Article

2023-09-09 Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

Exit from a protracted war: Ukraine makes its move

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Text via Big Serge
[ColonelCassad] SUMMER ZAPORIZHZHYA BLOCKBUSTER
The long-awaited Ukrainian grandiose summer counter-offensive has been going on for about 80 days, and there is nothing to brag about. During the summer there were fierce battles in various areas (more on them later), but the line of contact remained virtually unchanged. Ukraine still held troops in reserve, and I did not want to draw premature conclusions. After all, they could use some new trick or pull an ace out of their sleeve.

The appearance at this stage of some of the remaining advanced Ukrainian brigades, held in reserve, indicates that the directions for the offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been determined. Time will tell whether these valuable reserves will succeed in breaking through Russian lines. But enough time has passed to outline in general terms what exactly Ukraine tried to do, why and why nothing worked.

The problem with covering the war in Ukraine lies in the protracted nature of the fighting. There are those who hope for a bold operational maneuver to break the impasse. But the reality is that the combination of capability and restraint turns the conflict into a trench war with a slow pace of advance. And it is more reminiscent of the First World War than the Second.

Ukraine had intentions to break through this “meat grinder” and return to mobile operations. Get out of the grueling fight and strike at operationally significant targets. But so far these efforts have not been successful. Despite arrogant boasts of tactical superiority, Ukraine is stuck under siege, trying unsuccessfully and painfully to break through strong Russian positions. Perhaps Ukraine was not interested in a war of attrition, but attrition, of course, was already interested in itself.

STRATEGIC PARADIGM OF UKRAINE
It is worth thinking about the meaning of the war for Ukraine and the factors influencing its strategic decision-making. For her, the conduct of war is determined by many alarming strategic imbalances. Some of them are obvious: Russia's much larger population and its own military-industrial complex. And Ukraine is completely dependent on Western supplies of equipment and ammunition.

Russia can single-handedly increase arms production. And many signs from the battlefield confirm this. More new products are appearing, such as the Lancet. And Western sources admit that Russia has successfully established mass production of a localized version of the Iranian Shahid drone.

Russia also has unequal potential for striking rear areas. And Ukraine is not able to respond in kind, even if it receives the formidable ATACM missiles. They will increase the range of hitting targets at operational depth. But they will not be able to reach facilities in Moscow and Tula. Whereas Russian missiles hit any point in Ukraine.

We should not forget about Russian sovereignty and freedom of decision-making. In such conditions, a protracted positional struggle is an extremely bad choice for Ukraine. But that’s where she’s stuck right now.

This strategic disparity extends to the realm of strategic goals and timelines. Russia is deliberately waging an open war, its goals boil down more to the idea of \u200b\u200b“demilitarization” of Ukraine. In fact, territorial claims beyond the four already annexed regions remain rather vague.

Moscow definitely claims much more territory than it does now. But he deliberately conducts the operation as a military-technical event aimed at the destruction of Ukrainian armed forces. And it demonstrates complete readiness to cede territory for military reasons.

And Ukraine is pursuing maximalist goals that are of an unambiguous territorial nature. He openly declares that he strives, no matter how strange it may sound, to restore his territory within the borders of 1991. Including not only the four lost regions, but also Crimea.

The combination of two factors: Ukraine’s territorial maximalism and Russia’s asymmetrical advantages in the context of an exhausting positional struggle is forcing Ukraine to look for ways to break through the front and restore operational mobility.

Kyiv cannot afford to continue to remain trapped in a positional conflict. After all, the advantages of Russia described above will inevitably prevail. In a duel between two big guys swinging clubs, bet on the one with the bigger club. Also, positional warfare (essentially reduced to a massive siege) is not a very effective way to regain one’s territories.

Ukraine can only try to advance the front and return to mobile operations, with an eye to creating its own advantage. The only real way is to cut the most important Russian communications and supply lines. Contrary to proposals made in the spring of this year, a major offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Bakhmut or Donetsk is not suitable for this.

There are only two suitable operational targets for Ukraine. One of them is Starobelsk, the pulsating center of the Russian Lugansk front. The capture or blockade of Svatovo, and then Starobelsk, will create a real operational disaster for the Russian Armed Forces in the north of the country, with cascading consequences right up to Bakhmut. And the second is a land bridge to Crimea, which could be cut by an offensive through Zaporozhye to the Azov coast.

