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| Science & Technology |
| Review of the Russian Nuclear Deterrent Forces-2023 |
| 2023-12-31 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. Text taken from an article which appeared on telegra.ph [ColonelCassad] At the end of the year, it’s time to strike a balance on Russian strategic nuclear forces, fortunately, a fair amount of official information has been added. In general, the nuclear factor was mentioned quite often this year, with or without reason; accordingly, we note the quote from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: “In the context of the changing nature of military threats and the emergence of new military-political risks, the role of the nuclear triad, which ensures the balance of forces, the strategic balance, has grown significantly forces in the world" As usual, we cannot live without percentages of the "level of modernity of weapons." In the strategic nuclear forces declared in general - 95%, in particular in the strategic nuclear forces - “almost 100%”. The mention of the strategic nuclear forces clearly indicates that only missiles are taken into account in this case, because boats of Project 667BDRM cannot in any way be considered modern, unlike the completely modern SLBM R-29RMU2/2.1 “Sineva”/“Liner”. The construction of infrastructure for strategic complexes with unlimited-range nuclear cruise missiles "Burevestnik" and carriers of unmanned underwater vehicles "Poseidon" continues - another reminder that the programs are not closed. This is especially true for the Burevestnik, which, even though, according to officials, was successfully tested not so long ago, still remains a very mysterious product. Russia and the United States continue to notify each other at least 24 hours in advance of any planned launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, and this is good. At the same time, our early warning system detected 78 launches of ballistic missiles and 168 launches of launch vehicles in 2023 (until an unspecified date). Traditionally, no one showed us the breakdown, and in general, more than two hundred launches of space rockets have already happened in the world this year. However, nothing new. Now for the individual “legs” of the nuclear triad. According to the Strategic Missile Forces, the share of modern weapons “until the end of 2023” now 88%, with land-based ICBMs accounting for the largest number of carriers and charges in the nuclear triad, approximately 60% of the total “ceiling” under the suspended New START Treaty. We are probably talking about ~420 deployed carriers with ~930 nuclear warheads. The ratio of carriers in the PGRK and silos, i.e. in mobile and stationary groups, approximately equal, but the latter have slightly more warheads. The last missile regiment with the Topol PGRK was re-equipped with the Yars in 2023 - as usual, the specific modification (-S, -M, you understand) is not indicated. “The re-equipment to the modern Avangard missile system has been completed.” We can probably assume the completion of the deployment of ICBMs with a hypersonic glide unit in its current form with the UR-100N UTTH as a “booster”. By the way, the prospects for the appearance of PCBs on lighter PGRKs are quite directly indicated, and the corresponding R&D is underway. Will wait. “By the end of the year, 15 launchers of the Yars and Avangard missile systems will be put on combat duty in the strategic missile forces - apparently, we can actually consider it a fait accompli. It seems that they have not forgotten about the infrastructure for missile divisions and their combat duty; 592 “high-tech facilities” have been announced. In 2024, the main task is to place the heavy Sarmat ICBM on combat duty in Uzhur, i.e. in the attack 62nd missile division. Whether it is there on experimental combat duty, as was reported in the fall, is unknown. Frankly, we were expecting something symbolic already under this Christmas tree, well, there, the activation of a regiment from a command post and a pair of silos, but it seems that we will be left without a reason for jokes. The number of ICBM launches for 2024 has been announced again, namely seven. We assume. By the end of 2025, they promise to complete equipping the 28th Missile Division with silo-based Yars. Near Kozelsk, work is proceeding slowly but progressively. Separately, we would like to point out that it was in the context of the ministerial visit to these guys that active protection systems for silos against enemy high-precision weapons were mentioned, but, apparently, for now we are talking exclusively about electronic countermeasures and camouflage. Apparently from 2026-2027. we can expect the beginning of the replacement of the Topol-M ICBMs, which still seem to be in good condition, but nothing lasts forever, especially if it is something - a solid propellant rocket engine. On the agenda, as you know, is the 60th missile division in Tatishchevo (SPU) and two missile regiments with a PGRK from the Teikov missile division. But what they will be re-equipped with - modifications of the Yars or something new (remember, they mentioned Aspen, Kedr... Anchar...) - that’s the question. In general, at this stage there are no plans to change the ratio of the PGRK and silo launchers, nor is the formation of new formations and units planned. Well, fine. Yes, it should also be noted that “if necessary” the Strategic Missile Forces can “in the shortest possible time” receive medium or shorter range missiles. Probably this question answers the subordination of at least the MRBM in the Russia of the Future, but with the CBMD and BRMD the question may remain open. #MoratoriumLive ! The Long-Range Aviation unit received four Tu-160Ms (obviously including modernized ones), which even exceeds the three aircraft announced in 2022. The delivery of two Tu-160Ms (apparently new construction) is planned for 2024. Also mentioned are “completely new aircraft, on new principles, with new aerodynamic and combat qualities.” It’s difficult to guess here, PAK DA is unlikely to reach this stage, and what’s new from the point of view of aerodynamics in the Tu-160M and even the Tu-22M3M is not very clear. Yes, don’t forget, the dagger-bearing MiG-31Is are also in the YES, no one is particularly shy about talking about this. In terms of the naval component, everything is quite simple and progressive: the SSBN “Emperor Alexander III” of Project 955A has been adopted, at the end of 2024 it is planned to transfer the SSBN “Prince Pozharsky” of Project 955A to the fleet, and the only surprise is the plan to return the SSBN K-117 “ Bryansk" of project 667BDRM after completion of the medium repair in November 2024. To summarize: our strategic nuclear forces remain the most important element of strategic deterrence. The processes of rearmament and modernization are progressing quite steadily, but not without some rough edges. First of all, Sarmat and PAK DA are causing concern, but we are not particularly worried about new nuclear-powered toys. No particularly new details have appeared about the strategic nuclear forces combat control systems, which, in principle, is not surprising. It needs to be better and more sustainable - well, no one argues. True, overseas counterparties have recently begun to look at this more closely - perhaps we will be pleased with a new level of transparency. But obviously not today and not tomorrow. Perhaps the main conclusion is the imperceptible desire for quantitative growth. This is good, this is correct, my head hurts about something else now. No one should have any doubts about the possibility of delivering a crushing blow in accordance with the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence. |
| Posted by:badanov |