Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] Libyan Foreign Minister (Government of National Unity) Najla Mangoush was suspended from work immediately after information surfaced about her meeting with Israeli counterpart Eli Cohen . Tripoli does not recognize the Jewish state, and all contacts with its representatives there are prohibited by law.
The meeting took place last week in Rome, but the publication ban was lifted on Sunday evening. It was emphasized that this is the first ever meeting of the foreign ministers of the two countries.
Western agent in the Libyan government?
After this publication, protests broke out in Libya demanding the resignation of Najla Mangush. The Foreign Ministry of the Government of National Unity of Libya (GNU) released a statement on Sunday calling the meeting in Rome "random, unofficial and unprepared."
In turn, such a step by Mangush seriously weakens the position of the head of the PNU, Abdulhamid Dbeiba , around whom clouds continue to gather. This is all the more important given the continuing division of the country and the continued activity of the alternative Government of National Stability in the east.
Foreign Minister Mangush herself remained the "face of Libya", turned to the EU and the US, and repeatedly carried out the decisions of Brussels and Washington, without any coordination with the leadership (PNU and the Presidential Council). We can say that she was an outspoken lobbyist for the US and the EU. They had repeatedly wanted to fire her before, but Dbeiba did not dare to take this step so as not to spoil relations with the West.
For example, during a visit to Turkey, Mangush asked the Turkish troops to “go out”, they say, this is the decision of the Libyan forum (despite the fact that the GNU did its best not to advertise this decision, lobbied by the US and the EU, especially regarding Turkish troops). The Turks then got out and even praised Mangush in their statements. Like, everything is correct, and all mercenaries must leave Libya.
Then she was left at her post.
You can also recall how Mangush was removed from work by the Presidential Council after the decision to extradite the person involved in the case of the 1988 terrorist attack on the Scottish city of Lockerbie to the United States. Again, then Dbeiba defended it, because he did not want a break with the US and the EU.
But there are limits to everything, especially since Mangush and her department, in fact, lived their own lives, repeatedly substituting both Dbeiba and PNU, especially, as now, in the most difficult periods.
Elections amid fragmentation
At the moment, things are moving towards new elections in the country, and the chair under Dbeiba has staggered again. This time, the head of the UN mission to support Libya, Abdoulaye Batili , said at a briefing at the UN Security Council on August 22 that the new unified government of Libya is a necessary condition for holding elections in the country.
Thus, Batili signaled that Dbeiba should leave, handing over powers to the new government. Although the same applies to the Government of National Stabilization of Osama Hamad operating in the east of Libya.
Therefore, for conspiracy theorists, the version that Mangush deliberately “set up” Dbeiba, putting him under attack not only from the UN (and the West), but now also from his own supporters, may seem quite capable.
On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that even if Dbeiba leaves and a new government is formed that will lead the country to elections, their holding may mark not so much stabilization as a new escalation and another civil war, as has already happened in recent Libyan history.
The country is still fragmented, with a large number of different groups and factions operating in it, united under various "umbrella commands", the most famous of which is the LNA (Libyan National Army or LAAF - Libyan Arab Armed Forces), operating in the east and south of the country.
However, its leadership does not fully control most of the groups formally subordinate to it. The process of decentralization became especially noticeable after the defeat of the LNA near Tripoli in 2020, and now there can be no talk of assembling a shock fist for a campaign in the west of the country.
In turn, in the very west of Libya, military integration is even more conditional. In Tripoli, military clashes periodically occur between various power blocs that are formally subordinate to Dbeiba.
So, on August 14, battles took place in Tripoli between the two most combat-ready units. On the one hand, these were the Deterrence Forces to combat organized crime and terrorism, and on the other, Colonel Mahmoud Hamza's "brigade 444" .
Therefore, the holding of elections alone without national reconciliation is unlikely to lead the country to sustainable peace.
Libyan "Game of Thrones"
The fight for control of Libya looks so confusing to an outside observer that it is easier to understand the ups and downs of the struggle for the fantasy universe of Westeros by starting to watch the cult series from the middle. But let's try to do it anyway.