Ukraine's choice of the Azov option was inevitable. The land bridge to Crimea is a more confined space for military operations. And the attack on Lugansk will be carried out under the cover of the borders of the Belgorod and Voronezh regions of Russia, making the task of ousting large Russian forces much more difficult.

But an even more important reason is the complete obsession with Crimea and the Crimean Bridge - objects that will always attract Kyiv in a way that Starobelsk never could. So this offensive did not come as any strategic surprise - the video with the grinning head of the Main Intelligence Directorate Budanov did not fool anyone.

For months, the Russian Armed Forces have been filling the front with minefields, trenches, firing points and artificial barriers. Everyone understood perfectly well that Ukraine was going to attack in the direction of the Azov coast, in particular, towards Tokmak and Melitopol. Which is exactly what they then did.

A frontal attack on a prepared line of defense, without the element of surprise, is considered to be a bad decision. However, Ukraine not only launched such an attack, but also carried it out against the backdrop of general triumph and illusory expectations.

Ukraine is still constrained by a certain interpretation of the war. Kyiv and its supporters mention two successes in 2022, when Ukraine managed to recapture significant territory - in the Kharkov and Kherson regions. The problem is that none of these operations apply to Zaporozhye.

In the case of the Kharkov offensive operation, Ukraine exposed a weakly protected section of the Russian front, defended only by small covering detachments. Thanks to the dense forests and the general lack of Russian intelligence assets in the area, they were able to amass forces and achieve a degree of strategic surprise.

This does not detract from the scale of Ukraine's success. This was certainly the best use of the forces and resources available to them. And they really took advantage of a weak section of the front. But this success hardly correlates with the current situation in the south.

The mobilization that was carried out solved the problems with building up a group of troops, and now Russia no longer has to choose what to protect and what not. And the strongly fortified Zaporozhye front is not at all similar to the weakly held front in Kharkov.

The second example, the Kherson counteroffensive, is even less relevant. But the Ukrainian leadership is rewriting history in record time. In the summer and autumn of 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces banged their heads against Russian defenses in Kherson for several months and suffered terrible losses. An entire group of Ukrainian Armed Forces brigades was defeated in Kherson without achieving a breakthrough.

Despite the fact that Russian troops were in an extremely difficult operational situation - with their backs to the river. Kherson was abandoned only a few months later, due to fears that the Kakhovka dam might not withstand or would be undermined, and also because of the need to save manpower.

It is a mistake to believe that Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson did not matter. Obviously, the loss of a hard-won bridgehead is a serious setback, and the return of the western bank of Kherson was a boon for Kyiv. But let's be honest, this was not due to Ukraine's summer counter-offensive. Ukrainian officials then openly wondered whether the Russian withdrawal was a ruse or a trap.

As a result, we have one case when Ukraine identified a weakly protected section of the front and broke through it, and another when Russian troops abandoned the bridgehead due to problems with logistics and distribution of forces. Neither one nor the other is relevant for a breakthrough to the Azov coast. And a sober understanding of the Kherson counter-offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine could make Ukraine think twice before launching a frontal attack on the prepared Russian defense.

Instead, Kharkov and Kherson are presented as proof that Ukraine can defeat Russian defenses in direct combat. Although until now there have been no examples of the Ukrainian Armed Forces defeating firmly held Russian positions. Especially after mobilization, when Russia finally began to solve the problem of shortage of manpower.

Ukraine was captured by its own legend about this war, which gave it excessive confidence in its ability to conduct offensive operations. Unfortunately, for the mobilized Ukrainian Mikola, this coincided with the second narcissistic mythologeme.

One of the main advertising arguments in favor of the Ukrainian counter-offensive is the assessment of the superiority of the main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles donated by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the West. Since the first deliveries were announced, there has been no shortage of boasts about the many advantages of Western models such as Leopards and Challengers.

It was argued that experienced Ukrainian tank crews were just waiting to be “let off the leash” when they got behind the wheel of superior Western cars. Particularly amusing is the practice of calling Russian tanks “a relic of the Soviet era,” without paying attention to the fact that the Abrams (developed in 1975) and Leopard 2 (1979) are also examples of Cold War weapons.

There is nothing wrong with Western tanks, both the Abrams and the Leopard are good cars. But the belief that they can make a difference on the battlefield stems from a misconception about the role of armored vehicles. Tanks have always been and will be items of mass consumption. Tanks explode, are disabled, break down and are captured. Tank forces are being depleted much faster than people expect.

