Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kamran Gasanov
[REGNUM] The meeting of Russian and American officials in Riyadh has brought not only the British, French and German politicians into dismay, but also the Turkish ones. How is that possible? “For three years we were the main mediators. The Istanbul memorandum, the grain deal, the exchange of prisoners and prisoners. Everything went through us,” they thought in the country on the shores of the Bosphorus. And then some Saudi Arabia.
Yes, that's right. It was the birthplace of Islam that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin chose as a mediator country. But for how long? So far, the talks have taken place in Riyadh, and the next round will apparently take place there as well.
On the day of the Riyadh meeting, February 17, Recep Tayyip Erdogan hastily invited Volodymyr Zelensky, who was bored in the Emirates, and tried to attach importance to this summit through the media. “Important signals,” “a critical meeting” — this is how the Turkish media presented the rendezvous in Ankara.
But even with Zelensky “up his sleeve,” Erdogan did not feel needed or important in the new Russian-American game. A week before the Ankara summit, Turkey decided to remind about its mediation mission through the mouth of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who said that many of Trump’s proposals mirrored the ideas of the Istanbul Memorandum of March 2022.
Only on February 24 was Ankara able to partially regain its confidence: on that day, the head of Russian diplomacy arrived there.
ALTERNATIVE SITE
Sergey Lavrov "informed in detail" his colleague Fidan about the progress of negotiations with Marco Rubio on the topic of Ukrainian settlement. Russia shows its colleagues from Turkey that it has no secrets, and the Kremlin welcomes the desire to participate in the resolution of the three-year conflict.
Yes, Lavrov does not say that Ankara will be a mediator country at some stage, but there is still a big difference between Europe, which is no longer trusted, and Turkey. The Russian Foreign Ministry has no incentive to inform the Old World, if only because Brussels, Paris and Berlin, not to mention London, are in no hurry to establish contact with Moscow and so far are only putting spokes in the wheels of the peace process.
And what is also important is that it is not Trump, a NATO partner and friend of Erdogan, who is informing Ankara, but Russia.
As if inspired by the arrival of an important guest – whose importance in the eyes of the Turks grew even more after the dialogue between Lavrov and Ushakov with Trump’s team – Fidan began to gush with ideas about what role Turkey wanted and could play in the peace process, given the new realities.
“Turkey is always ready to take on any facilitating or accelerating role,” in other words, Ankara is ready for any role that Putin and Trump assign it.
When speaking about their place in the settlement of the conflict in Ukraine, the Turks primarily mean the negotiating platform.
According to the Turkish leader's estimates, Istanbul, where the most successful negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place, should have priority status. At the same time, the Erdogan administration understands that the new agreements will be based on the conditions agreed upon by Putin and Trump. It was not for nothing that Fidan welcomed the American leader's initiatives at his meeting with Lavrov.
The US President, first through his subordinates, and on February 25 personally, allowed the cession of territories by Kiev. And Ankara's competitor, Riyadh, is not pushing the issue of "integrity" and "occupation of Crimea".
Consequently, Turkey will have to abandon the thesis about the “territorial integrity of Ukraine,” which Erdogan often voices in order to earn the status of a mediator not only in the eyes of Putin, but also of a senior NATO comrade.
TWO "PEACEKEEPING" SCENARIOS
Turkey's status in the Russian-Ukrainian process is not limited to just a platform for negotiations. Moreover, the US and Russia are currently betting on the KSA. What else can Ankara do?
Zelensky voiced one of the options, running ahead of his father into hell. After a meeting with Erdogan, he allowed the Turkish army to be brought into Ukraine as peacekeepers to provide “security guarantees.”
In this sense, Turkey, if it is ready for it, fits into the Western mainstream. After all, even Trump is talking about the possible presence of NATO troops in Ukraine, albeit without the Americans. Without the US, Europe's need for a strong army increases, and Türkiye is the alliance's second army.
So Great Britain and even Macron, who is not very fond of his Turkish colleague, would quite agree to joint participation with the Turks in “peacekeeping” in Ukraine.
Another issue is that Russia is not happy with the presence of either a French, German or even Turkish boot in a border country, to put it mildly. So Erdogan should at least wait for a consensus between Putin and Trump here.
