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| Stratfor: France and the EU Vote |
| 2005-05-22 |
| Posted in full since no link available. France and the EU Vote: Oui or Non? Dream On Summary French voters decide May 29 whether to approve the proposed EU Constitution. Public opinion has favored a no vote over the past four weeks. But regardless of how the vote turns out, the French dream of using a united Europe to magnify Paris' influence globally will remain just that: a dream. Analysis The French vote May 29 on whether to approve the European Union's new constitution. Far from the easy victory the government -- and France's fellow Europeans -- expected, however, the constitution's naysayers have consistently led in opinion polls over the past four weeks. In a union of 25 states, there is little that everyone can agree on. But one thing our sources across the Continent seem to be in agreement on is this: if the French reject the constitution, the charter dies. Unlike previous treaties, this one will not be renegotiated. Not only is the text as integrationist as Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, etc., would allow, the constitution is the best that Paris could possibly hope for -- after all, a Frenchman wrote it. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the document's author, has campaigned for the constitution in a bit of a fog, stunned that any sane Frenchman might suggest that he could have eked more out of the marathon negotiations. So a French "non" leaves only one route for the constitution to be salvaged: resubmission in hopes of receiving the "correct" result. Hardly the vote of confidence that France, a founding member of a united Europe, was expected to provide. Many pundits have attributed the lack of French enthusiasm for the constitution to the love deficit they feel toward the current government. Similar perceptions nearly defeated France's approval of previous EU treaty law and have led many to call the constitution vote a "Raffarindum" on the popularity of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, which a survey published May 20 puts at 21 percent. That is an easy explanation, but it represents a cop out. It also does not explain why French politicians on the left and right -- some even from within the ruling party -- are both campaigning for the "non" forces. In fact, French agonizing is so acute that Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, currently wearing the mantle of the EU presidency, resorted April 19 to saying that the French should vote for the constitution if for no other reason than because the Americans want them to vote no. What all this misses is that this referendum is fundamentally different from previous EU votes. France stands at a crossroads and quite literally has no idea which path to follow. France and "Europe" When the French government first jumped into the European experiment in the early days after World War II, the idea of a "united" Europe was simple: make another European war unthinkable. After France's initial postwar political stability issues were sorted out with the ascendance of Charles de Gaulle, however, the focus quickly changed. Under Gaullism, the French sense of centrality, extant since the pre-1871 period, returned. Formerly, Paris was for all practical purposes the capital of Europe, even while the British were far more active in global affairs. The reascendance in French political thought of the importance of French power left Paris -- and in particular, de Gaulle -- outraged at the political balance of the Cold War. Far from calling the shots -- or even having a say -- in Europe, France found itself relegated to the sidelines as just another European state undergoing massive American-funded and -directed reconstruction. Washington created the Bretton Woods system to manage European economic affairs. Washington created NATO to manage European security affairs. Politics were left to the Europeans so long as they did not clash with either Bretton Woods or NATO. For a Gaullist, such an arrangement was intolerable. De Gaulle's reaction was twofold. First, France needed to take command of its own security affairs, so in 1966, Paris withdrew from the NATO Military Committee, ordering NATO forces off French soil. Second, it needed a potential counterweight to the United States. Something that could in time ultimately challenge the West's superpower. That something became "Europe." At first, everything went blissfully according to plan. France's original five European partners -- Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands -- perhaps represented the perfect match for France's geopolitical ambitions. The Low Countries -- ravaged in both world wars -- were in no mood to rock the boat and demand much of anything. And given their diminutive size, France had little problem overshadowing them politically. As for the other two, Western attitudes toward German behavior during the Second World War ensured that Bonn would spend at least a generation apologizing for its actions, allowing Paris to slip into Germany's shoes and speak for Bonn, too. Finally, there was Italy which was, well, Italy. And so in this little Europe, the French had their first soapbox. Paris wasted no time in working to establish a middle ground between Washington and Moscow. A key policy of the time were efforts to convince their European partners that American security guarantees were meaningless, and that Europe should seek an accommodation with the Soviets under a French-led security partnership. In retrospect, Americans may find this almost farcical, but one must remember the context and the times. While pitching itself as the ultimate guarantor of European security, the United States suffered from an unavoidable and equally inconvenient fact: it was on the wrong side of the Atlantic. Any conventional NATO-Russian conflict was destined to end with the Soviets overrunning Western Europe, as the Americans simply could not relocate forces in time. That meant that the core pillar of the American security guarantee was the nuclear option -- which would, of course, result in a Soviet counterstrike annihilating the United States. Why, the French would ask, should we believe that the Americans would be willing to guarantee their country's destruction to protect us? Countering that argument forced the United States to fight