The brigades prepared for the Ukrainian offensive in Zaporozhye were significantly understaffed with equipment, and it was unreasonable to expect great results from them. This doesn't mean that tanks aren't important—armored vehicles remain a critical element of modern combat. But in a conflict of equal forces, losses of armored vehicles should always be expected, especially if the enemy maintains fire superiority.

Pride easily creeps into Ukrainian thinking, fueled by a healthy dose of despair and strategic needs. Having a distorted understanding of the successes in Kharkov and Kherson, inspired by their new shiny toys and guided by strategic interests to unblock the front - the idea of a frontal attack without strategic surprise against a prepared defense seems to them to be a good idea. Add in the good old cliché about Russian incompetence and disorder, and you have all the ingredients for an imprudent decision by Ukraine.

MISFIRE
Let's move on to the operational details. How did Ukraine decide to carry out this frontal attack on Russia's fortified Zaporozhye front? There were several clues related to geographic features and information leaks. In May, the Dreizin Report published what it claimed was a Russian version of Ukraine's operational directive, which provided a general outline of the expected course of the operation.

This document was described as a summary of Russian expectations regarding Ukraine's offensive (it was not a leak of Ukraine's internal planning documents, but a leak of Russia's best guess about Ukraine's plans). It remains to be seen whether this document is genuine or not, but we were later able to cross-check it. Which was related to another, even more infamous leak that occurred in the spring of 2023, which included the Pentagon's plan to build up combat power for Ukraine.

The NATO bloc was very generous and built a mechanized strike complex for Ukraine from scratch. And since these forces were cobbled together from many different systems from all over the world, Ukrainian formations are uniquely identified by a specific combination of vehicles and equipment. For example, the presence of “Strikers”, “Marders” and “Challengers” means the presence of the 82nd Brigade on the battlefield.

Despite Ukraine's claims of operational secrecy, observers were able to determine quite easily which Ukrainian units were on the battlefield. There are several deviations from the script: for example, the 47th Brigade was supposed to be armed with Slovenian Frankenstein M55 tanks, but then it was decided to send these low-power M55 tanks to the northern front. And the 47th Brigade received at its disposal Leopard tanks, which were originally located in the 33rd Brigade. But these are minor details, because in general we got a good idea of when and where specific formations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces enter the battlefield.

Judging by the units identified, the Dreizin Report was very close to what we saw at the beginning of the Ukrainian offensive. It ordered the attack of the 47th and 65th brigades on Russian positions south of the city of Orekhov, in the area between Nesteryanka and Novoprokopovka. In the center of this area is the village of Rabotino, and, of course, it was there that on the night of June 7-8, 2023, the first major offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces led by the 47th brigade took place.

But from this moment on, it becomes difficult to evaluate the “Dreizin Report”, since the offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces instantly collapsed. One thing is for sure - their source was right about the order in which Ukrainian units were brought into battle. And now we can detail the operational directive and confidently say that the Ukrainians were counting on something like this:

The idea, apparently, was to break through the Russian defense line with the help of a concentrated armored attack by the 47th and 65th Brigades. After which the forces consisting of the 116th, 117th and 118th Brigades were to begin to build on their success, moving towards the Azov coast - to the village of Mikhailovka and the village of Vesyoloye in the west. The task was not to get bogged down in urban battles, trying to capture Tokmak, Berdyansk or Melitopol, but to bypass them and cut them off, taking up blocking positions on the main roads.

At the same time, a less powerful, but no less important blow would be delivered from the Gulyai-Polye area and move along the axis of the village of Kamenka (formerly Belmak). This would make it possible to cover the main offensive to the west and penetrate the Russian positions, splitting their troops in the center. Overall, this is a fairly reasonable, if ambitious and not very creative plan. In many ways, it was really their only option.

What went wrong? Well, in theory it's simple. There was no breakthrough! The lion's share of the maneuver plan was devoted to developing success - reaching certain lines, occupying blocking positions, operational camouflage of the city (approx. per.: imitation of actions) and so on. But what if there is no breakthrough? How to save the operation if it failed at the initial stage?

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are stuck on the edge of Russia's outer defense line, spending considerable resources to capture the small village of Rabotino. And/or to bypass it from the east, penetrating into the gap between it and the neighboring village of Verbovoye. Thus, instead of a rapid maneuver to break through and turn towards Melitopol, we get something like this:

One could be generous and say that the village of Rabotino is the last populated area before the Ukrainian offensive reaches the main line of defense of the Russian Armed Forces, but one would have to lie . They will first have to clear the larger village of Novoprokopovka, located two kilometers to the south. Just for reference, here's a more detailed analysis of the mapped Russian defense line, based on the excellent work of Brady Africa.