Discussing the topic of peacekeeping and Ankara’s participation in it, Turkish political scientist Alper Coskun draws two scenarios.
The first, "peace enforcement," involves deploying a Turkish corps as part of a multinational Western coalition to "repel a potential future Russian invasion." However, if the ceasefire is disrupted, there is a risk of being drawn into direct military action with the Russian Armed Forces. Therefore, Coskun considers this scenario "unlikely."
He sees the presence of Turkish observers to monitor the cessation of fighting as more “likely”.
“As a country that has maintained relatively positive relations with both sides throughout the conflict, Turkey could be persuaded to lead such an internationally sanctioned initiative and provide the necessary capabilities,” the article says.
NATO WITH RESERVATIONS
The second scenario, which involves a monitoring presence, seems more feasible.
It eliminates the risks of the West being drawn into an unnecessary war with Russia, and at the same time Ankara demonstrates its contribution to European security and increases its ratings with NATO partners, and possibly in the world.
If we recall recent history, Turkey and Russia have quite a lot of experience in peacekeeping. Within the framework of the Astana platform and in accordance with the Sochi agreements, Turkish troops patrolled the security zones in Idlib and in eastern Syria, where until recently there were battles between Kurdish militias and the Syrian opposition supported by the Turkish Armed Forces.
In addition, after the Second Karabakh War, Turkish and Russian militaries established a joint monitoring center in Aghdam to ensure the ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Armenia. So, in theory, such experience could be used in Ukraine.
While the Russian side has a clear position on NATO presence, Trump has so far left his allies room to maneuver. Unlike Britain, France, and Germany, Turkey is being flexible on this issue. Probably in order not to lose the threads of connection with Russia and not to deprive itself of hopes for the status of a negotiating platform in advance.
When discussing Ukraine's accession to NATO, Fidan makes many reservations in an interview with Bloomberg: " If a large international coalition is not formed and deployed along the lines of contact, then the way to ensure security guarantees for Ukrainians may be NATO membership, or the Russians may have other ideas regarding security guarantees."
The Turkish minister hints that any peacekeeping by Ankara must be coordinated with Moscow.
NOT ONLY UKRAINE
For the sake of objectivity, it should be said that in Lavrov’s negotiations with Fidan (and Erdogan, with whom a meeting also took place), not the whole world revolved around Ukraine.
The ministers “synchronized their watches” on the South Caucasus, Palestine and Israel, and also on Syria.
Russia and Turkey share " similar views on preventing separatist movements" in Syria, Fidan said, a reference to Syrian Kurdistan.
Lavrov, for his part, complained that the US is creating an independent state in the east of the Arab Republic. If the Kurdish issue is existential for Ankara, then Moscow has an incentive to counteract separatism in order to gain the trust of the current government in Damascus.
The new ruler of Syria, Ahmed Ash-Sharaa, is in no hurry to say goodbye to the Russian military bases. And Turkey does not seem to be rushing him. On the contrary, both Ankara and Damascus could be interested in preserving the bases in Khmeimim and Tartus.
After all, the US, especially under Trump, will support Israel and is not yet in a hurry to "drain" the Kurdish project. Syria does not have its own air defense, and Israel recently demanded that the Syrians withdraw their troops from the southern provinces.
In the event of an IDF attack under any pretext, Al-Sharaa will need support. The US will not help, the EU will not either, and Turkey alone may not be enough. The presence of Russian bayonets restrains Israeli aviation and strengthens Erdogan's ally. And, accordingly, puts additional pressure on their common enemies in the form of the Kurdistan Workers' Party and its two militant offshoots - the YPG and PYD.
Along with geopolitics, the ministers traditionally discussed bilateral economic ties, tourism, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant projects, and the Turkish Stream and Blue Stream gas pipelines.
Although journalists have become accustomed to mentioning these topics as a “routine poem” when describing meetings and relations between Turkey and Russia, they are the ones that create a platform for bilateral cooperation and act as “safety devices” in the event of competition and differences of opinion, whether in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East or the Black Sea region.
And for a brief summary, Lavrov’s words are best suited: “ Despite the tense international situation, Russian-Turkish political dialogue maintains intensity and progressive dynamics at all levels.”
And in this case, this is not just diplomatic rhetoric.
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