Mahan Abedin: What is the latest information on terrorism in Saudi Arabia?
Saad al-Faqih: The latest general trend is that the jihadis have abandoned their previous tactics of targeting Westerners and the security forces. The jihadis are now focusing all their attention on the royal family. Two factors have driven this change. Firstly, the jihadis had previously avoided targeting the royals for fear of offending Muslim sensibilities. But now they believe that the prevailing opinion in Saudi Arabia-and probably in the wider Muslim world-is that the royal family is infidel and deserves harsh treatment. | That's the usual takfiri spew. The House of Sod is assiduous in spreading Salafism. The al-Qaeda bitch is that they keep power to themselves, rather than letting the holy men be in charge. |
Secondly, the jihadis have finally overcome their fear of a secular takeover in the event of the sudden downfall of the House of Saud. Somebody told me that in the late 1990s bin Laden used to say that if the House of Saud is removed, the country will fall into the hands of secular forces. But now al-Qaeda believes that the regime is behaving far worse than a would-be secular system, because it is gradually destroying Islam under the banner of a false Islam. Al-Qaeda has reached the conclusion that the sudden collapse of the regime will either invite foreign interference or chaos. | My guess would be the latter, followed by the former. Because of Arabia's importance, I doubt the interference would brook a lot of nonsense. On the other hand, splitting the peninsula into a number of emirates — which is actually possible, given that the provinces are governed by princes who're prone to their own barely comprehensible internal rivalries. The end result would be an exanded "United" Arab Emirates, with the non-oil producers either finding some way to compete or becoming quaint cultural exhibits. |
| The lesson they seem to be missing in Iraq and elsewhere is that jihad depends on money. Remember the multiple trucks captured in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq invasion, carrying a half billion dollars? The ones that got away are financing the fight now. If there's no money coming out of Soddy Arabia, then there's no money for jihad. Guns only seem free to the cannon fodder they're being handed out to. You can have all the guns and ammunition you want, but you'll only last a few days without anything to eat or drink, and operations slow down when there aren't vehicles to transport you to where the fight is. There would be a dribble of cash from Emirates moneybags and Kuwait, some international donations, but it's unlikely it would be enough to sustain the kind of war the geniuses of jihad seem to have in mind. |
MA: How has the political transition (i.e. death of King Fahd) affected the struggle between the regime and al-Qaeda?
SF: The transition has little to do with al-Qaeda; in fact al-Qaeda is not in the least bit interested in these developments.
| If it's not them in charge, then it's irrelevant. |
MA: But presumably al-Qaeda is monitoring developments inside the regime very closely and the decision on the timing of any assassination attempt against a leading figure would surely be determined by these internal developments.
SF: Al-Qaeda will certainly exploit any open divisions in the regime. In fact Abdullahâs ascension will most likely result in open disputes, and this will benefit the jihadis. But in terms of target selection, at the very highest levels of al-Qaeda, targets are discussed and selected very carefully. But at the local leadership level, quite a few clumsy decisions have been made in the recent past. And of course at the operational level there is now a very tenuous link between bin Laden and his advisers and the local al-Qaeda leadership in Saudi Arabia.
| They're not sure Binny is actually alive, either. So they're on their own. And they've got a foot in a bucket because the big money comes from the princes and the princes don't want to be targeted, so they have to get by using the international donations route. |
MA: When is an attack likely to take place?
SF: If you read Zarqawiâs statement after the incidents at Dammam a few months ago, you get the impression that something is going to happen very soon. Zarqawi is clearly after revenge after what happened to his brothers in Dammam.
MA: I have a couple of questions on the Internet. Firstly do you think that the jihadis now see the Internet as the most important battle space?
SF: Only the jihadis in Iraq.
MA: Why?
SF: Because the only place on earth where the jihadis feel safe is Iraq. The Internet used to be awash with jihadi material but this is becoming less so for two reasons. Firstly, Western intelligence services are now aggressively targeting jihadi websites and are showing a greater determination to close them down completely. In the past they would allow some of the more interesting ones to remain in operation so that they could covertly gather intelligence on the webmasters and the contributors. Dozens of websites have been closed in recent months.
| I'd call that a sign they've got the information they need or that they've come to the conclusion that the bullshit content so far outweighs the actual intel content that the sites have become all grass... |
MA: Are you saying the Americans are providing the Saudi authorities with the requisite technology to trace contributors to jihadi websites?
SF: Precisely! The problem is that the Saudis are using the technology to trace and detain non-jihadi authors and contributors as well. In fact several people connected to our organization have been detained in recent months as a result of the transfer of technological expertise.
MA: What happens to these people after they are detained?
SF: Firstly they conduct a thorough search of their computers to trace all their communications and contacts. The detainees are then subjected to prolonged and tough interrogations.
MA: Are they subsequently released?
SF: No, they remain in detention because the Saudis now consider a wide-range of people as critical security threats.
| In other words, they've gone beyond looking only at cannon fodder. They're looking at clamping down on the supporters, as well. But they haven't taken the final step of clamping down on the holy man and the sheikhs and princes who're running things. |
MA: How many forum users have been arrested?
SF: The figures are no less then 2,000, but this includes both jihadi and non-jihadi forum contributors.
MA: Do you think the jihadis are trying to consolidate their assets on the Internet? I refer specifically to the emergence of the âGlobal Islamic Media Frontâ.