The discussion about these fortifications can be confusing because it is not always clear what is meant by the popular phrase “first line of defense.” It is obvious that there are defensive structures around Rabotino and in it itself, and the Russians decided to fight for this village. So, in a sense, Rabotino is part of the “first line”. But it is more correct to talk about it as part of the “support strip” (forefield). And the first line of continuous fortifications along the entire front is located several kilometers to the south, and Ukraine has yet to reach them, let alone break through them.

But why are both sides fighting Rabotino so hard? At first glance, this is quite strange, given that in 2022 Russia chose a tactical retreat under its fire “umbrella”. But this time they are fiercely counterattacking, trying to recapture Rabotino. The value of this village is not only in its location on the T-0408 highway. It is an excellent location on a hill. Both Rabotino and Novoprokopovka are located on a hill that is 70 meters higher than the low-lying plain to the east.

And if the Ukrainian Armed Forces move forward, trying to bypass the Rabotino-Novoprokopovka line, wedging into the gap between Rabotino and Verbov, then they will be vulnerable to fire from the flanks (in particular, from anti-tank systems) from Russian troops located on the hill. Footage has been published showing Ukrainian equipment being fired from the flank from Rabotino. And I am very skeptical that Ukraine can try to seriously attack the first line of defense until it captures Rabotino and Novoprokopovka.

Even under ideal conditions this would not be easy. This includes solving various engineering problems; and obstacles designed to draw the attacker into firing lines; and perpendicular trenches that allow enfilade (flank, longitudinal) fire on advancing Ukrainian columns; and strong defenses on all major roads.

But the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have the best conditions now. They have a tired force that has exhausted much of its fighting power. Who are trying to organize an offensive using scattered and small assault troops. The Ukrainian offensive was hampered by several factors, which together led Kiev to a real military disaster

(c) by Big Serge

More from Big Serge (via Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin
Exit from a protracted war: Ukraine makes a move. Part 2

Problem 1: Hidden Defensive Line
It must be admitted that everyone somehow lost sight of the Russian defense. Earlier I wrote that Ukrainian troops will not be able to break through it. But he mistakenly believed that it would be built according to the classic Soviet principle of defense in depth (described in detail, for example, in the works of David Glanz).

Such a defense, simply put, presupposes the possibility of the enemy breaking through the first or even second line of defense. The goal of a multi-layered (or in classical terminology, “echeloned”) defense is to ensure that the enemy gets stuck in it when trying to break through.

It can penetrate the first echelon, but as it advances it is constantly being ground down by subsequent echelons. A classic example is the Battle of Kursk, where powerful German tanks broke through the Soviet defensive line, but then got bogged down and were destroyed. An analogy can be drawn with a Kevlar body armor, in which a multilayer web of fibers is used to protect against damaging factors: the bullet does not bounce off, but is delayed, and its energy is absorbed.

I accepted the idea that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would be able to achieve a breakthrough of some echelons, but I believed that they would get stuck in the subsequent ones and would be incinerated.

What I missed, and this is the merit of the Russian command, is a hidden defensive line in front of the main trenches and fortifications. This forward belt consisted of extremely dense minefields and firmly held forward positions in the support zone (forefield). And the Russians obviously intended to fight fiercely for them. Instead of breaking through the first echelon and getting stuck in the intermediate zones, the Ukrainians were repeatedly beaten in the protective zone. And when they managed to gain a foothold, the Russians successively counterattacked to push them back.

We expected Russia to conduct a defense in depth, absorbing the breaking through Ukrainian troops and grinding them down deep in the defensive lines. But in reality they demonstrated a strong commitment to defending their forward positions, the most famous of which was the village of Rabotino.

It was assumed that Rabotino would become part of the so-called “deformation zone” or “protection zone”. An easily vulnerable buffer, where the enemy is subjected to pre-prepared fire before he encounters the first belt of continuous and strong defense. And according to aerial and satellite surveys of the area taken before the Ukrainian offensive, Rabotino was located at a considerable distance from the first echelon of Russian fortifications.

It was overlooked that the Russian Armed Forces have mined areas on the approaches to Rabotino and intend to defend themselves within the security zone. The scale of mining certainly surprised the Ukrainians. This put a strain on their already limited engineering forces. Moreover, dense minefields force the Ukrainian Armed Forces to move along previously prepared paths and repeatedly cross the same lines of fire and Russian countermeasures.

