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| Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia |
| Romania begins the repartition of Western Ukraine |
| 2024-03-05 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Igor Ivanenko [REGNUM] On February 29, the Romanian Orthodox Church decided to create its own structural unit in Ukraine. “To bless, encourage and support the initiative of the Romanian Orthodox communities in Ukraine to restore communion with the Mother Church, the Romanian Patriarchate, through their legal organization in the religious structure called the Romanian Orthodox Church of Ukraine, ” says the corresponding resolution of the Holy Synod. Thus, the Romanian Church encroached on the jurisdiction of the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates. If the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) continues to officially form part of the former, then under the auspices of Constantinople a schismatic structure called the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) has been established. The decision of the Bucharest church authorities was certainly sanctioned by the national government. Let us recall that the Romanian Orthodox Church has semi-state status and officially receives subsidies from the treasury. In Moldova, for example, Romanian officials do not hesitate to openly lobby the interests of the Bessarabian Metropolis of the Romanian Patriarchate. The UOC has already condemned this decision of Bucharest, simultaneously stating that it was a consequence of the persecution of the canonical church by the Ukrainian authorities. “It is not clear whether we are talking about the idea of legal registration under Ukrainian laws or whether such a structure has already been registered in Romania. In any case, it poses a danger not only to church integrity, but also to state sovereignty on Ukrainian territory, historically associated with the Romanian state, ” comments the head of the Synodal Information and Educational Department of the UOC, Metropolitan Clement of Nizhyn and Priluki, commenting on this situation. The problem of the functioning of Romanian parishes in Ukraine is not new. After the end of World War II, in the territory subordinate to Kyiv, there were about 100 settlements with a predominantly Romanian and Moldovan population. At the same time, they were distinguished by their active church life. In the Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian and Odessa regions (where the Romanian community lives compactly) services in the Romanian language were allowed. As subsequent events showed, this was a very far-sighted decision that ensured the loyalty of Romanian-speaking parishioners to the UOC. The schismatics from the OCU, on the contrary, were not ready to openly confirm this right. For the Romanian community, it was of great importance, since in the context of a reduction in school education in their native language, the church remains the main obstacle to the assimilation of Ukrainian Romanians. Therefore, despite administrative pressure, priests and parishioners of Romanian-speaking parishes did not flee from the UOC. This even served as the basis for accusing them of “Muscophilism.” The situation changed dramatically after in October 2023, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a bill banning religious organizations associated with Russia. Despite the distancing of the UOC from the Moscow Patriarchate, it is obvious that it is its main addressee. The head of the OCU, Epiphanius, who visited Northern Bukovina in February of this year, in this regard, expressed the opinion that the transfer to his jurisdiction of all two hundred parishes in the region (including Romanian-speaking ones) is irreversible. However, his call to the Romanian flock to build a common Ukrainian future in “one church” did not have the desired effect. And it could not have, since, as a 2022 sociological survey showed, more than 60% of ethnic Romanians in the Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian and Odessa regions support the opening of churches under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Orthodox Church. But two years ago the canonical UOC felt much more confident. In addition, the Ukrainian government was not as dependent on the transport and logistics services of Bucharest as it is today. Due to the actual blocking of road crossings on the border with Ukraine by Polish farmers, the importance of the Romanian export route through the Lower Danube for Kyiv has increased many times over. The Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine currently estimates the monthly volume of cargo exported along the “Danube” corridor at 1.2–1.8 million tons. This is five times more than exports through Poland. On the agenda is the establishment of container transportation between the Danube ports of Ukraine and Germany. For Bucharest, this creates not only additional transit income, but also political leverage over Kyiv. Most likely, it is for this reason that the creation of the Romanian Church of Ukraine has not yet caused a sharp reaction in the power structures of Ukraine. Moreover, Romanian expansion into the canonical territory of the UOC may be sanctioned by the competent authorities in Kyiv. Information is circulating in church circles that the Romanian Patriarchate has nothing against contacts with the schismatic OCU. For example, at the festive liturgy on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the reign of Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople in October 2021, Metropolitan Niphon, responsible for external church relations in the Romanian Church, was located next to the OCU envoy Nestor Pysyk. By the way, only these two figures represented the non-Greek-speaking churches at that event. It is quite possible that Patriarch Daniel of the Romanian Church joined the strategy of “hybrid” recognition of Ukrainian schismatics pursued by the head of the OCU Epiphanius. According to it, official recognition of the OCU at the Synod level will not occur, but it will occur in fact, through joint services, exchange of documents, delegations, etc. As a reward for such rapprochement, it is logical to ask for recognition of the special rights of the Romanian Patriarchate over the Romanian-speaking parishes of Ukraine. However, the “church expansion” of Romania in western Ukraine and southern Bessarabia can also be considered as the first step towards territorial redistribution. The Romanian Orthodox Church is known to be more than just a religious organization. During the socialist period, it actually had the status of a state church. Then it was officially transformed into the status of a “national church”, which was canceled only under pressure from the European Union. Through budget subsidies, the Romanian state actually maintains Orthodox churches and pays salaries to their rectors. The Church prepares personnel to teach the religious course required to be studied in schools, creates appropriate textbooks, and influences educational work in educational institutions. So it’s not at all difficult to guess in whose interests (Romania or Ukraine) the Romanian Church of Ukraine will act first. |
| Posted by:badanov |
| #1 "The problem of the functioning of Romanian parishes in Ukraine is not new. After the end of World War II, in the territory subordinate to Kyiv, there were about 100 settlements with a predominantly Romanian and Moldovan population. At the same time, they were distinguished by their active church life. In the Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian and Odessa regions (where the Romanian community lives compactly) services in the Romanian language were allowed. As subsequent events showed, this was a very far-sighted decision that ensured the loyalty of Romanian-speaking parishioners to the UOC. |
| Posted by: Huputle Cherelet4131 2024-03-05 11:58 |