SF: I think this Global Islamic Media Front is just a name. The jihadis have used over-arching and inclusive names like this before. In any case the jihadis do not need to consolidate their resources, because the existing set-up works quite well.
MA: I have a few questions on Afghanistan. Do you believe the Taliban insurgency is intensifying?
SF:
Yes it is. The spread of crime and lawlessness was the single most important factor which led to the emergence and empowerment of the Taliban in the mid-1990s. The same situation is developing now where the central Karzai government, which is heavily sponsored by America and the West, only exerts control in the major cities and the north of the country. | Their control used to be concentrated in Kabul. Saad is missing the real story here. |
| Not actually being there, I couldn't say for sure. But judging by the numbers of actual Afghans who're potted or captured, and the fact that the entire Taliban high command seems to be situated in Waziristan, I'd guess that's not a true statement. |
| I don't think we intended to continue a program of bribery indefinitely. I think the longer term goal was to set up a situation where once they stop being bought they immediately regret the fact. |
MA: This is Saudi money spent on American national security?
SF: Exactly!
| Tusk tusk. |
MA: Some jihadis have begun to talk about a great new jihad in Afghanistan on a par with the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s. Do you share this assessment?
SF: I think it is too early to make such predictions. But the general trends point toward a deterioration of security in Afghanistan. In fact Zawahiriâs latest statement highlights this.
MA: Do you think there is going to be greater resistance to the continuing U.S. and Western military presence in the short-term?
SF: There is now a sense that the aura and prestige attached to the swift American victory in Afghanistan is well and truly over.
| That's short attention span kicking in. There's a difference between military operations, occupation, and peacekeeping. Not being real military guys, Saad and Ayman don't recognize it. |
MA: Do you think the Taliban and other insurgent forces in Afghanistan are copying the methods and tactics of the Iraqi insurgents?
SF: Maybe, but these tactics are nothing new. They date back to Lebanon in the 1980s.
| And before that, to Algeria, in the 1950s... |
MA: To what extent is al-Qaeda involved in the intensifying Afghan insurgency?
SF: Iâd say that most of the training and planning are masterminded by al-Qaeda.
MA: Let us discuss the recent Amman Bombings. Were the bombings a blunder by Zarqawi?
SF:
The consensus is that it was a reckless move, even by jihadi standards. It was certainly not useful to the jihadi cause.| Translation: "Yes, it was a blunder." He just can't bring himself to say it. |
MA: What was Zarqawi trying to achieve?
SF: Zarqawi hates the Jordanian regime and simply striking at it and proving to them that he can breach their security was his primary aim.
MA: How do you interpret the use of female suicide bombers both in that attack and other attacks in Iraq, for instance the suicide bombing in Tal Afar?
SF: There are two reasons why females are being deployed for these operations. Firstly, a large number of women are ready to join jihad. Secondly, women want to exact revenge for assaults against them and their families. This is particularly the case in Iraq where civilians have borne the brunt of the fighting.
MA: Does this also indicate an ideological shift by the jihadis?
SF: No, it does not. Although jihad is a task generally for men, there are no Islamic injunctions against women fighting on the frontlines of jihad. Moreover, jihadis have been training their wives and sisters for combat and jihad since the early 1980s. In many Arab tribes women have the position of knights and dominate the toughest of men. Those who raise the issue of an ideological shift on the part of the jihadis are driven by Western prejudices against Muslim societies.
MA: Will Jordan be attacked again?
SF: If there are further attacks, they wonât be as stupid and self-defeating as the suicide bombings in the hotels. Zarqawi is coming under huge pressure, especially by other jihadi leaders in Iraq who are now very skeptical about him. They begrudge his arrogance and recklessness.
| There's a nice little bit of news... |
MA: Which other country might be attacked by the Zarqawi network in the foreseeable future?
SF: Saudi Arabia. In fact it is the most logical choice, especially in light of Zarqawiâs statement on the recent events in Dammam.
MA: Do you believe the Zawahiri letter to Zarqawi is genuine?
SF: Analytically speaking I believe it is genuine because it conforms to Zawahiriâs mentality. But I have no information to this effect. But I was expecting this type of letter simply because even hardcore jihadis believe Zarqawi has gone too far in his arrogance and recklessness.
MA: What is the most striking feature about the letter?
SF: I think it shows that al-Qaeda secretly thinks it might have made a mistake by appointing Zarqawi as its leading representative in Iraq. Zarqawi is far too decisive as a commander, and this is what drives his arrogance.
| I was remarking the other day about idolatry at the altar of the Moloch of Certainty. I was thinking of Zark when I wrote it. |
One of their biggest criticisms is on Zarqawiâs decision to stay and fight in Fallujah once the Americans decided to attack the town in November 2004. The other jihadi leaders wanted to avoid a direct large-scale confrontation with American forces and instead concentrate on exhausting them through a war of attrition. At that time the other jihadi leaders not only avoided criticizing Zarqawi but in fact decided to stay with his forces and fight the massive U.S. Marines assault on the town.| Brilliant move, wasn't it? |
MA: Are there any other striking features about the letter?
SF: It indicates that Zawahiri remains al-Qaedaâs main strategist and that his understanding of the battle space and how it will evolve in the immediate future surpasses that of any other strategist, whether jihadi or American.
| And that indicates it's not Binny running things. |