Problem 2: Insufficient fire suppression
Characteristic scenes in the first large-scale offensives were undisguised columns of maneuverable forces and assets of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Which were subjected to fire from the ground (missiles, ATGMs, cannon artillery) and from the air (for example, from Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopters). What was most striking was that Ukrainian troops came under heavy fire while still in marching columns, suffering losses before reaching the firing lines to begin the offensive.

There are many reasons for this. One of them is the now familiar problem of shortage of ammunition. In anticipation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' offensive, the Russians carried out powerful air and missile strikes, knocking out large ammunition depots. And when the first Ukrainian attacks failed due to powerful unsuppressed fire from Russian troops, the United States decided to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine. Because, according to Biden, “they are running out of ammunition.”

Add to this the degradation of Ukrainian air defense, which allows Russian helicopters to operate extremely effectively along the contact line, and you have a recipe for disaster. Having neither artillery to suppress Russian fire, nor air defense to drive away Russian aircraft, the Ukrainian Armed Forces began their offensive, unsuccessfully throwing naked mobile units under a hail of fire.

Problem 3: Russian Countermeasures
It is important to understand that the range of Russian weapons now is fundamentally different from what it was during the Battle of Kherson last year. Thanks to the rapid growth of production - primarily the Lancet and adjustable glide modules for free-fall aircraft bombs.

The main superstar, of course, was the Lancet. It is believed that this loitering munition accounts for almost half of the Ukrainian artillery losses. It also filled a critical capability gap that plagued the Russian army in the first year of the war. Contrary to Western assessments that it is unable to produce enough drones, Russia has successfully increased Lancet production over a short period of time. It also established mass production of other systems, such as the Geranium attack drones.

The proliferation of the Lancet and similar systems means that there are no longer safe places within a radius of 30 km from the line of combat contact. They disrupt the deployment of critical support assets such as air defense and engineering vehicles. Increasing the vulnerability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to Russian mines and fire. The use of Ukrainian artillery in the Rabotino area has been reduced due to the threat from the Lancets. They appear to be moving artillery to other areas of the front, preferring to use HIMARS to suppress the enemy.

Issue 4: Reusing Engagement Paths
The Ukrainian Armed Forces failed to make a breakthrough in the Rabotino sector on the first attempt, and they are forced to constantly bring up additional units and resources to attack these positions. Moreover, they have to overcome the same routes of entry into battle, use the same rear area to assemble and deploy strike forces.

This significantly simplifies the task of Russian intelligence, since the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have an effective way to disperse forces and assets or hide their transfer. The formed Ukrainian forces and materiel repeatedly took refuge in villages located directly outside the city of Orekhov - Tavriysky and Omelnik.

Russia is capable of striking rear infrastructure facilities, such as ammunition depots. And frankly, there are only so many places where these assets can be deployed if you are repeatedly advancing on the same 20 km wide front.

Recently, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Anna Malyar complained that the 82nd Brigade, recently deployed to Orekhov, was subjected to a series of Russian airstrikes. And she claimed that this happened due to non-compliance with the secrecy regime, as a result of which the Russians became aware of the whereabouts of the brigade.

However, this is pointless: the entire area of the operation around the town of Orekhov is no more than 25 km deep (from the village of Kopani to Tavriysky) and 20 km wide (from Kopani to Verbovoy). This is a small area where a huge number of troops passed along the same roads throughout the summer. The idea that Russia needs some kind of inside information to begin surveillance and destroy targets in the area is absurd.

Problem 5: Fragile Brigades
To “destroy” an operational-level unit requires significantly fewer casualties than is commonly believed. It can be disabled as early as 30% of losses (depending on how they are distributed). When people hear the term “annihilation,” they think it means complete loss. In colloquial speech this word is used precisely in this meaning, but for the military it is important whether the formation is capable of fulfilling the tasks assigned to it. And this opportunity may disappear much faster than it seems.

For a number of reasons, this is especially true for Ukrainian armored vehicles. Firstly, these brigades began combat operations seriously understaffed (for example, the Ukrainian 82nd brigade has only 90 Stryker armored vehicles, while the American one has at least 300). Moreover, these brigades were hastily put together from separate parts and do not have their own repair base.

Ukrainians have to engage in cannibalization. They allocate “donor” equipment, which they write off for disassembly for spare parts. This means that initially understaffed mechanized brigades will have a monstrously low equipment replacement rate and will face hidden attrition due to cannibalization.

