Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
Commentary unless otherwise indicated are from Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin:
[ColonelCassad] Answers to questions about the course of the SVO for the military correspondent Kotenok's channel.
- On November 15, after a long break, a massive blow was again dealt to the energy infrastructure of Ukraine. How likely is it that we are talking about raising rates before negotiations?
- In my opinion, the strikes will continue regardless of the continuation of closed consultations between the United States and the Russian Federation.
At the moment, there are no prerequisites for freezing the conflict, and everything is leading to an active winter campaign, which, in turn, requires intensifying strikes on the enemy's energy system. This will have critical consequences for its rear during the winter campaign of 2022-2023. I am sure that this is not the last such complex strike. In my opinion, the issue of strikes on the ground infrastructure of underground gas storage facilities is also relevant.
- So what are we more likely to see - a winter "freeze" or a full-fledged winter campaign?
— Without a doubt, the winter campaign. There will be no complete freeze of the front.
Intense hostilities will continue in a number of directions - first of all, these are the Avdeevskoye, Artemovskoye, Ugledarskoye and Svatovskaya directions. Plus, probably, the enemy will try to advance in the Zaporozhye region. So the struggle for the operational-strategic initiative will continue.
- The Armed Forces of Ukraine are increasingly using "Hymars" for strikes against secondary civilian targets. Does this mean that Kyiv has so many shells that it can not save them? Or have our military learned how to successfully counteract them?
- It can be noted that in recent months, the air defense forces of the RF Armed Forces have been able to adjust to the enemy's MLRS, and the percentage of missiles destroyed is steadily increasing, although there is still no talk of a guaranteed interception of all missiles, especially in conditions of swarm launches.
In addition, the RF Armed Forces more effectively use the tactics of dispersing forces, trying not to expose themselves to the blows of MLRS on large depots and infantry concentrations (although there are still episodes when losses cannot be avoided due to such shortcomings).
As for the fact that the enemy will run out of missiles, I would not worry - the United States will supply as many as necessary. For the most part, Tochka-U has already come out, so missiles for HIMARS will be the main enemy for our air defense in the long run.
- Do the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the southern direction have enough forces to force the Dnieper?
- From a quantitative point of view, it is enough, but the lack of crossing facilities and problems with the supply of troops on the Left Bank during an attempted landing make its prospects doubtful. So far, the enemy is limited to the activity of the DRG and we are probing the defenses of our troops. If he finds weaknesses, he will try to intensify efforts to seize the bridgehead. Plus, he will probably try to hang a dill flag on the Kinburn Spit at least for a photo shoot. Our troops have already repulsed one unsuccessful landing attempt. But, for sure, there will be others, as with Fr. Serpentine. The enemy simply realized that it would not be possible to take it from a swoop, and now he will act according to science, pulling up artillery and revealing our defenses in the area of \u200b\u200bthe spit.
— Now, without emotions, how would you rate the abandonment of Kherson? Was it really impossible to keep the city?
- Of course, I don’t have the entire operational situation at the time of the decision to withdraw. The decision was clearly made back in the second half of October, and in the last weeks before the withdrawal, various activities were carried out related to the evacuation of the population, military equipment, valuable property, as well as various disinformation activities aimed at ensuring the withdrawal of troops.
As a result, the troops in full combat readiness were able to retreat, having suffered minor losses, while the enemy, even at the stage of occupying the abandoned territories, suffered much greater losses in people and equipment.
From a military point of view, the withdrawal itself was well organized. From the point of view of strategy, leaving the Russian regional center without a serious defense is an obvious military failure, and it would be foolish to present this as some kind of victory and cunning maneuver.
Kherson, according to the official logic, was abandoned due to supply problems and the desire to pull out the most combat-ready units from the bridgehead on the right bank for the upcoming offensive operations. In fact, if in the next couple of months the RF Armed Forces carry out successful offensives and succeed, using, among other things, units withdrawn from Kherson, this will allow us to say that such a withdrawal was justified, much like the withdrawal of Strelkov’s units from Slavyansk paid off by the participation of these units in battles south of Donetsk, which was of the utmost operational importance during the 2014 summer campaign.