In 2014, already in “post-Gaddafi” Libya, a new civil war broke out, when parliamentary elections ended with mixed results. Less than 20% of the Libyan voters took part in them, and in a number of regions they were not held at all. Then part of the country's political forces refused to recognize the results of the vote, and the Supreme Court annulled them.
Another part of the political forces that achieved success in the elections formed a parliament - a house of representatives headed by Aguila Saleh - and teamed up with military leader Khalifa Haftar . Haftar had previously opposed the country's General National Congress, whose powers were expiring in connection with the new elections. This alliance was able to find support in the east of Libya and placed its institutions in the eastern cities of Tobruk and Benghazi.
At the same time, stereotypes often voiced in the media that the confrontation in the country is a war between the so-called. "Islamists" and secular military led by Haftar.
Various "Islamist" groups, as well as "Gaddafi" groups, were present in both opposing camps and changed frequently.
For example, the Libyan "Muslim Brotherhood" (an organization whose activities are banned in the Russian Federation) is now in opposition to the current head of the PNE, Dbeiba, and support the initiatives of Saleh and Haftar. Although, starting a campaign against Tripoli in 2019, Haftar said that he was going to fight precisely with the “Muslim brothers”.
This stage of the civil war, which began in 2014, ended in a draw and ended with the creation in early 2016, at the initiative of the UN, of the Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Faiz Sarraj . The PNS was supported by part of the forces operating in the west of Libya, both "Islamists" and secular "regionalists", for example from Misrata and Zintan, as well as the Berbers.
Nevertheless, the PNS never received a vote of confidence from the House of Representatives, and therefore the legitimacy of the PNS was often disputed (as well as the legitimacy of the House of Representatives itself, taking into account the decision of the Supreme Court that did not recognize the election results).
After that, the division of Libya was fixed.
In the east of the country, its own government was formed, its own national bank and the national oil corporation, which duplicated the functions of the structures located in Tripoli.
How Russia and Türkiye established peace in Libya
A new phase of the civil war began in 2019, when Khalifa Haftar tried to capture Tripoli and remove the Sarraj government.
However, the majority of Western Libyans opposed Haftar, who was assisted by the UAE, Egypt, France and Russian PMCs, and supported the actions of various armed groups operating under the auspices of the GNA.
In addition, Turkey intervened in the conflict on the side of Sarraj, which predetermined the retreat of Haftar's troops from Tripoli.
Relative calm and a ceasefire between the opposing forces was achieved through the efforts of Russia and Turkey.
Then, after the unsuccessful attempt by the Libyan commander Haftar to take Tripoli from Sarraj during the 2019-2020 campaign. Moscow and Ankara were able to agree on the boundaries of the parties along the Sirte-Jufra line and stop the hostilities.
This was facilitated both by the participation of Russian PMCs on the side of Haftar's forces, and the Turkish military and Syrian mercenaries on the side of Sarraj. Without the support of Russian PMCs and the Turkish military, the parties to the conflict could not count on the continuation of hostilities, becoming dependent on Moscow and Ankara in terms of decision-making.
However, the US and its European allies tried to prevent Russia and Turkey from resolving the Libyan issue without their participation.
The West was forced to intervene more actively in the Libyan settlement. In fact, the convening of the Libyan National Dialogue Forum and the formation of a new presidential council chaired by Muhammad Menfi and the Government of National Unity (GNU), headed by Abulhamid Dbeiba, which was supposed to lead the country to elections in December 2021, was the result of Western interference in the process.
Nevertheless, the Dbeiba government itself was far from following in line with the decisions of the West, as before, in many ways continued to focus on Turkey. Although, as mentioned above, certain positions in the new cabinet included politicians with an undeniably pro-Western orientation, such as Foreign Minister Najla Mangush.
The collapse of Western stabilization plans
Given the continued influence of Ankara on Tripoli and Moscow on Benghazi, which jointly ensured the preservation of peace in the country, the West began to pay increased attention to the topic of foreign military personnel in Libya, of course, referring primarily to those associated with Russia and Turkey, from which the US and the EU in every possible way tried to get rid of, making this question fundamental.
