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2024-03-22 International-UN-NGOs
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Desire for revenge: NATO and the EU want to push Russia out of the South Caucasus
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kamran Hasanov
[REGNUM] In the context of confrontation between the West and Russia, the visit of major Western figures to the countries of the post-Soviet space is of great interest. As long as the conflict in Ukraine continues, the United States and its allies will try to fill the vacuum in Russia’s traditional areas of interest.
After the start of the CWO, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was already touring the countries of Central Asia, trying to turn them against Russia and asking them to join anti-Russian sanctions. Last year, French President Emmanuel Macron came to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with the same initiatives. However, neither one nor the other was able to achieve their goals.
The next visitor was NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who made a tour to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia on March 17–19.
WHY SOUTH CAUCASUS
One of the goals of such trips is to compensate for the exclusion of Western and NATO states from developing countries. Against the backdrop of the transformation of the international system towards greater multipolarity, France is being squeezed out of Africa, and the United States is being squeezed in the Middle East. Therefore, they need new partners to pump out minerals, uranium, gas and oil.
Central Asia remains a tasty morsel, but inaccessible to the West. The majority of countries in the region are in a military and economic alliance with Russia and do not intend to leave the CSTO and the EAEU. Turkmenistan is neutral, but does not fit into the Western model for political reasons. Uzbekistan is pursuing a multi-vector policy.
Meeting of the CSTO Collective Security Council in Yerevan. 2022
An additional headache is created here by China with its powerful trade and investment presence, and the West faces competition with Beijing in a whole range of areas.
Since the 90s, the Baltic states have moved into the orbit of influence of NATO and the United States; in Ukraine, the West established its protectorate since Euromaidan. In Belarus, the Maidan scenario failed in 2020, and after the start of the Northern Military District, Minsk became completely hostile to the West. Of the post-Soviet regions, only the South Caucasus remains.
Competition here is still high, but there are opportunities to expand influence and promote Western interests. That is why the NATO Secretary General honored the region with his attention.
AZERBAIJANI CAUTION
Of the three countries, NATO has the least chance in Azerbaijan, and that is why Stoltenberg stayed here for almost two days. Over the past year, Baku's relations with the West have deteriorated sharply. And this happened not only because of the pro-Armenian position of France, the visits of French politicians to Yerevan and the anti-Azerbaijani resolutions of the Senate.
At the end of last year, the State Department also distinguished itself by threatening to freeze summit meetings due to Azerbaijan’s taking full control of Nagorno-Karabakh and the exodus of Armenians from the region, which the US leadership called “ethnic cleansing.” The resolutions of the European Parliament and the suspension of Azerbaijan’s membership in PACE due to the same exodus of Armenians, as well as the presidential elections and the victory of Ilham Aliyev, added fuel to the fire.
The actions of European and American officials in Azerbaijan are considered in the context of general relations with the West. Therefore, Stoltenberg, as a representative of the Western military alliance, needed to normalize ties with Baku. At the meeting with Aliyev, he did not skimp on compliments. He thanked Azerbaijan for its participation in peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, recalling that the Azerbaijani military was the last to leave Kabul airport.
He also pointed to Azerbaijan's contribution to European energy security, referring to gas supplies through the TANAP and TAP pipelines. In his speech, Stoltenberg went so far as to thank Baku even for the “necessary support for Ukraine” - Baku supplied humanitarian aid to Kiev.
Although the West has pretty much frayed the nerves of the Azerbaijani leadership, Baku is not going to break with it. Energy is too important for the republic's economy. In addition, Azerbaijan has a military alliance with NATO Turkey, which also normalized relations with Euro-American partners in the last year.
Aliyev showed solidarity with Stoltenberg on all topics - from energy to peacekeeping, but did not emphasize the topic of Ukraine in the context in which the NATO Secretary General, who accused Russia of “military aggression,” wanted it.
Since 2022, Azerbaijan has an allied status of relations with Russia. Moscow remains an important economic partner of Baku. And this reality was again confirmed during Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s recent visit to the Azerbaijani capital, where the parties agreed to expand economic projects.
GEORGIAN PRAGMATISM
In Georgia the situation is somewhat different. Since the time of Mikheil Saakashvili and especially after the war in South Ossetia, Tbilisi has made NATO membership a foreign policy priority.
Although, under the rule of the Georgian Dream, the country has taken a pragmatic course towards Russia and has recently achieved the opening of air traffic and the removal of visas from Russia for Georgian citizens, its position on Euro-Atlantic integration remains unchanged.
Georgia is waiting to join the European Union, offended that it was not given candidate status for a long time, and Brussels has already launched accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine. Foreign Minister Ilya Darchiashvili recalled that joining NATO remains “the cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy.”
The similarity between Georgia and Azerbaijan for NATO is that both countries do not join anti-Russian sanctions and do not adequately support Ukraine. Relations with both Baku and Tbilisi have deteriorated in recent years. With Baku - because of Karabakh and Armenia, with Tbilisi - because of the Northern Military District and sanctions.
