| Submit your comments on this article |
| Home Front: WoT |
| Al-Qaeda answers the CIA's hiring call |
| 2005-07-11 |
| As many as 40 possible terrorists may have attempted to infiltrate U.S. intelligence agencies in recent months, CIA expert Barry Royden reported at a national counterintelligence conference in March. If that news isn't sufficiently terrifying, consider this chilling paradox: Though the agencies caught the potential spies at the job application stage, post-Sept. 11 pressures to quickly boost staffing make it increasingly likely that a terrorist could sneak into the intelligence community's ranks. Since Al Qaeda's attacks on New York and Washington four years ago, the Sept. 11 commission and other investigative bodies have criticized intelligence agencies for failing to hire enough qualified personnel. President Bush ordered the CIA to increase analytic and operational personnel by 50%. In response, intelligence agencies have launched ambitious campaigns to attract new recruits, even enlisting advertising agencies and running glitzy commercials. But this scramble to hire leaves agencies vulnerable, as a woefully small number of security analysts attempt to vet the flood of applicants. Job seekers with the native language skills and overseas experience that much intelligence work requires are among the most difficult to screen for security. This conundrum comes to light as intelligence agencies have finally recognized that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups operate like traditional intelligence services. Terrorists spy before they terrorize. They case and observe their targets. They collect intelligence about their enemy's vulnerabilities from publicly available information and by eliciting secrets from unwitting sources. Like intelligence officers, terrorists also practice tradecraft — the art of blending seamlessly into a society's fabric for months or years before striking. Consider two men whom U.S. officials have linked to Al Qaeda: Iyman Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen, exploited his job as a truck driver to plan ways to sabotage bridges and derail trains across the country. And Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member and a convert to Islam, could maneuver in Western society without the scrutiny given those of Middle Eastern background. Padilla's ultimate mission, allegedly, was to explode a "dirty bomb" in a U.S. city. Considering their backgrounds, these recruits would presumably have failed to pass muster if they attempted to find jobs in U.S. intelligence. But what about John Walker Lindh? Dubbed the American Talib, Lindh was of a different mold. He came from an affluent Marin County suburb, had decent academic credentials and no criminal record. If the U.S. hadn't captured him in Afghanistan, if he'd simply returned home to the U.S. after his secret training and indoctrination, his knowledge of Arabic and Middle East travel may have made him an attractive candidate for U.S. intelligence. That others with similar experience will infiltrate intelligence agencies is a real risk. In the war on terrorism, intelligence has replaced the Cold War's tanks and fighter planes as the primary weapon against an unseen enemy. A single mole in the CIA, the National Security Agency or the FBI could inflict far more damage to national security than Soviet spies did during the Cold War. Because the U.S. and Soviet Union never went head-to-head in war, the Soviets never fully exploited the advantages from its spies. Now, however, our nation is at war. Imagine the damage Al Qaeda could do with the help of an infiltrator such as FBI spy Robert Hanssen or CIA traitor Aldrich Ames, each of whom passed a wealth of classified material to the Russians. To prevent that sort of catastrophe, our intelligence agencies need to strike a difficult balance. Starting immediately, they need to develop common databases to share hiring information, and they need to add investigators and counterintelligence experts to bolster security screening. Senior officials must resist political pressure and exercise patience in investigating each applicant thoroughly. U.S. counterintelligence safeguards must remain impregnable even as agencies push to replenish the depleted ranks of intelligence professionals. |
| Posted by:Dan Darling |
| #7 Of course, the other thing that makes the entire article overheated is that it overlooks what entry-level intel analysts do and have access to. Achmed: What have you learned about the infidels in the CIA, Omar? Omar: They love Powerpoint presentations! |
| Posted by: Dreadnought 2005-07-11 15:22 |
| #6 "Why LH! That would be profiling!" Where did I say they should only carefully vette arabs or muslims? :) Im not saying somebody might not successfully infiltrate (which is why you need careful internal security on your own people, need to know and all that) but I think the fears in the above post are a tad overblown - some of this would come in routine vetting, I would think. I mean the guy gives Jose Padilla as an example for crying out loud - a former gang member!!!! I mean I hope the CIA isnt scraping bottom of the barrel THAT badly!! Now maybe as an FBI informant Padilla would make sense - but you dont give an informant top secret material, do you? |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2005-07-11 15:10 |
| #5 Naturally. Remember the stories about the translators cheering 9/11? I'm glad to see the CIA is on top of this, at least. |
| Posted by: trailing wife 2005-07-11 14:51 |
| #4 Wasn't there some arabic translators in the FBI who celebrated 9/11? Dunno about that, but there were some who were/are members of the organizations they were tasked with monitoring. They reportedly sanitized the translations they produced. |
| Posted by: Robert Crawford 2005-07-11 14:50 |
| #3 Why LH! That would be profiling! Wasn't there some arabic translators in the FBI who celebrated 9/11? |
| Posted by: CrazyFool 2005-07-11 14:48 |
| #2 Actually, LH, I think Lindh learned Arabic domestically and went to Yemen to work on his accent. Apparently the dialect there is closer to what Mo' spoke. |
| Posted by: Robert Crawford 2005-07-11 14:28 |
| #1 "If the U.S. hadn't captured him in Afghanistan, if he'd simply returned home to the U.S. after his secret training and indoctrination, his knowledge of Arabic and Middle East travel may have made him an attractive candidate for U.S. intelligence" so where did you get your knowledge of Arabic, John, you studied at the University of Michigan? Er, no, I picked it up in the region. Oh? Where, in Egypt? Lebanon? Or did you work in KSA, like so many? Well, er, no, I learned my Arabic in Afghanistan, theres a big arab community there, you know? Seriously, I hope our vetting for CIA types actually includes checking on foreign travel, and accounting for where people were, etc. |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2005-07-11 14:14 |