Obviously, this was not the problem on which the fate of the Libyan peace process depended, but it was it that diverted all the attention of Western diplomats from the really important issues of the inter-Libyan dialogue. This, in particular, led to the disruption of the elections scheduled for December 24, 2021.
After that, another consolidation of the division of the country into “West” and “East” took place in Libya.
The eastern authorities, led by military leader Haftar and head of the House of Representatives Saleh, refused to recognize the legitimacy of PNE Dbeiba (it should be noted that this happened back in the fall of 2021), and after the December elections were canceled, Saleh initiated the creation of an alternative National Stabilization Government headed by the former the Minister of the Interior in the GNA, Sarraj Fathi Bashaga , who had a strong position in the west of the country and with the help of whom they expected to remove Dbeiba.
In turn, at the same time, there was a rapprochement between the House of Representatives of Saleh and the Supreme State Council (analogous to the Senate) headed by Khaled al-Mishri , in which the Libyan “Muslim Brotherhood” was represented mainly, and their collaboration with Haftar and Saleh against Dbeiba.
The 6 + 6 committee, which was itself created by the chamber and the council, was supposed to provide preparations for the elections, bypassing the activities of the GNU Dbeiba.
The cancellation of the elections also testified to the collapse of efforts to impose settlement formats on the country under the auspices of Western diplomats and according to their patterns, without taking into account local specifics. Every time, representatives of the United States and leading European capitals (whose representatives, such as Abdoulaye Batili's predecessors, Slovak Jan Kubiš or American diplomat Stephanie Williams , also acted on behalf of the UN) make the same mistakes.
In particular, they then focused on secondary issues of the peace process, turning them into fundamental ones - for example, on the withdrawal of foreign military and armed groups from the country. Others, on the contrary, returned to seemingly priority topics on the agenda, but only when there was practically no chance of their implementation, making rash statements (like Kubis’ statement about supporting the dubious election law adopted by Saleh, in fact, without a vote in the House of Representatives ).
Sons enter the arena
All this led to the fact that two Libyan parallel governments - Dbeib and Bashagi, each of which received international support and was called legitimate, switched to open armed confrontation at the very end of August 2022.
Of course, both the Ukrainian events and the distraction of the main international actors on the Libyan field played a role here.
With Bashaga unable to establish his control over Tripoli as a result of this failed military action, he and his supporters could no longer be relied upon as an effective tool.
Haftar now seeks to build ties directly with the head of the GNU, Dbeiba, having come to the conclusion that it is impossible to remove him through a rebellion. The line of communication between Haftar and Dbeiba was established through their sons.
In turn, the House of Representatives removed Bashaga from office and transferred his powers to Finance Minister Osama Hamad , who is a close ally of Haftar.
In addition, Haftar has established direct contacts with the leaders of the most influential groups in Tripoli, again through his sons, who are beginning to play an increasing role under the aged commander.
Russia is still in the game
At the end of August, it was Saddam , the son of Khalifa Haftar, who led the operation to oust Chadian rebels from southern Libya and close their military camps there. It is significant that at the same time the Libyan National Army (LNA) demonstrated its ability to land an airborne assault.
Also, interestingly, on November 1, 2021, Saddam Haftar visited Tel Aviv for a secret meeting with Israeli officials, allegedly seeking to establish diplomatic relations in exchange for Israeli "military and diplomatic assistance." However, at that time there was no official confirmation of this, nor did it cause any public outcry, in contrast to the Mangush negotiations.
In addition, Saddam met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov , who visited Libya in August this year. It could be about strengthening military cooperation between Russia and the LNA, especially against the background of the transfer of Wagner PMC assets in this country under the control of the Ministry of Defense.
On the other hand, Russia also maintains relations with the military command in the west of Libya, associated with the Dbeiba government.
For example, in November 2021, a Russian high-ranking military delegation visited Tripoli, where they were received by the chief of the general staff of the armed forces in the west of the country, General Muhammad al-Haddad .
Thus, Russia will continue to participate in the Libyan peace process, maintaining a balanced relationship with all parties to the dialogue.
And the resumption of work this summer of the Russian embassy in Tripoli should improve Moscow's ability to build relations with Libyan politicians not only through military and "informal", but also through official diplomatic channels, making them permanent.
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