|
2022-12-27 Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
|
|
About the course of the NWO. 26.12.2022
|
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
 [ColonelCassad] Answers to questions about the course of the SVO for the channel of the military commander Yuri Kotenok.
1) How to evaluate the outcome of Zelensky's visit to the States? How right are the Western media who claim that the trip did not bring practical results, since it did not affect the list of weapons supplied to Kyiv?
The list of weapons was determined by the Pentagon and the White House a week before the visit. Zelensky was needed to push through the defense budget with the necessary parameters before the House of Representatives came under the control of the Republican Party. And this task was solved, no matter how much the Republicans are now indignant about this performance. Zelensky here, as usual, played the role of a puppet, which is controlled from the Biden administration, including in the interests of US domestic policy. The United States perfectly defines the parameters of the war in Ukraine even without Zelensky, he is not needed for this.
2) There is a lot of PR around sending the "Patriot" air defense system to Ukraine. What is paramount in this case - the practical purpose of this system or the propaganda effect?
So far, all delivery parameters are unknown - neither the modification of the complex (PAC-2 or PAC-3), nor the number of launchers. As the practice of the war in Yemen showed, this system has significant shortcomings, which were revealed by Iranian drones and missiles. Therefore, the effect of the 1st battery will be rather propaganda. In the case of deliveries of several batteries, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be able to strengthen the air defense of critical infrastructure. Newspaper publications that the Patriot air defense system will be delivered in 6 months should not deceive, it will appear in Ukraine much earlier. And where there is one battery, there will be others.
3) Is it worth talking seriously about the growing contradictions between Zelensky and Zaluzhny, or is this just another plot invented by journalists?
From the point of view of directive control, these contradictions are of little importance. Ultimately, all the real levers for the formation of a puppet administration are in the hands of the United States. And they can easily get rid of obstacles interfering with the general course. This applies to both Zelensky and Zaluzhny. Their personal competition is insignificant if the US is satisfied with the current nature of the formation of the colonial administration.
4) After 10 months of NWO, the pace of advancement in the DPR is low. Many people ask - is it really impossible to destroy the defensive lines with the help of carpet bombing? Is it true that the defense built by Kyiv in this direction has no analogues in modern history?
Impossible until the air defenses that prevent carpet bombing are suppressed. And the very principle of carpet bombing seems redundant. As the experience of the war in Ukraine shows, it is necessary to strive to increase the role of high-precision weapons and their number on the battlefield, as well as the speed of decision-making on their use for identified targets. Ideally, this time should be reduced as much as possible. Well, a breakthrough in defense requires the creation of the necessary numerical and logistical superiority in areas of a potential breakthrough. If there is no such superiority, then no amount of carpet bombing will help.
5) A lot of information about the transfer of forces to Belarus. In the event of a new attempt by a grouping of the RF Armed Forces from the north, will the Armed Forces of Ukraine have enough resources at the same time to repel this attack and hold the front in the Donbass?
It depends on which grouping can potentially be concentrated in Belarus and what tasks it will have. Since it is almost impossible to hide the accumulation of a large group, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will most likely strengthen the northern border (they are already strengthening it), fearing a potential strike. However, the RF Armed Forces may not plan such strikes, but they can successfully speculate on this topic in order to mislead the enemy command and make it difficult for him to maneuver with reserves. The maximum fog of war in this matter is very beneficial to the Russian General Staff.
6) “Experts” affiliated with Zelensky’s Office continue to tell the Ukrainian population about the upcoming attack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which allegedly will begin after the ground freezes. In particular, the possibility of an attack on the Belgorod region is being discussed. Is Kyiv ready to risk its accumulated reserves for the propaganda effect of seizing the border strip?
The presence of sufficiently significant forces gives the Armed Forces the opportunity to either carry out propaganda attacks on the territory of the Belgorod region, or to intensify attacks on Svatovo and Kremennaya, in the interests of which the enemy continues to attack in the direction of the Svatovo-Kremennaya highway, regardless of losses. The main objective of these attacks is to reach the highway (for example, in the Krasnopopovka area) and violate the integrity of the front of the RF Armed Forces in this sector in order to create the prerequisites for the assault on Kremennaya and Svatovo. Achieving some success in this regard has more military and propaganda prospects for the enemy. Hence the waste of resources.
7) In Ukraine, they threaten to hit Moscow and other Russian cities. What risks does Kyiv face if such a decision is made, and what opportunities does it have to implement it?
Well, if there is no question of using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, then in fact Kyiv does not risk anything, since the Russian Federation already uses almost the entire range of available weapons in Ukraine. And as the United States shows, a course towards further escalation is inevitable, because the United States does not consider Russian red lines that go beyond the parameters of nuclear doctrine to be significant. In a conventional war, the US will obviously raise the stakes to the limit - any costs to Ukraine or Europe are not significant.
8) There is an opinion that the Ukrainian side purposefully overestimates the damage from strikes on its critical infrastructure. What is the meaning of this and what is the real scale of the current destruction?
Disinformation associated with exaggeration or underestimation of the results of strikes is necessary to make it difficult for the Russian command to plan new strikes.
The less objective information, the more difficult it is to plan the next strike and form a pool of targets. The real scale of the strikes and their consequences seem to be critical, but not yet lethal for the energy system of Ukraine. Systemic consequences are already being felt, but further blows are needed to resolve the unified energy system and eliminate the remaining large thermal power plants and distribution stations.
9) Simultaneously with the build-up of artillery and rocket terror against Donetsk, a series of provocations against Russian peacekeepers in Artsakh is taking place. How independent is Baku in organizing provocations? Why does Russia demonstrate such a tolerant attitude towards what is happening?
Baku is taking advantage of the fact that Russia is busy in Ukraine and is trying, through provocations in Karabakh, to force Russia to make certain concessions. Ultimately, Baku is interested in completely absorbing Karabakh (including the ethnic cleansing of local Armenians) and squeezing out Russian peacekeepers by 2025. Under Pashinyan, Armenia simply cannot defend its national interests, and while Pashinyan remains in power, Armenia will face further losses of everything - from territory to national pride. It was obvious in 2018, it is even more obvious in 2022. Since Pashinyan suits the Armenians, apparently they don’t really need their own state in a hostile environment. The West is naturally interested in undermining Russia's positions in the Transcaucasus, playing along with Baku and at the same time playing through Pashinyan.
Russia's strategy will continue to be to try to maintain a certain status quo and the role of arbitrator. But it is obvious that this strategy will be subjected to attacks from different sides, since the status quo that is beneficial to Russia at the current stage does not suit Baku and the West.
10) Is it possible to single out the main lesson that Moscow learned from the events of 2022? What practical conclusions were/should be drawn from the failures in the Liman and Kherson directions?
The main lesson is that you can not fight half-heartedly. This lesson has obviously been learned, so the war in 2023 will be different.
It is necessary to add quantitative and qualitative superiority over the enemy and to carry out defensive and offensive operations more effectively. Actually, the measures already taken and the recently announced decisions regarding the changes in the army in 2023 are aimed precisely at this. How effective all this will be in practice, we will see during the winter and especially during the spring-summer campaign of 2023.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/73649 - zinc (broadcast of hostilities in Ukraine as usual in Telegram - if you are interested, subscribe) 
|
Posted by badanov 2022-12-27 00:00||
||
Front Page|| [9 views ]
Top
|
|
01:03 Grom the reflective
00:34 DarthVader
00:31 Nero
00:16 Angealing+B.+Hayes4677
00:14 Angealing+B.+Hayes4677
|
