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US searchlight moves from AQ Khan to PAEC-NDC
2004-02-16
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf’s proliferation headache shows all signs of becoming even more severe. Sources say the Bush administration has now asked the Pakistan government to debrief scientists at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the National Defence Complex (NDC), fearing Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan just might have been used as a decoy to divert the international community’s attention from these two bodies where substantial work on the country’s nuclear programme was undertaken. Diplomatic sources in Islamabad say the US demand is based on intelligence showing that most aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear programme—mining and processing of uranium, and designing and manufacturing—were assigned to the PAEC which, till April 6, 2001, was headed by Dr Ashfaq Ahmed. The enrichment of fissile materials to weapons-grade level was the responsibility of the Khan’s Kahuta Research Laboratories. Since Pakistan’s nuclear programme was covert, Khan was encouraged to pose as the ‘father of the bomb’, even though he was responsible for just one of the 24 steps required for producing nuclear weapons. Those entrusted with the other 23 steps worked under Dr Samar Mubarikmand, member (technical) of the PAEC, who reported to chairman Ahmed.

It was under intense pressure from Washington that Musharraf effected, on April 6, 2001, large-scale changes in the country’s nuclear establishment. Khan was retired as KRL chairman and made advisor to the chief executive; Ahmed was packed off from the helm of PAEC; so was Mubarikmand as member (technical). But there was one vital difference. Mubarikmand, on the same day, was anointed NDC head. This was in effect a promotion: earlier in the year the weapons programme had been transferred to the NDC, as the establishment feared the gathering proliferation storm—and fearing sanctions against organisations known for their roles in the nuclear programme. The US intelligence apparently believes all this drama could have been enacted to use Khan as a decoy and divert attention from the PAEC, where the real nuclear programme was carried out. Diplomatic sources say the Americans are aware that the KRL’s scientists constitute only a fifth of the PAEC’s and that it was grossly overmanned considering its workload. This was done to mislead those who would want to train the searchlight on Pakistan’s nuclear programme. In fact, the information acquired by the US suggests the PAEC’s top brass, including Mubarikmand, knew of Khan’s proliferation activities and his clandestine attempts at procurement for the programme. It’s felt that this is reason enough to debrief Mubarikmand.

The Pakistan government’s response to the US demand for the debriefing of PAEC and NDC scientists has been positive. The government has, however, communicated the implausibility of PAEC and the NDC scientists being involved in proliferation, largely because of the stringent security restrictions under which they work. Yet, diplomatic sources say, the welter of information the US possesses shows that Pakistanis were assisting North Korea and Iran in accordance with officially vetted agreements for clandestine training of nuclear scientists and mutual exchange of the nuclear know-how. They say no such agreement could have been possible without the military leadership’s approval. Sources say US intelligence sleuths stationed in Pakistan began to suspect North Korean involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme after Kim Sin-ae, wife of Kang Thae-yun, North Korean economic counsellor in Islamabad, was found murdered. It was Kang Thae who had brokered a deal with an unidentified Russian company to bring to Pakistan Maraging Steel, a key component of missile bodies and nosecones. He and his wife, Kim, were close to Khan. The US agents believe Kim was probably killed by her own government after she approached a British agent, wishing to defect in exchange for Pak and North Korean nuclear secrets. US sleuths were also told a prototype centrifuge was smuggled with her coffin on a special flight from Islamabad.

Diplomatic sources cite US intelligence to claim that since January 2000, after Musharraf came to power, Pakistani nuclear scientists had been working in North Korea and the latter’s missile experts in Pakistan. It was part of the now infamous nuke-for-missile deal. With the US, the EU and Japan providing Pakistan increased economic assistance post 9/11, Islamabad began to pay cash for North Korean missiles. Diplomatic sources here say few believe the military establishment wasn’t aware of the role Khan and his colleagues played in proliferation. But they are willing to not name Musharraf or past governments as long as the US is provided detailed information on the nuclear blackmarket and assured that Islamabad will indeed cap the proliferation for all times to come.
Posted by:Paul Moloney

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