When by mid-July Ukraine had already lost 20% of its maneuver forces and assets, this led to a catastrophic decrease in combat effectiveness. Leading brigades that have expended 50% or more of their maneuver assets can no longer properly carry out their combat missions. And the Ukrainians are forced to prematurely introduce second-echelon units into battle.

At the moment, there are remnants of at least ten different brigades in the Rabotino area, and the 82nd may join them in the near future. But the NATO plan to increase the combat power of the Armed Forces of Ukraine provided for the deployment of only 9 brigades that had undergone retraining, plus several restored Ukrainian formations. And we can confidently say that spending all these forces on 71-day battles just to break into the forefield was not part of their plans.

Looking into the abyss
I have seen many comments from analysts and writers that the introduction of additional Ukrainian units into the Rabotino sector is a signal for the start of the next phase of the operation. This is complete nonsense!

Ukraine is still in the first phase of the offensive. And only the failure of the first echelon brigades forced them to send the second (and third) wave to carry out the tasks of the initial stage. The initial attack, carried out by the 47th Brigade, was intended to make a hole in the supply line around Rabotino and advance further south to the main defensive lines. This failed, and now, in order to achieve the goals of the first phase of the offensive, additional brigades that were previously intended to enter the breakthrough are being systematically introduced into the battle - the 116th, 117th, 118th, 82nd, 33rd and others.

These brigades have not yet been destroyed, as they are being brought into battle in parts. At the moment, Ukrainian casualties account for most of the entire brigade, scattered among smaller units. More than 300 units of maneuverable equipment (tanks and armored vehicles) were lost. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are slowly but surely burning out their entire operational group, but have not yet broken through Russia’s supply line.

The great counteroffensive turns into a military disaster.
This does not mean that the operation failed, just because it is still ongoing. History teaches that it is unwise to draw premature conclusions. Luck and the human factor (bravery and intelligence, cowardice and stupidity) can always influence the situation. But so far the trajectory of events undoubtedly leads to the complete failure of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are still trying to somehow adapt. For example, they abandoned the tactic of advancing mechanized columns without support. And they are now relying on small infantry detachments, slowly trying to move forward in the area between Rabotino and Verbov. The transition to dispersal is intended to reduce the level of losses, but further reduces the likelihood of a sudden breakthrough. And it marks a temporary refusal of decisive action and a transition to that very protracted positional war.

It should be noted that in this whole story there are tangible Russian losses. Russian troops in the Rabotino sector required rotation and reinforcement, including through elite units of the Airborne Forces and Marine Corps. Russia suffered losses from counter-battery fire, lost equipment in counterattacks, and killed people holding their positions. The initial assault groups of the Ukrainian Armed Forces had great combat power. The fighting was bloody for both sides. This is not a one-sided shooting gallery, but a high-intensity war.

But the fact of the matter is that Ukraine seems unable to get out of the positional war in which it finds itself. Declaring a return to “war of maneuver” is, of course, good. But if there is no way to break through the enemy’s defenses, all this is just empty boasting. The nature of the struggle remains protracted. And if the question you have is: “Will we have time to break through the defenses before we run out of forces and means” - this is not a maneuver, but a retreat.

In my series of articles on military history, I have examined many cases in which armies desperately tried to unblock the front and restore a state of operational maneuver. But when there is no technical capability for this, all these intentions do not matter in the slightest. Nobody wants to end up on the other side of the loss count, but sometimes your wishes don't matter at all. Sometimes exhaustion just forces itself on you.

Without the ability to successfully break through Russia's powerful defenses—more long-range guns, air defenses, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, electronic warfare capabilities, military engineering assets, and more—Ukraine is trapped in a rough-and-tumble battle. Two big guys are swinging batons, and Russia has the bigger one.

Two bad reasons
Against the backdrop of a clear misfire and growing strategic disappointment, two new narratives are increasingly being heard. They are used to explain why the Ukrainian operation is actually going well (despite almost universal recognition in the West that its results are, at best, unsatisfactory). I would like to briefly touch on each of them.

Justification No. 1: “The first stage is the most difficult”
You can often come across the statement that it is enough for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to break through the supply line and the rest of the defensive structures will fall down like dominoes. Allegedly, the Russians have no reserves, and subsequent defensive lines are insufficiently manned. If you break through the first one, the rest will immediately collapse.

