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Iraq
The pros against the rag-tag conscripts
2003-03-09
Edited for length and relevance
A few days ago, British troops in Kuwait were deprived of a small piece of technology which, although not essential, represented their last direct link to their loved ones and the increasingly remote green, wet, cool homeland. The Army took away their mobile phones. The soldiers reacted philosophically. They expected it. Kuwaiti cellphone coverage leaks across the border into mobile-less Iraq. When the invasion takes place, none of them wants the merry sound of Nokia ring tones pealing over the battlefield.
"Mildred! I told you, never call me at the office!"
Such temporary, mild, and largely symbolic privations compare starkly with the conditions affecting the men whom our soldiers are preparing to fight: the regular Iraqi army. The loss of a mobile phone does not concern them for a second. It is the prospect of finding their next meal, and of surviving an onslaught of terrifying magnitude, that concentrates their minds. The contrast between the fates of these two groups could not be more extreme.
It's just amazing that Sammy has lasted this long, treating the army like this.
In the desert, it is easy to see the war machine. Column after column of British trucks and Land Rovers and American Humvees move north through the dust storms. Streams of gigantic tank transporters rumble around the Kuwait City ring roads. The US convoys are edgy, after several shootings by locals; every man and woman wears a helmet, and the convoys are always topped and tailed by vehicles carrying heavy machine guns on swivelling mounts, with a stony-faced gunner behind each one.
No one wants to be the last one capped in Kuwait.
The British are more relaxed, but their vehicles, too, are festooned with weaponry. Their menacing Land Rover convoys are a frequent sight, two guns on each one, the faces of their crews invisible behind helmets, goggles and dust scarves, like a vision from desert warfare of 60 years ago.
They sound like happy warriors, but they're probably just as grouchy as the Yanks. The weather's not getting any more pleasant — which is why they need goggles and dust masks, both of which are hot and uncomfortable to wear for extended periods...
They are almost ready. But not quite. Ironically, after the sniping in the press back home — and the fact they were originally supposed to be based in Turkey — the British deployment seems to have gone relatively smoothly, and it is the United States which has been lagging behind. American forces have been so pressed for time that they have been moving ammunition to their bases in the desert using civilian trucks and local drivers. A crucial contingent of the US buildup, the 101st Airborne Division, is still waiting for its helicopters — its main means of transport — to arrive, shrink-wrapped, by ship. Then they will have to be unpacked, assembled and worked up and their aircrews given days to acclimatise to local conditions.
Hence the seven day ultimatum to Sammy.
It is still likely that General Tommy Franks, overall commander of the Iraq operation, will have the equivalent of five ready divisions at his disposal in Kuwait by mid-March — two airborne, the 82nd and the 101st; one armoured, the 3rd Mechanised Infantry division; one of US marines, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force; and one British, a mix of airborne, armoured and marine. For all its hundreds of thousands of men, however, it is a remarkably light force compared to the one Norman Schwarzkopf had under his command in 1991. It is some five divisions smaller, and the missing divisions were the main armoured fist of the successful blitztkrieg into Iraq and Kuwait at that time. More divisions are on their way, but will not arrive for weeks; the anticipated second front in the north is not now going to happen.
This is going to either prove or disprove the light force concept. The only thing that bothers me is that Franks is so unlike Schwartzkopf...
This time around, fewer troops will have to travel much farther, through areas that are thick with civilians. In other words, whatever Gen Franks' plan is, it counts on very fast movement, very light resistance and fair weather — a risky strategy. 'Mr Rumsfeld tells us it's going to be like Palm Sunday, they'll be strewing palm leaves in the streets,' said one senior British commander. 'I hope he's right.'
I'd guess some places will — and others won't. The question is how well the places that aren't strewing palm leaves are going to fight...
In the 1991 Gulf war, overwhelmed by surrendering Iraqis, allied forces took to disarming them, binding their hands and instructing them to walk south. Now optimistic officers think even disarming the soldiers might not be necessary. 'A hundred thousand prisoners would be difficult,' said one. 'If they lay down their weapons and depart, or frankly even if they don't lay down their weapons but depart, we have no legal responsibility to take charge of them.'
Collect the rifles, just in case, and send them all home.
I don't think I'd even consider leaving an armed formation behind me, especially not in Iraq, where pretending to surrender is an accepted tactic...
Before the troops go in, and as they advance, US and British aircraft will be carrying out heavy air raids across Iraq, probably the most dangerous and destructive actions of an invasion both from the point of view of Iraqi civilians and world public opinion. At one airbase in Kuwait where RAF Tornado aircraft are based, a bleak, seething anthill of grey dust, armourers, mechanics, helicopters, fighters and bomb dumps, the aircrews work alongside old armoured concrete aircraft shelters which they helped destroy in 1991 when they were under Iraqi control. Thin sunlight shines in through ragged gashes in the roof. The Kuwaitis are said to be suing the French company which built them; the French point out that they were designed to protect against Iraqi bombs, not British and American ones.
Oh giggle! THAT is funny! I wonder if the Kuwaitis got a warranty?