any fight the Soviet Union chose, at the time and place of the Soviet Union's choosing. As such, the United States found itself sucked into conflicts in places such as Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia. But in time, France's ability to speak for Europe rapidly degraded. The core logic behind Gaullism and French foreign policy in the post-World War II era was that Paris had to matter. Countries should need to come to France for guidance and arbitration. French troops should be needed in strategic locations. For that to happen, France needed a core group of states willing to let France speak and act on the group's behalf. In a Europe of six, that was possible. But not as Europe expanded. The key year when France's dream of a French-led Europe began to falter was 1973, the year Denmark, Ireland, and most of all, the United Kingdom, joined the European Community, the forbearer of today's European Union. Unlike France's existing partners, London would neither admit to French centrality nor submit to French authority. The United Kingdom -- a country with a vested interest in being part of Europe so it could prevent the development of a Europe strong enough to threaten its independence -- became Europe's poison pill. It should be no surprise that Paris did not cease vetoing the United Kingdom's membership application until after de Gaulle left office. Every state that the European Community -- which morphed into the European Union in 1993 -- accepted as a member for the next 22 years complicated France's vision. Greece was in effect a European island with security concerns far from France's; Spain and Portugal enjoyed strong relations with Latin America and ultimately the United States; Austria, Finland and Sweden -- all officially neutral states -- made the idea of a French-led common European security force problematic at best. Russia and a "Greater Europe" But what is often missed is the centrality that Moscow played in French plans, and how efforts to broaden and deepen the European Union -- a prerequisite for a stronger Europe capable of countering the United States -- made it impossible for Russia to participate in realizing French ambitions. Paris fully understands that the United States' overwhelming economic heft -- at the beginning of 2005 the U.S. economy stood at more than $11 trillion versus the European Union's $7 trillion -- means that successfully challenging the United States requires some flavor of a "greater Europe." Considering the dearth of options available, such an entity by default required a close strategic partnership with Russia. In many ways a Franco-Russian partnership is a match made in heaven. The two are far enough removed from each other that they have few points of contact, and therefore few points of friction. That became even more the case with the implosion of Russian influence globally during the 1990s. Both are resentful of what they perceive as the intrusion of American power into their backyard -- and front yard. Both feel, with considerable justification, that they would be far more powerful both at home and abroad if the United States were taken down a peg or 30. During the Cold War, European security arrangements with the United States made any broad Franco-Russian alliance impractical. With the end of the Cold War, however, the European security dynamic changed sufficiently enough that it was possible to consider not just a Franco-Russian partnership, but perhaps even a European-Russian grouping. Despite the problems of brokering agreements among a Europe of 12, and as of 1995, 15 members, suddenly the building blocks for a larger "Europe" came tantalizingly within reach. But two unrelated events directly linked to French efforts to strengthen Europe soon fully killed the French dream to create a rival superpower -- and both had to do with Russia. The first occurred Jan. 2, 2002, when the European Union formally adopted the euro as the Continent's common currency. Although since that time the financial strictures undergirding the euro have been watered down and creatively interpreted, one thing that all EU states readily agree on is that post-Soviet collapse Russia is incapable of meeting the financial rigors necessary to qualify for euro membership within a human lifetime. Since meeting those requirements is embedded within EU membership requirements, Russia is barred from EU membership because of technical reasons. In other words, assuming both Paris and Moscow were interested in solidifying an alliance under the aegis of the European Union -- which would constitute the ideal scenario for Paris given its assumption that it would lead an EU with Russia as a member -- the implementation of the common currency regime essentially rendered this economically impossible. The second discriminating event occurred on May 1, 2004 when the EU expanded to bring in 10 Central European and Mediterranean states. Seven of the 10 states the European Union absorbed in 2004 had been directly occupied by the Russians since World War II, and none of them trust Moscow. The problem introduced by U.K. membership was suddenly magnified tenfold, and a common Russian-French foreign policy, determined by Paris of course, is now a political impossibility. Without the population, geographic heft and resources of Russia, Europe remains dependent on the United States for security, markets and -- via American global military commitments -- also on U.S. military force to guarantee European access to global resources and markets alike. For all practical purposes, from the French viewpoint, the idea of a greater Europe realistically capable of challenging the United States is dead. Of Constitutions and Betrayal Which brings us back to the issue at hand: the French Constitution. While Paris continued to attempt to use Europe to further its geopolitical goals, it knew full well that Europe would lack the size and strength to challenge the United States in its current form without Russia's help. The question then became: How does France make due with the building blocks it has on hand? The constitution was supposed to answer that question. As French thinking went, having a common European constitution would bind the member states into a firm alliance that paid heed to French wisdom, expertise and goals. As such, Paris pulled every string it had to put a Frenchman in charge of putting the