Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] Against the backdrop of the SVO in Russia itself, an increase in the activity of various anti-migrant and radical nationalist structures became noticeable, which began to more aggressively promote their own agenda. This is a dangerous phenomenon for Russian statehood, since often something more is hidden under anti-migrant sentiments. Namely, an attempt to disrupt interfaith peace and the unity of our multinational people. In this context, the definitions of “anti-migrant” and “radical nationalist” should certainly be put together, since, in essence, these are the same structures. Radical ethnic nationalism and the anti-migrant agenda are often two sides of the same coin. However, they are also accompanied by a third “pillar” of such views, namely Islamophobia and anti-Islamic sentiments.
Most likely, the anti-migrant agenda itself, as a tool of those who use it, is ultimately directed precisely against Russian Islam and Russian Muslims, in the first place. Although every time certain groups of ethnic nationalists speak out against mosques, hijabs and other attributes of Islam, they emphasize that indigenous Russian Muslims have nothing to do with it, and this is only about the fight against illegal migration. That is, it turns out that, in their opinion, Russian Muslims should not go to mosques, eat halal products, and Muslim women should not wear a hijab. However, this necessary qualification seems to absolve people who hold such views from responsibility for inciting Islamophobia.
THE END OF THE “KIDNAPPINGS OF EUROPE” AND THE GROWTH OF ISLAMIC FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
And here I would like to draw attention to why it is now, against the backdrop of the Northern Military District, that such trends have begun to manifest themselves most clearly.
First of all, for a part of political and public circles that adhere to the ideology of Russian ethnic nationalism, the SVO is presented as a kind of act of purification of the Russian nation, not just in its narrow ethnic sense, but also in its confessional sense. Where “Russian” and “Orthodox” are used as synonyms.
That is, in their opinion, the Northern Military District has led or should lead to some kind of renewal of the Russian people (in the narrow ethnic sense), to change the very ideology of the Russian state and subordinate it to the interests of Orthodox Russians.
The active participation of Russian Muslims in the Northern Military District does not fit into this paradigm. Moreover, it would be okay if they were simply “ethnic”, but, as it turns out, they also fully respect and adhere to Islamic religious principles. For the latter, the constitutional foundations of Russian statehood and a sense of belonging to the multinational people of the Russian Federation are enough to repay their debt to the Motherland without looking for new ideological content, as is often the case with nationalists.
At the same time, these Muslims find themselves not just somewhere on the sidelines, but often at the forefront of the struggle for the Russian world on our new territories and old borders.
Let’s not hide the fact that for this group of nationalists it would be much more acceptable for Muslims to remain somewhere in the rear, in secondary roles, which is often the subject of various news stories in the yellow media (especially concerning units from the Chechen Republic) or words of dissatisfaction with regarding portraits of heroes of the Northern Military District with “non-Russian surnames” in Russian cities. That is, such participation of Russian Muslims seriously confused the cards for many, since the calculation was precisely that Muslims should turn out to be almost a fifth column in the event of a conflict, and this would become the long-awaited reason for their final marginalization and suppression.
But exactly the opposite happened. And instead of the expected marginalization and suppression, nationalists fear that it will no longer be possible to ignore the interests of Muslims, as was the case before, brushing aside their legitimate demands. Promises, so far promises, of the construction of numerous new mosques in the Moscow agglomeration and region are confirmation of this.
The second factor is the fears of nationalist groups advocating Eurocentric tendencies or simply European ones. That is, those who consider Russia and Russians to be an inseparable part of Europe, in the future, together with whose peoples, they must resist “Asianization” and “Islamization.”
But now the Northern Military District has separated Russia from Europe in a way that had never happened before, even during the Soviet era, and has clearly demonstrated who is our partner and friend, and who is our enemy.
Simply put, if you follow the concept of the author of one of the Russian geopolitical doctrines, Vadim Tsimbulsky, the North Military District can interrupt the cycle of “abductions of Europe,” that is, the return of Russia to Europe, and Europe to Russia after stages of confrontation and ruptures, as has happened many times since the time of Peter the Great’s coup in the end of the 17th century.
That is, now the vector of Russia will finally change for the first time since the 17th century. And Russia’s main partners will be not only China and India, but those very countries of the Muslim East, which are highlighted in the Russian foreign policy concept of 2023 precisely as the “Islamic world”, as a priority Russian partner. And this, of course, will no longer lead to the “kidnapping of Europe”, but the “kidnapping of the Islamic world” and the coming of the Islamic world to Russia and Russia to the Islamic world. Naturally, then we should expect an increase in the Islamic factor not only in Russian foreign but also in domestic policy, which for many would be unacceptable.
NATIONALISM AND MIGRATION
Actually, the migration factor, as already noted, is turning into the main ideological weapon, if not to directly counteract the processes outlined above, then to minimize them.
Because if you remove the problem of migration, then all radical ethnic nationalism (along with its exotic surrogates and other variations) will disappear, since its ideological paradigms are unlikely to find many supporters among Russian citizens. The overwhelming majority of them are quite satisfied with the current constitutional foundations of the country, since the constitutional reform did not in any way affect the provisions on the multinational people of the Russian Federation and the right of citizens to profess any religion or not to profess any. But the factor of migration, primarily from Central Asian states, is something that has been causing dissatisfaction among Russian citizens for a long time.