The contrast between the fortunes of Western forces, with their well-fed, motivated troops and airmen, and those of their prospective foe could not be more intense, a point underscored by the sight of the young Iraqi deserters who are appearing in increasing numbers in Amman, joining the queue that forms outside the offices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to ask for asylum. According to officials many gave the same account. They had heard a story that Saddam was changing the rules of the military draft. Instead of serving for a few months before being rotated out, the young men said they had been warned new soldiers would have to stay with their units until war broke out. The implication was not lost on these young men. In the last Gulf War it was conscripts who had borne the brunt of the withering American assault, many being buried alive by US bulldozers. So they ran.
"Take a number, Line forms to the left. Take a number, ..."
It takes money, a passport and connections to flee abroad, however, though others have taken a less costly and marginally less risky course — stumping up a bribe to local Baath Party officials for a call-up exemption. The price of that bribe has increased sharply. In the autumn it was $400 (£250) now it is $900 and rising. Those who cannot pay simply flee to relatives in the countryside when the conscripting officer comes visiting.
This is in contrast to the Baghdadis jumping up and down and making faces and vowing to defend Sammy to the death...
Finally, there are the unlucky ones without influence or money. Collectively they are known as the Iraqi army. Already they are preparing for surrender, defeat and even death. Travellers from Iraq describe soldiers in ragged uniforms sometimes without boots. It is also said they are paid only intermittently and survive, in some units, on little more than soup, bread and what they can beg. But Saddam is wasting little of his resources on the regular army — which is distrusted for its lack of loyalty and morale — and regarded merely as cannon fodder to slow the US advance before they meet more loyal units in the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard.
Sammy treats them like garbage and then wonders why they won't be loyal. Why even bother? He knows that we won't slow down.
You wouldn't know this, however, from the daily military parades and nightly broadcasts of Saddam, sometimes appearing with his son Qusay, or meeting with his military commanders to disparage American military might. According to these broadcasts, the Iraqi soldier is a formidable fighter, fit as an SAS trooper, schooled in the intricacies of urban warfare, well commanded and committed to Saddam. If true, American and British forces might have reason to worry. But, of course, it is not true. The regular Iraqi army has no inclination to fight, so Saddam is turning to the use of fear to persuade its soldiers to fight.
And this is the Guardian talking, folks.
Gulf War I set the psychological background for Gulf War II. Sammy's been calling Gulf War I a victory, but the rest of the country was there, too, as was the military. It'd take another 20 years of propaganda to convince people otherwise. He doesn't have that long...
Then there are the tanks: the newest are Iraq's 700 T-72s which were heavily outgunned by US armour in the last Gulf War and have loading problems and the propensity to burn. These are, in any case, limited to the Republican Guard.
The T-72 "Jack-in-the-Box." Hit them and the top flies off.
But even tanks are pointless without the will to fight. Western analysts have been suggesting for months that Iraqi soldiers are being asked to sacrifice themselves not for Iraq, but for Saddam, a strategy made clear by Saddam's deployments of his best soldiers around himself in Baghdad and not around the country. It is a plan designed, not for victory, but for carnage stalemate, to draw on the Americans and inflict sufficient casualties so that Saddam can sue for another imperfect peace. 'Even the regime has become aware that it is unlikely the majority of its forces will fire a shot,' said one Western source last week. 'They have been told by security officers attached to different military units that morale is at rock bottom and that no-one wants to die for a hopeless cause.'
I wouldn't even want to get bruised for Sammy...
This message has been reinforced by a massive US leafleting campaign that has told soldiers: 'Surrender if you don't want to die' — an idea mocked by Saddam in his broadcasts. 'Are they still harbouring the illusion that they are capable of toppling Iraq with their leaflets?' he said last week. 'This love has been going on for 35 years of my being in power.'
Does he even believe this stuff?
"Enforced love" isn't a new concept. In 99 cases out of 100, it just doesn't stick...
While the regime has tried to foster a sense of collective unity and repeating the decade-old canard that it was Iraq that won the last Gulf War, in reality Saddam is preparing to defend himself by the only way that he knows — by threatening violence against those who falter. Civil governors have been replaced by military governors, and pressure has been put on the population to remain in their homes, rather than flee. Iraqis who have left in recent weeks, speak of intimidation both of the civilian and military to lock them into Saddam Hussein's last stand. New, sandbagged positions, residents of the cities understand, are to keep them in, not the tanks out. Most shocking of all is the unverifiable claim by Western intelligence agencies that special security units have been trained how to hang deserters quickly to provide a visible encouragement to both the army and the civilian population.
Special satisfaction then, will come about when it's Sammy swinging from a lamp post.
And we have our reporters "embedded" now, so they can send live pictures of dangling corpses...
It has a certain logic that accords with other verifiable details: for instance the claim by Iraqi soldiers to officers of the 32-country UN Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission based on the Iraqi border (Unikom) that their families have been put under protective custody 'to make sure they fight'.
When everything disappears at once, how do you know who fought and who didn't?
'They are terrified,' a Unikom captain said in a recent interview. 'They won't surrender at the first shot. They will surrender when they hear the first American tank turn on its engine.'
Let's get this over with a minimum of casualties to us and to all the poor schmoes in the Iraqi army.
Posted by:Steve White

