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| Iraq-Jordan |
| Shiite Radicals Join with Sunni Insurgents in Ramadi |
| 2004-04-07 |
| Debka, so you decide whether this is based on real intelligence or not. EFL The third day of Moqtada Sadr’s radical Shiite uprising saw US-led coalition forces under attack by both Sunnis and Shiites and the first extremely dangerous sign of a merger between the two fronts. DEBKAfile’s military sources report that US-led forces, instead of beginning to get a grip on the armed Shiite militia uprising in Baghdad and four cities, appeared to be letting command slip out their hands. The failure to move fast enough to nab Sadr may be as costly as was the escape from capture of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in November 2001and of Saddam Hussein in March 2003. Al-Sadr matches neither in stature. He also represents no more than a splinter faction of the Shiite community. Yet if he proves able lead an effective underground resistance to the coalition for a critical period, he could attract a disproportionately large number of Shiite followers to his flag. It might be enough for him to keep going for another five days to a week without being caught or stopped, for the Americans to find themselves in the midst of a full-blown war. I initially dismissed the idea that they could loose control so quickly, but changed my mind when I thought about how states lose control. It always happens within a few days and its a perception issue. Think back to Eastern Europe and the fall of communism. The firebrand cleric and his Mehdi Army militia went into action in three rapid phases: Stage One: Early Tuesday, April 6, he melted out of his headquarters in the Kufa mosque near Najef and went to ground. Stage Two: Simultaneously, his militia moved in on the police stations and government buildings of one town after another in southern Iraq. Stage Three: Tuesday afternoon, shortly after US Marines entered Fallujah to collar the men responsible for the brutal murder of four US contractors last week, fresh Shiite militiamen were drawn from the Sunni Triangle towns of Baquba, Balad, Samarra and Al Muqdaryah to launch a ferocious assault on the US Marine compound in Ar Ramadi, 40 km east of Fallujah. At least 12 US Marines were killed and 20 injured in this assault. Well Debka are either right or wrong about this and we will find out soon enough, but no one else seems to be saying AR is Shiites. This development represents an ominous turning-point in the Iraqi conflict for four reasons: 1. It was almost certainly coordinated with the Sunni Baathists, imported Arabs and al Qaeda combatants battling US Marines in Fallujah in order to draw off American military pressure in Fallujah and threaten the Marines from the rear. 2. Instead of al Qaeda striking Shiites to inflame civil war - as predicted by some US strategists – Shiites apparently turned up in Ramadi to fight the Americans in cahoots with Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda combatants. This show of solidarity makes the Sunni Triangle of central Iraq, including Baghdad, a doubly hazardous and unruly region 3. US intelligence evaluatons of Moqtada Sadr’s military strength have proved wide of the mark. Tuesday morning, it was still estimated as 10,000 with a hard core of 3,000 fighting men. DEBKAfile’s military and intelligence sources believe this figure represents only the Mehdi Army’s numbers in Baghdad, Najef and Karbala. It does not take into account the Sunni Triangle Shiite force that was secretly trained and prepared over the past year by thousands of Iranian Republican Guards infiltrators in conjunction with the Iranian protégé, Lebanese Hizballah terror-master Imad Mughniyeh. This force numbers an estimated 5,000 combatants, who are better equipped, organized and trained than Mehdi Army militiamen. 4. The Sadrist revolt looks therefore like having taken hold in three major regions of Iraq: The Sunni Triangle, Baghdad and the South. As for the other fronts: Baghdad. By Tuesday night, US forces had not regained control of the sprawling Shiite districts of the capital, except for some police stations, and the sounds of fighting were rising in intensity. The South. Sadr’s militia captured Diwaniya 30 km east of Najef after beating back repeated Spanish attempts backed by US helicopters to recover control.This is the first Iraqi town to fall to Sadr’s forces, a situation that is totally unacceptable to the US command. If complete Iraqi towns continue falling into Shiite or Sunni insurgent hands, the US and coalition forces will quickly lose control of the country. In Karbala, al Amara and Nassiriyeh, the Mehdi Army captured buildings in the town centers. In Karbala, US and Polish forces failed to repulse the Shiite attackers; likewise the Italian troops in Nasseriyah. In Al Amarah near the Iranian border north of Basra, British contingents using helicopter gunships, tanks and artillery failed to break the Shiite Sadrists’ grip on the town center. At the end of Day Three of the radical Shiite uprising, therefore, the score was not in the coalition’s favor. The overall thrust of the article fits with my view that the fighting is a lot fiercer than a series of sponteous and largely uncoordinated attacks would be, and the Iranians are behind this big time. Funding anyone who will cause trouble in Iraq. |