Perhaps such thoughts calm someone down, but they are quite irrational. We can start with the Russian doctrinal scheme of defense in depth, which assumes the free distribution of reserves throughout the depths of the defensive system. But it will probably be more fruitful to turn to visual evidence.

Consider Russia's behavior over the past six months - it has spent enormous effort creating a defense in depth. Really, to waste all their combat power in battles right in front of them?

There is also no evidence that Russia is experiencing difficulties in providing the front with manpower. We are seeing constant rotations and redeployments amid the general process of expansion of the armed forces. Of the two warring parties, it is Ukraine that is now scraping its bottom in search of manpower.

Rationale #2: “Get within shooting range”
This is a more fantastical story, a radical shift in the original goals. The narrative is that Ukraine does not actually need to advance to the sea and physically cut the land bridge. It is enough just to come within firing range of the supply routes to cut off Russian troops. This theory is actively promoted on the social network X (Twitter) by such personalities as Peter Zeihan (a man who knows nothing about military affairs).

There are many problems associated with this theory, most of which stem from an inflated understanding of the concept of “fire control.” Simply put, being “in range” of artillery fire does not mean effectively blocking an area or cutting off supply lines. If this were so, then Ukraine would not be able to attack from Orekhov at all, since the entire direction of its access to combat lines is within the Russian shelling zone. In Bakhmut, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continued to fight for a long time after their main supply routes fell into the zone of destruction of Russian troops.

Most combat missions are accomplished within the range of at least some of the enemy's long-range weapons. And the idea that Russia will collapse if the Ukrainian Armed Forces manage to shoot down to the coastal route near the Sea of Azov is quite ridiculous. After all, Russia’s main railway supply line is already within the range of Ukrainian HIMARS, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces are successfully striking coastal cities such as Berdyansk.

At the same time, Russia regularly attacks the Ukrainian rear infrastructure - and so far none of the armies has collapsed. This is because long-range fire weapons are a tool that allows you to increase enemy losses and achieve operational goals. But they don't win wars just by targeting his supply routes.

But let's assume that the Ukrainians will still manage to advance - not all the way to the coast, but far enough so that Russia's main supply routes are within artillery range. What will they do? Will they bring a battery of howitzers, place them at the very front line and start shelling the road non-stop? What do you think will happen to these howitzers?

Counter-battery systems will undoubtedly cover them. The idea that you can just drag in a big gun and start shooting at Russian supply trucks is actually quite childish. Depriving enemy troops of supplies has always required physically blocking transit, and that is what Ukraine will have to do if it wants to cut the Russian land bridge.

Red herring
We must not forget about the second direction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ offensive—in the east, in the Donetsk region. Here the Ukrainians advanced a considerable distance along the highway from the village. Velikaya Novoselka, capturing several settlements.

The problem with this “other” Ukrainian offensive is that it is, in a word, meaningless. This line of attack is in the most important operational sense futile, since it involves the advance of groups along a narrow road corridor that does not lead to anything important.

As in the Rabotino sector, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are located at a considerable distance from serious Russian fortifications, and, even worse, the road and settlements in this direction lie along a small river. Rivers are known to flow in lowlands, which means that the road runs along the bottom of a wadi/dam/glacis - choose your favorite term. Essentially, this road network is nothing more than a single lane road on both sides of the river.

I believe that this direction was planned as a ruse to create the appearance of operational confusion. But when the main efforts in the Orekhovsky direction turned out to be a colossal misfire, it was decided to continue this offensive for propaganda purposes. Ultimately, this is simply not the right axis of attack to have a significant impact on the course of the war as a whole. The forces deployed here are relatively insignificant in the grand scheme of things, and they have no intention of advancing anything important. A needle-thin breakthrough will not allow one to travel more than 80 km along a single-lane road to the sea and win the war.

Conclusion: Mutual reproaches
One of the surest signs that Ukraine’s counteroffensive has taken a catastrophic turn is the way Kyiv and Washington began blaming each other “while the dead were still warm.” Zelensky blamed the West for being too slow to deliver needed equipment and ammunition, arguing that unacceptable delays allowed the Russians to improve their defenses. This seems rather vulgar and ungrateful to me. NATO created a new army for Ukraine from scratch in the conditions of a significant reduction in training time.

For their part, Western experts began to blame Ukraine for allegedly not being able to use “combined arms combat.” This is indeed a very ridiculous attempt to use terminology (and incorrectly) to justify the problem. “Combined arms combat” is the combination and simultaneous use of various types of weapons, such as armored vehicles, infantry, artillery and aviation.

