Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
Commentary by Russian military correspondent Kotenok
[ColonelCassad] Answers to questions about the course of the SVO for the channel of the military correspondent Yuri Kotenok.
1) Into what stages would you divide the past 10 months of CBO?
1. From the beginning of the NWO to the departure from Kyiv.
2. Late March-early May - the end of the battle for Mariupol.
3. May-July - the liberation of the LPR.
4. August-September - APU counteroffensive. Loss of Izyum, a successful defensive operation on the bridgehead on the right bank.
5. October-December - the final formation of a positional front, withdrawal from Kherson.
2) What victory at the front do you consider the most significant?
The defeat of the enemy in the Severodonetsk-Lisichansk agglomeration, which allowed the liberation of the territory of the LPR. Further in importance, one can put the encirclement and defeat of the Mariupol grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In both battles, the enemy suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, losing large cities and leaving large territories.
In addition, the victory near Mariupol allowed Russia to break through a land corridor to the Crimea and make the Sea of Azov an inland sea of Russia.
3) A similar question, but with a minus sign. Which of the failures made the most painful impression on you?
The defeat at Balakliya, which entailed a forced withdrawal from Izyum and the subsequent loss of Kupyansk and Krasny Liman. This strike was warned, but no proper measures were taken, as a result of which the loss of territory and a significant material part was allowed. From a military point of view, this is our most significant defeat in 2022.
4) Now, 10 months after the start of the NWO, is it possible to say that we were not sufficiently prepared for the level of military conflict that is taking place in Ukraine?
As events at the front showed, no one was fully prepared for the type of war that began in Ukraine. Including Russia, which has to adapt to a type of war for which it was not prepared. As I pointed out back in March, the war will follow the path of Syrianization, which implies extended fronts and an indefinite duration of the war with its maximum internationalization. The problems of the Russian Federation are mainly of an objective nature, which was further aggravated by various unforced errors of an organizational and managerial nature, some of which were officially recognized already in the autumn.
5) One of the main characters of the SVO was the fighters of the Wagner PMC, who showed themselves excellently in combat operations. Was this expected, given the participation of this PMC in the Syrian war, or was it still some kind of surprise?
Since I followed the operations of the Wagner PMC in Syria, Libya and Africa, there are no particular surprises about its success. The high-quality assault work of the Wagner could be observed in Syria (for example, during the assault on Palmyra and Akerbat) or in Libya, during the battles for Tripoli. Of course, for those who did not monitor the work of Wagner in remote theaters, the successes of the PMCs were somewhat unexpected. The main result of this participation is that PMCs received final legalization in Russia, even in the absence of a law regulating the activities of PMCs. Not de jure, but de facto.
6) What is the main domestic political outcome of the past months?
The main result is that Russia has finally acquired full military-political and economic sovereignty. The current world order is obviously collapsing and Russia is now fighting for its place in the future multipolar world. Nobody said it would be easy and painless. But now everything depends only on ourselves. Unlike most other countries that do not have a military-political subjectivity, we are now completely independent.
That in itself justifies the beginning of the NWO, although even according to Putin, this was belated, following the promises of the West. Of course, these processes seriously affect the internal situation in the country. On the one hand, I like the changes that I see in society, but on the other hand, they are still insufficient. It will take some time before we fully pay off the "holy 90s"
7) Which countries have proved to be reliable partners of Russia during these months? And, on the contrary, which states have disappointed with their position?
China, Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, Belarus, Cuba.
| Goodness, what a list. George W. Bush is no doubt not surprised, but it does reinforce the image of President Putin as a cartoon villain. |
As for disappointments, I personally don't have any. Everyone behaves within the limits of expectations, even some partners in the CSTO, from whom I initially did not expect anything (this does not apply to Belarus, which, to the best of its ability, provided assistance to the Russian Federation).
Separately, it is worth finding out Turkey, which sits on two chairs and is guided by its own benefit. Despite delivering weapons to Ukraine, Erdogan has managed to remain a useful companion for Russia, helping to redirect trade flows and build parallel import schemes. "Friend Rejep" is certainly not an ally and it is not recommended to turn his back on him, but the "nothing personal - just business" interaction scheme still works.
8) In your opinion, to what extent did the NWO bring Russia and the United States closer to the possibility of a direct clash? Or are these risks of a completely different nature?
These risks are now very high and such a collision could occur as early as 2023. The reasons for this are obvious - the United States, having failed to achieve the defeat and surrender of Russia, is forced to continue to raise the stakes, but they have not so many moves left before the issue of using nuclear weapons comes to the fore, as in 1962 or 1983.
Russia, of course, is not interested in such a nuclear crisis, but one must be prepared for it in the event of a NATO attack on Belarus or Kaliningrad. The better Russia will convey such prospects to the West, the greater the chance that the notorious red line will not be crossed. In the meantime, we see how Russia's red lines are pointedly ignored, because they do not threaten the West with destruction. The West understands only strength, not concerns with protests in an embrace.
9) How adequate is the point of view that the whole of 2022 was a kind of preparation for the decisive campaign of the year 2023?
In my opinion, this is a simplification. 2022 was the first year of a war that will not necessarily last only 2 years. Considering the experience of the Iran-Iraq and Indo-Pakistan wars, as well as the experience of Syria, such a war could go on for much more than two years. The United States is already frankly planning to accompany the war until 2025-2026. We need to do the same, forming the readiness and ability to wage such a war for several years (if we finish earlier - good), simultaneously dealing with the issues of modernizing the country to the current economic and military-political realities. At the same time, it is important to understand that the Cold War, regardless of the timing of the war in Ukraine, will go on for a long time, just as the end of the Korean War did not lead to the end of the Cold War. So we need to tune in to a long conflict and serious work to develop the country in the new realities.
Of course, the sanctions will not be lifted in the foreseeable future. In addition, other conflicts are likely, where the Russian Federation and the United States will collide on the territory of third countries. But whoever remembers the past Cold War knows how it happens. Well, regarding purely military successes at the front, everything depends solely on the military and how they will conduct the 2023 campaign.
Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin says:
https://t.me/boris_rozhin - the broadcast of hostilities in Ukraine continues as usual in Telegram, who are interested, subscribe
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