From a political point of view, the abandonment of Kherson, of course, made a painful impression on Russian society.
Ultimately, if the RF Armed Forces return the operational initiative, then the withdrawal from Kherson in society will be perceived as a maneuver. If there are no serious successes in the coming months, then this will be perceived simply as a retreat and the surrender of the regional center. So the final assessment of the abandonment of Kherson will be formed during the winter. Regarding the ability to defend Kherson, I believe that if there was a task to defend the city further, it would be defended, despite all the problems.
- Is the effect of saturation of battle formations with mobilized servicemen beginning to be felt?
- At the current stage, less than 1/3 of all those mobilized are involved at the front. The arrival of the bulk is expected in December, which will certainly increase the capabilities of the RF Armed Forces to conduct both defensive and offensive operations.
The mobilized are already actively used in the Kherson, Zaporozhye and Svatov directions. Of course, there are various jambs associated with supply, coordination, discipline, etc., but if taken as a whole, it can be noted that in the same Svatov direction the front actually stabilized - the enemy threatened to take Svatovo on October 17th. Today is already November 17 - the front is plus / minus in the same place.
It is necessary to strengthen the supply and quality of training of mobilized fighters, then the effect of their presence at the front will increase.
- The topic of Ukraine's use of the "dirty bomb" has faded into the background. Has the danger passed?
- I think this threat will not disappear as long as the Nazi regime remains in power in Kyiv, which still has the ability to create and use such a bomb. I am sure that this scenario has not been removed from the agenda, it has simply been temporarily put on the backburner, as happened repeatedly with Assad's "chemical attacks" in Syria, which were repeated after some pauses.
The "dirty bomb" is very convenient for raising the stakes, especially in the event of a further increase in the threat of a direct military clash between Russia and NATO.
- How true is the information about Tehran delaying new supplies?
- In practice, there is no real information in the public domain about the parameters of military-technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and Iran. There are only various speculations of the Western media. Russia and Iran are doing the right thing by not disclosing the parameters of this cooperation on principle and leaving it in a kind of "grey zone".
Therefore, we will learn about the actual purchases of weapons already after the use of certain samples at the front, as was the case with the Shahed-129 or Shahed-136 drones.
Accordingly, information about the supply of Arash-2 UAVs and ballistic missiles can be confirmed only after their actual use on targets in Ukraine. I believe this issue may clear up at the end of November or during December.
From a military point of view, if such a purchase is made, this is only a plus for our grouping in Ukraine. Of course, Iran will also benefit from such deals, gaining access to modern military equipment that Russia can sell to Iran legally, since the UN weapons sanctions against Iran were lifted in the fall of 2021.
Is it even worth talking seriously about a strategic alliance between Iran and RF?
- At the current stage of a full-fledged military alliance between the Russian Federation and Iran, of course, there is no, but there is obviously movement towards deepening the strategic partnership. In the new realities, Iran is a natural and logical partner for Russia in Central Asia and the Middle East. It is desirable and even necessary to expand military-technical and economic cooperation with it.
Of course, Iran has its own interests, which do not always overlap with Russian ones, but, in my opinion, there are no unsolvable problems in Russian-Iranian relations, and issues that cause friction in certain regions can be resolved to mutual benefit.
- Unpleasantly surprised by the results of voting at the UN General Assembly regarding "reparations for the invasion of Ukraine." It seems like the republics of Central Asia, which are entirely dependent on the Russian Federation, abstained from voting. Does this mean that we are losing this region?
- There is no need to be surprised. Russia pursued a rather passive policy on the territory of the former USSR and has long allowed other major players to penetrate into their usual zones of influence, which strengthens the "multi-vector nature" of a number of familiar allies who act, among other things, with an eye on Russia's enemies. This suggests that policy approaches in the near abroad need to be changed, as the current ones are not effective enough.
If we take the vote in the UN, then, from the point of view of those who did not vote "for", it became the most successful for Russia since the beginning of the NWO, as it showed a trend of declining support for the American course - less than half of the UN states voted for "reparations", and most of those who voted are direct satellites of the United States.
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