upon which newpaper accounts shed no light, is why the IDF should so furiously pulverize Hezbollah's enclaves in southern Beirut, blockade the port and disable the airport. The object isn't to shut down Lebanon. It is to momentarily disorient the Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut, so that in a moment of absentmindedness, the Hezbollah forces in Southern Lebanon will do what comes most naturally: commit themselves against the IDF. Whether accidental or not, the IDF attack on Kiyam raises the specter that it will operate eastward against the Bekaa valley and perhaps eventually against the Beirut-Damascus highway. That would cut off supplies from Syria to his men in the south and to his command element in Damascus. Then where would Nasrallah's influence over Lebanese politics be? And how should he fare against his former adversaries in the recently concluded Civil War? With the onus of all the ruination he has visited upon Lebanon upon him and his forces in stuck in a southern front against the IDF he may find it hard to cut the swath he once did in government circles. |
| Posted by:Nimble Spemble |
| #6 Hesb'allah's weakness is also the Arab military mindset and their training from certain muslim countries and Iran (and likely a few ex-Red Army veterans as well). Neither is exactly strong on initiative. Hence the fanaticism and over zealousness as a substitute. |
| Posted by: Fordesque 2006-07-27 22:00 |
| #5 The weakness of the Hezzies is fanaticism and over zealousness. While great recruitment tools, irrationality comes with the fanaticism and zeal. Let's pour more Hezzies into the meat grinder. |
| Posted by: Captain America 2006-07-27 17:38 |
| #4 Hezbollah are doing the single most stupid thing imaginable for a guerilla organization. They are fighting to keep territory. Something that nearly aways ended in total defeat for the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2006-07-27 13:42 |
| #3 I sure hope he does. I don't know what to make of all this... |
| Posted by: Flinelet Angavitle5908 2006-07-27 13:37 |
| #2 The Hezbollah are doing the single most stupid thing imaginable for a guerilla organization. They are fighting to keep territory. . . . in a moment of absentmindedness, the Hezbollah forces in Southern Lebanon will do what comes most naturally: commit themselves against the IDF. By God, I think he's got it! |
| Posted by: Mike 2006-07-27 13:02 |
| #1 What is the most important component of Hezbollah's power in the south? It is the Hezbollah cadres themselves. Hezbollah's most precious possession isn't Katyushas, long-range rockets, night vision goggles or antitank missiles or electronic equipment. So little time, so many Hezzies to take out. |
| Posted by: JohnQC 2006-07-27 12:10 |