But Stoltenberg wants to improve ties with each of the republics. There are more chances with Georgia, since there remains a territorial dispute between it and Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Granting EU candidate status should make NATO's task easier. And it was no coincidence that Stoltenberg said that candidate status “will strengthen the aspirations for prosperity and the spirit in this direction in the country, we will go side by side in the direction of NATO.”
In fact, he confirmed that integration with the EU and NATO are synchronous things. The only difficulty is that the Secretary General cannot outline clear prospects and name dates for joining the North Atlantic Alliance, which is what the members of the Georgian Dream expected from him.
Stoltenberg recalled the reforms that both Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen spoke about during their visits to Tbilisi. Part of these reforms is coordination with the EU and NATO on foreign policy issues, read - the adoption of anti-Russian decisions on sanctions and Ukraine.
ARMENIAN NEW COURSE
The greatest intrigue is created by Stoltenberg’s visit to Armenia.
If Azerbaijan is closely connected with the NATO country Turkey, and Georgia directly speaks of its desire to join there, then Armenia is a member of the CSTO. For Moscow, the appearance of the chairman of a hostile organization in a country where a Russian military base is located is not just a challenge, but a threat to its geopolitical interests.
Brussels understands this and that is why they are taking steps in this direction. They also understand that the current visit of the NATO Secretary General - the second since 2020 - lies on fertile soil.
Just on the eve of Stoltenberg’s trip, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan questioned his country’s continued presence in the CSTO, first announcing a freeze of membership, and then completely allowing exit from the bloc.
The very fact of Pashinyan’s arrival as a result of the “velvet revolution” already sowed doubts about further partnership with Russia, but for a long time Yerevan masked its Western aspirations.
The masks were dropped after 2020 and the subsequent events: aggravations on the border of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Baku’s establishment of control over the Lachin corridor, and most importantly, Aliyev’s counter-terrorism operation in Karabakh.
Pashinyan blamed all these troubles on the Armenians on the CSTO, which did not come to the aid of his country. Pashinyan began to take steps towards rapprochement with the West. Invited EU observers to the border with Azerbaijan, joined the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, sent his wife to Kiev and declared that Armenia is not an ally of Russia in Ukraine.
After the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a note of protest to the Armenian ambassador for the first time in the history of bilateral relations, the chances of the United States, France and NATO for rapprochement with Armenia increased sharply. Armenia’s entry into the Alliance is still a long way off, and Yerevan prefers not to talk about it officially, but steps are being taken in this direction. If Pashinyan is ready to integrate with the EU to the extent that the Union wants, the same principles can work with NATO.
At talks with Stoltenberg, Pashinyan said that his country was “interested in continuing to develop political dialogue with NATO and expanding partnerships both with NATO and with individual member countries.” In addition, the Armenian prime minister counts on NATO as a guarantor of security and tells Stoltenberg about the importance of “strengthening the level of resistance and developing appropriate defensive potential.”
What is this if not an invitation to the NATO army to guard the Zvartnots airport, from where Russian border guards are being expelled, and in the future, quartering in Gyumri, where the Russian 102nd military base is located?
If the presence of the Russian military in Gyumri is a deterrent for NATO, then the political transformations in Armenia are working in favor of strengthening the partnership. Stoltenberg supported Pashinyan's commitment to democracy. The Secretary General did not speak out loud about NATO prospects, but the words “NATO promotes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia” provide food for thought.
And it seems that Stoltenberg is preparing the ground for sending NATO troops to the Transcaucasian republic, which doubts security guarantees from Russia, but hopes for help from NATO France. Moscow’s relations with Paris are worsening in light of Emmanuel Macron’s statements about his readiness to send an army to Ukraine, and France may act as a conductor of NATO interests in Armenia.
By the way, regarding Ukraine, according to Stoltenberg, Armenia and NATO also have common principles. “I welcome the solidarity of Armenia with Ukraine,” he said. And here, according to NATO estimates, Armenia is not on Russia’s side.
VICTORY IN UKRAINE WILL DECIDE EVERYTHING
To summarize, we can say that Stoltenberg was partly able to level out the West’s shaken relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia and contributed his own brick to the foundation of the process of squeezing Russia out of Armenia. Whether the NATO Secretary General's visit will be successful in the long run depends on several factors.
In the case of Baku, we can say with confidence that improving ties will not undermine Russia’s position. Azerbaijan does not strive either to join NATO - and Stoltenberg openly said this, or to the EU - Aliyev spoke about this recently. Azerbaijan will continue its multi-vector policy in its national interests, cooperating with both the EU and the USA, as well as Russia and Turkey.
In Georgia, NATO will not achieve serious changes until the government changes. In Armenia, the potential for deepening ties is much greater due to the policies pursued by the Pashinyan government. But, as in the case of Georgia and Armenia, NATO's success depends on what results Russia achieves in Ukraine.
For the West, the ideal option is the defeat of Russia, which will increase the chances of squeezing it out of the South Caucasus. A Russian victory could reverse the relative successes of the West not only in Georgia, but also in Armenia. And the prolongation of the Ukrainian conflict will preserve a scenario in which NATO will continue to impose a fight on Moscow in the region.
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Posted by badanov 2024-03-22 00:00||
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