#7  There may be Republican Guard surrenders also. As pointed out above, all the important RG hardware are easy targets. The only really intense training these guys have is ideological training. It is doubtful that after the first strike they will even function as organized troops. They may do some sabotage or fire some bio/chem stuff which could be bad enought; but the tanks will be worthless within a few hours of the balloon going up.
Posted by: mhw   2003-03-09 10:36:01  

#6  I'm not a military expert(TM), but I had fostered the impression that tank-on-tank warfare was a luxury retained to keep the M1/Challenger crews happy. Air superiority makes anything static or ground-dwelling an elaborate Iraqi coffin...?
Posted by: Bulldog   2003-03-09 10:29:13  

#5  It's not so much the tanks, it's the guns, their accuracy and their aiming electronics. American Tankers found that they could hit Iraqi tanks of whatever model at a range of 2 miles. the Iraqi guns had a range of 1 1/2 miles. The Americans learned that all they had to do was stand off and fire away.
Posted by: Jabba the Tutt   2003-03-09 10:10:51  

#4  Tanks have three elements, Mobility, armor, firepower which makes them powerful weapons. Take away any of those elements and it becomes just another heap of junk. Iraqi armor 'doctrine', such as it is, takes away mobility. Incredible.

The Soviets developed their engineering corps' equipment to enable tanks to dig in quickly for the purpose of defeating an imminent atack, preferably a tactical ambush, the idea being that once an engagement is concluded, tanks could quickly roll out of their entrenchments, form up and launch an immediate counterattack.

What Iraqi commanders are doing is almost criminal in its stupidity; not at all how these systems were designed to be used, and the result will be, a bunch of heaping wrecks, misused, and burning.

Don't get me wrong. This all works for US. I think the best use for T-72s in this case is the best outcome. Pop hatches and abandon the vehicle.

It just goes to show how true what Sun Tzu said about war. Paraphrasing: To use an uneducated population in war is to throw them away.
Posted by: badanov   2003-03-09 09:05:24  

#3  good point Badanov - however, the Strategic Genius™ that Saddam is, he digs them in so their little heads turrets peek out and can shoot. I'm sure the pilots love the lack of mobility. A dead-in-it's-tracks tank is indeed a Jack-In-The-Box (lovely visual...heh heh)
Posted by: Frank G   2003-03-09 08:11:00  

#2  A technical note:

The Russian T-54/55 series and the T-62 series tanks are the ones with the design flaw in which a shot on the turret or an internal explosion will cause the turet to come off.

The T-72 is one hell of a fine vehicle with a 125mm main gun that is quite capable and, with the right ammunition, co-equal to the 120mm main guns.

I do not know if they have the same turret problems as previous series, but I do regard the T-72 as a very capable tank
Posted by: badanov   2003-03-09 07:20:29  

#1  "Collect the rifles, just in case, and send them all home."

Collect their rifles and send them home, but treat them with some courtesy and give them a decent meal first. We want to make sure that they tell everyone back in the village that the Americans are decent folks.
Posted by: jrosevear   2003-03-09 05:49:56  

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