| Posted by:Phil B |
| #9 I know I'm a little late for this discussion, but Murat, you may want to double-check how much in both material and manpower the Viet Cong got from the North way-back-when; in particular, after Tet depleted their manpower, they relied heavily on NVA regulars to fill out their ranks. Most of their arms/ammunition/etc. came from the North, via the Ho Chi Minh trail (plus some coming in over the water, both in the early days, and via Cambodia in the later days); and finally, the NVA itself attacked during the Tet offensive and other offensives. For the N. Vietnamese, the guerilla war wasn't an isolated strategy, but part of an overall strategy that involved lots of more conventional military action, including attacks by mechanized units. I just thought I'd be a little pedantic, what with all the Tet Analogies going around... |
| Posted by: Phil Fraering 2004-04-07 11:50:51 PM |
| #8 All reports Ive seen indicate that this is essentially an urban revolt, with the villages largely quiet. I presume this is largely driven by the interplay of class and religion among the Shiites, with the relatively conservative villagers largely loyal to Sistani, as are the urban middle classes. Sadr gets more support from the more radicalized urban working classes. Nothing clear on the Shiite tribal leaders. It DOES seem that in Iraq (as elsewhere in the region) tribal loyalty typically extends into at least the smaller cities, not just the rural areas. Ive seen nothing to indicate significant tribal loyalty in a large city like Baghdad. |
| Posted by: Liberalhawk 2004-04-07 10:53:46 AM |
| #7 Grain of salt time, it's DEBKA after all. Murat, Sadr has little or no tribal support. They call him "the Iranian". And the Shia tribes suffered just as much as the Sunnis did in the war with Iran. This is an attempt at a Tet, and it will end as Tet did, with the Tikrit thugs and Sadr's thugs wiped out. The Kurd and mainstream Sunni and Shia militias are sitting this one out, waiting for June 30. That's what Sadr should have done.0. |
| Posted by: Chuck Simmins 2004-04-07 9:01:48 AM |
| #6 Hello Traveller, Not only the village life but also the tribal life is important in this case, the big wrong of the US or coalition forces are that they concentrate to much on Sadr or religious groups, while the actual power lies within the tribal societies. For an American it is hard to understand the Middle East structures. Let me try to describe it this way Sadr gets his strength from tribes (better said tribal leaders) who support him, the big fish is not Sadr but a dozen or so tribal leaders. Neutralizing them would neutralize the whole resistance. As long as the US lacks the needed intelligence (the biggest failure this far) she wont be able to quell the upsurge of insurgency. To my opinion the US has failed to ally enough tribal leaders what would have been far more effective than relying on Spanish, Italian etc. etc. coalition troops. |
| Posted by: Murat 2004-04-07 7:13:51 AM |
| #5 Militaries need supplies, lots of them. For them to maintain a successful insurgency, they need what LIC refers to as "an untouchable base of supply". In this case, they think they have one in Iran. They are mistaken. |
| Posted by: Dishman 2004-04-07 6:25:52 AM |
| #4 Dear Murat: I'm not saying your analysis is correct, but I remember you writing on the significance of Village life and politics in this conflict about a year ago. It is nice to see you making positive contribution again. |
| Posted by: Traveller 2004-04-07 6:19:34 AM |
| #3 Iyot, I am not saying they have not, but support alone is not enough to organise resistance, they (Iraqis) be it Suni or Shia are in control of the villages while coalition forces control the cities. In the villages they have almost free hand and can recruit supporters and organise them. What I wanted to point out is that resistance can't be eradicated without controlling also the countryside, the limited number of coalition troops limits the control only to control over the big cities. To make a plain comparisson Vietnam is a good example, the Vietcong controlled the countryside and jungle, that was their force. In Iraq it is comparable, if militia / resistance forces control the countryside (and they do), than it is almost impossible to stop the bloodshed and restoring order, even if Fallujah would be flattened completely it wont stop the insurgence. |
| Posted by: Murat 2004-04-07 5:22:11 AM |
| #2 question : why else would Sadr mention that 'they are now the arm of Hamas & Hezbollah in Irak' if his guys didn't have support from Iran ? |
| Posted by: lyot 2004-04-07 5:01:03 AM |
| #1 You are partly correct with you analysis Phil, but instead of thinking that Iran is behind (could be partly possible, I don't know) the upsurge of resistance you must not forget that underground resistance forces have had time to organise themselves. Especially in the villages there are no coalition forces (they are concentrated in the cities) to gain full control over Iraq, the result is that resistance / militia forces who control the towns do gain muscles and slip into the cities. |
| Posted by: Murat 2004-04-07 3:40:48 AM |