To claim that Ukraine and Russia are incapable of this intellectually or organizationally is extremely stupid. The Red Army had a complex and extremely deep doctrine of joint operations. One of the professors at the US School of Advanced Military Studies noted that: “The most complete core of theoretical works on operational art can still be found among Soviet authors.” The idea that joint operations is some kind of alien and innovative concept for Soviet officers (a caste that includes the Russian and Ukrainian high command) is simply ridiculous.

And the point here is not some kind of doctrinal stubbornness of Ukraine, but a combination of structural factors caused by the inadequacy of its combat power and the changing nature of military operations.

It is foolish to argue that Ukraine needs to learn “joint operations” when it does not have important capabilities to successfully conduct maneuver warfare. For example, adequate long-range weapons, operational aviation (and no F-16 will fix this), engineering tools and electronic warfare systems.

In essence, this is not about doctrinal flexibility, but about real possibilities. An analogy can be drawn with how a boxer would be sent into a fight with a broken arm, and then his technique would be criticized. The problem is not technique - the problem is that he is injured and physically weaker than his opponent. The problem for Ukraine is not that they are not able to coordinate the actions of types and branches of troops, but that their arms are broken.

Additionally, and I admit this is shocking to me, Western observers do not seem to accept the possibility that the accuracy of modern long-range weapons (whether Lancet drones, guided artillery shells or GMLRS missiles for HIMARS), combined with the density of surveillance systems and reconnaissance, may (except in very specific circumstances) make large-scale mobile operations impossible.

When the enemy is able to monitor areas of concentration, strike with cruise missiles and drones against infrastructure in the rear, precisely shoot the approaches with artillery and fill the ground with mines, how can one maneuver at all?

Joint operations and maneuvering presuppose the ability to quickly concentrate enormous combat power and fiercely attack weak points. This is impossible given the density of Russian intelligence and firepower, as well as the numerous obstacles they have erected to deny the Ukrainian Armed Forces freedom of movement and constrain their actions. The main examples of maneuvering in Western history—the campaigns in Iraq—have very little to do with the situation in Zaporozhye.

Ultimately, we returned to war in large forces, with extensive use of reconnaissance and destruction weapons. The only way for Ukraine to maneuver the way they want is to break through the front.

What can only be done with the help of a larger amount of everything necessary - engineering equipment, shells and artillery, missiles, armored vehicles. Only mass action can make a suitable breach in Russian borders, otherwise they risk getting bogged down in a protracted defense breakthrough. And to criticize them for their inability to understand some magical Western concept of “joint operations” is the strangest kind of reproach.

How will the war develop further? The question is whether we will believe that Ukraine will ever again have a more powerful assault potential than the one with which it began the summer. The answer is obvious - no.

Cobbling together these understaffed teams is like pulling their teeth out in advance. The hope that after the defeat in the battle for Zaporozhye, NATO will miraculously assemble an even more powerful contingent for Ukraine seems far-fetched. Moreover, American officials were quite clear that this was the best mechanized contingent that Ukraine could get.

It is foolish to argue with the assertion that this was Ukraine's best chance for a real operational victory, which is now slowly turning into modest but extremely costly tactical successes. As a result, Ukraine will not be able to avoid a war of attrition. And this is precisely the war that she cannot win. Due to all the disproportions that we talked about earlier.

Also, Ukraine will not be able to win a protracted positional war due to its own maximalist definition of the concept of “victory.” Kyiv insists it will not surrender until it returns to its 1991 borders. And the failure to dislodge Russian forces poses a particularly vexing problem. We will either have to admit defeat and Russian control of the annexed territories, or continue to fight stubbornly until Ukraine becomes a failed state.

Trapped in a fight with batons, when attempts to unblock the front through maneuvers are reduced to zero, Ukraine most of all needs a much larger baton. The alternative is complete strategic disaster.

Posted by badanov 2023-09-09 00:00|| || Front Page|| [23 views ] Top

#1 One of the surest signs that Ukraine’s counteroffensive has taken a catastrophic turn is the way Kyiv and Washington began blaming each other “while the dead were still warm.”

A lesson for Ukrainians: if you're a dog, don't volunteer for bear baiting.

A lesson for Americans: foreign wars are opium for the People.

It's all explained in the following American folk song.

Posted by Grom the Reflective 2023-09-09 01:44|| 2023-09-09 01:44|| Front Page Top

Posted by Abu Uluque 2023-09-09 12:40|| 2023-09-09 12:40|| Front Page Top