critical document together. While that process was under way, however, the world threw France a curveball in the form of the 2003 Iraq war. Paris recognized straightaway that a world in which the United States could launch Iraq-style operations without consent or consequence would be a world in which France neither mattered nor was respected. Paris, feeling secure in its position as the leader of "Europe," worked with the Germans and various EU bureaucrats nominally responsible for EU foreign policy and publicly challenged the United States' motives and methods on all things Iraqi. The result was that nearly all of the rest of Europe broke ranks with the Franco-German (and to a lesser degree, Russian) axis. In January 2003, almost a year after France took it upon itself to represent Europe as a power facing off against the United States, a host of other European countries -- Denmark, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom -- issued an open letter in the world's newspapers applauding the United States' role in Europe. The letter also opposed French efforts regarding Iraq and mocked the idea of a common European foreign policy. Within days, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia indicated that they also would have signed the letter if asked. The Netherlands chimed in that it had wanted to sign but was concerned that it would create an appearance of European disunity. Paris perceived the statements as betrayals of European (read: French) values and a (successful) challenge to the idea of French leadership. Suddenly, the entire European experiment had been turned on its head, and instead of Europe meekly allowing France to wax philosophic about the wonders of Parisian culture and statesmanship, a very different "Europe" began to take shape. That Europe became codified into the document the French will consider May 29. In this Europe, foreign policy would be largely relegated to the hands of each member state. Common European positions could be crafted, but they would first have to receive unanimous support from the 25 EU members. Estonia or Hungary could counter French efforts to ally with Russia. Cyprus or Greece could block French efforts to court Turkey. Bulgaria or the United Kingdom could halt French efforts to isolate the United States. Suddenly, instead of an enabler, the European Union had become a cage. And the cage has a mind of its own. The French statist/socialist model (still highly popular among the French) always has clashed with Anglo-style capitalism, which more closely resembles American economic practices. Nearly all of the states that joined in 2004, as well as Bulgaria and Romania who will join in 2007, fall on the side of the United Kingdom in thinking. Combined with a European Commission that took office in late 2004, Paris finds its entire economic model under constant criticism. And unlike the realm of foreign policy, EU economic initiatives do not require a unanimous vote -- except in issues of taxation, a category where high French taxes put French business at a permanent disadvantage. As such, the constitution put before the French populace in the May 29 referendum represents the worst of all worlds for France. It constitutionally isolates France within a union of broadly pro-American states, it gives other states the potential to impose on France what the French perceive as a hostile economic structure and it essentially destroys any hope France once had for forming a French-led union. No wonder then that the French are hesitant about voting for the constitution. Doing so not only would put them on the defensive within Europe, it would consign dreams of global influence to history's proverbial dustbin. Making matters even worse (yes, it can get worse), rejecting the constitution would not help. Should any single state -- say, France -- vote no, the constitution will not take effect. This would mean that existing EU treaty law, which the constitution would have superceded, would remain intact. The voting provisions laid out by the Nice Treaty represent the most important provisions a no vote would preserve. To be approved, the constitution demands that decisions be approved by 55 percent of the European Union's states representing at least 65 percent of the European Union's population. Under such an arrangement, France and Germany voting together could be overruled, but it would take near EU unanimity to do so. Under Nice, however, the smaller states have far more power in proportion to their populations. Spain, for example, has 27 votes to France's 29, despite only having 41 million people to France's 59 million. As the states get smaller, the distortion grows. The three Baltic states and the Czech Republic -- with a combined population of less than 20 million -- voting together wield as many votes as the proud Fifth Republic. The European Union has now become too large to be safely controlled, and too hostile to French aspirations to be trusted. The French truly are damned whether they do or do not. *sniff* |
| Posted by:.com |
| #4 --In many ways a Franco-Russian partnership is a match made in heaven.--- Commie to commie, what a surprise. We ain't calling it the EUSSR for nothing. To me, all this process is is another battle in a 1000 y.o. gaul/anglo war. Does schaudenfreude (sp) apply here? |
| Posted by: anonymous2u 2005-05-22 18:57 |
| #3 Anybody who thinks Chirac's government will allow a straight, un-fixed referendum hasn't been, y'know' paying attention. They're running scared, and the ballot boxes are looking nervous. |
| Posted by: mojo 2005-05-22 12:20 |
| #2 Many pundits have attributed the lack of French enthusiasm for the constitution to the love deficit they feel toward the current government. Love deficit---That's rich! In fact, French agonizing is so acute that Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, currently wearing the mantle of the EU presidency, resorted April 19 to saying that the French should vote for the constitution if for no other reason than because the Americans want them to vote no. Hey, guyz 'n' galz. Vote any way you like. It's your gig. Just think about what you have for glue to hold your little confederation together. It will take more than a multi-hundred page |
| Posted by: Alaska Paul 2005-05-22 11:03 |
| #1 Couldn't happen to a more arrogant, deserving country. |
| Posted by: too true 2005-05-22 10:24 |