Therefore, Russian ethnic nationalism itself, being a relic of the past, is fueled exclusively by the problem of migration. In the current conditions, which are very different from the situation in the 90s, when the separatism of Muslim regions is being replaced by their unprecedented activity in support and participation in the Northern Military District, and instead of “power that has sold itself to the West,” the country is headed by national leaders who have abandoned that same West challenge, it is the problem of migration that is the nationalist’s saving straw. It allows you to go in and promote related topics that in themselves are not particularly interesting for Russian citizens or in which they do not see any threat, if they are not passed through the prism of migration problems, such as, for example, the same Islamic factor among the indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation.
Migration remains the element through which nationalist groups can not only “softly” criticize the authorities, but also spread anti-Islamic sentiments in society, primarily emphasizing (and exaggerating) the connection between migration and radical Islam, but through which, in turn, they can put blow and Muslim activity of “indigenous” Russian Muslims and even in the future decide the fate of the Muslim regions of Russia in a negative context for them. That is, to minimize the consequences of the growth of the Islamic factor in Russian foreign and domestic policy, which occurs against the backdrop of the Northern Military District and the break with the collective West.
Therefore, modern ethnic nationalism keeps itself alive by feeding on Russian society’s fears of uncontrolled migration.
It is through the migration factor that part of society is turned against Islam as such and against Muslims. Of course, if we talk about Islamophobia, then in order to remove any claims, instead of Muslims and Islam, such groups often use the definitions “Wahhabism” and “Wahhabis”, which have exclusively negative connotations. At the same time, this is done very freely. Didn't like the fact that a new mosque was built? Just call it “Wahhabi” and the parishioners “Wahhabis”, regardless of what views or beliefs they profess.
If we remove the problem of migration, then the degree of Islamophobia will be noticeably reduced, and along with it the problem of building mosques, hijabs, etc. will be solved, which in themselves do not create problems for the majority of Russians of non-Muslim faith, if this is not related to domination and the dominance of migrants in certain regions.
At the same time, in nationalist public pages there is gradually a process of mixing and unifying migrants from neighboring states and Russian Muslims, primarily from the Caucasus, who are citizens of Russia and are free to choose their place of residence on the territory of the Russian Federation, and also have the right to practice their religion there, according to the Constitution. But you can often see how Russians from the North Caucasus are called “migrants,” putting them on a par with visitors from Central Asia.
In this regard, what is important for nationalists is not the solution to the problem of migration as such, but its constant “refinement” and “savoring”, since through it not only various “related issues” are resolved, but also the “life” of the nationalist ideology itself is maintained.
That is, it turns out that those who present themselves as the main fighters against it are often interested in preserving the migration problem. It is also clear that no one will solve this problem in the near future and no one is actually going to solve it, but they will certainly continue to raise their ratings and popularity on this topic.
RUSSIAN MUSLIMS AND MIGRATION
On the other hand, Russian Muslims themselves should be primarily interested in solving problems associated with uncontrolled migration. Many believe that the influx of Muslim migrants from neighboring countries strengthens the position of Islam in the Russian Federation. This is not the case, unless, of course, the strengthening of the position of Islam includes the expansion of the network of halal stores and economy class cafes in areas where migrants live, whose range of goods is more harmful to health due to its low quality than meets the standards halal.
The exaggeration of the problem of migration of the Muslim population from neighboring states in the information agenda as a positive factor for the promotion of Islam by some Muslim activists puts Russia on a par with European countries where there is the same problem of migration, but there is no indigenous Muslim population. Labor migration of the Muslim population from neighboring countries, on the contrary, blurs this factor, which is unique to Russia, but absent in European countries where there are no indigenous Muslim peoples, although analogies can often be heard between the problems of Europe and Russia in connection with Islam and migration.
The influx of migrants from Central Asian states also prevents Russian Muslims themselves from realizing their own rights. For example, this factor has already led to a sharp increase in the threshold after which the authorities come to understand the need to allow the construction of mosques (again, if they manage to overcome the resistance of nationalist groups). Thus, native Russian Muslims also find themselves hostage to the migrant problem.
Once during the time of the Russian Empire, there was a norm that allowed the construction of mosques in a city or county or part of a city, if we were talking about large cities, if the number of Muslims in that area reached 500 people. So, for example, a mosque was built in Tver, where there were approximately 500 Muslims, and in Astrakhan, on one street in a Tatar settlement, Muslims built as many as three mosques next to each other without any problems. Despite the fact that then there were significantly fewer Muslims living there than today.
Now, often behind the bans on building mosques is the justification that their main parishioners will be newcomers, despite the presence of a significant community of Russian Muslims, significantly exceeding the very “500 souls” of the times of the Russian Empire. Therefore, other religious groups, whose communities are much smaller than Muslim ones, usually do not have problems opening places of worship and religious centers.
Thus, it is the anti-migrant agenda that is actively used to prevent the revival of Islamic life in a number of Russian regions.
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