[REGNUM] The use of planning bombs on the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine forces the enemy to pull long-range S-300 systems closer to the LBS. The enemy is trying to push back the UMPC launch zones. To cover the S-300 from the interior regions of Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are forced to take Soviet-made Osa and Tor anti-aircraft systems and the German Gepard. At this moment, the Lancet appears on the arena.
The regular use of UMPC (universal planning and correction module) systems by the Russian Aerospace Forces is already well known, but not everyone has understood what the systemic consequences of such use are.
Our answer to the American JDAM glide bombs is an attachment to conventional FABs of the M62 model, which turns an unguided aerial bomb into a high-precision “smart” bomb with “wings.”
The use of gliding bombs requires the approach of combat aircraft close to the line of contact, for the maximum range of hitting targets in the depth of defense (up to 30-40 km). The appearance of such weapons has a serious impact on the course of hostilities.
Gliding bombs have been added to the arsenal of high-precision weapons that was previously introduced, including the Lancet kamikaze UAVs, which successfully knock out UAF vehicles in the immediate rear of the forward units.
In order to talk about a counteroffensive, at least in theory, the Armed Forces of Ukraine need to accumulate forces in front of the front line. And for the period of concentration, these forces must somehow be protected.
These are the circumstances in which an interesting scheme of the work of the Russian army emerges, which becomes a headache for the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The massive and very effective use of gliding bombs on the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine forces the enemy command to pull long-range S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems closer to the LBS. Thus, the enemy is trying to push back the launch zones of planning bombs.
But the S-300s do not work alone, they are covered by short-range systems within the framework of layered air defense. To cover the S-300 from the interior regions of Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are forced to take Soviet-made Osa and Tor anti-aircraft systems and the German Gepard.
At this moment, the Lancet appears on the arena. The hunt for air defense installations, which are now next to the LBS, begins. "Thor" and co. begin to suffer losses.
And this is not just a coherent theoretical scheme. This is already happening in practice.
"The Russian Armed Forces destroyed four S-300 launchers and a German Gepard self-propelled gun in the Kherson region with the help of Lancet drones," a RIA Novosti source in the Kherson direction reports.
Following this message from the news agency, video confirmation of the defeat of the relevant targets appeared.
As a result, the interior regions of Ukraine are left without air defense cover, "Gepards" and "Wasps" were primarily intended to fight against Geran attack drones and Caliber class cruise missiles.
There will be practically nothing to repel a new mass strike by Geraniums, Kh-101, Kh-50 and Caliber in the depths of the country.
Of course, this is not a protocol for suppressing air defenses using a combined strike of cruise missiles and aircraft, but also an elegant solution.
And one more aspect. On the eve of the announced counter-offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the forward formations need military air defense cover so that the advancing Ukrainian armored fists do not smash the attack aircraft and bombers of the Aerospace Forces from the air. However, SAMs intended to cover become vulnerable to Lancet strikes.
Thus, the recent effective strike in the Kherson direction, in addition to incapacitating a long-range air defense division, calls into question the effectiveness of covering offensive combat formations.
It is worth noting that the enemy had a plot similar in effectiveness after receiving the Hymars multiple rocket launchers. At that moment, they really changed the situation at the front very seriously. Vulnerability from shelling in the operational depth made it necessary to disperse warehouses, disposition of personnel, and increase the number of air defense systems on the line of contact.
Gradually, the experience of fighting the Hymars, their detection, the improvement of the interception of launched missiles, the defeat of installations, reduced the effectiveness of such strikes, and from the beginning of spring the situation changed in a mirror. Moreover, when using the UMPC, the weight of the warhead is almost an order of magnitude greater, and, consequently, the amount of destruction when hitting targets is much greater than that of the American MLRS.
And if the Russian army was able to basically neutralize the Hymars factor, then in the situation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine it is impossible to find new S-300 complexes, like the Buk complexes. Namely, they are the backbone of the Ukrainian air defense system.
Western air defense systems are inferior in terms of efficiency, quantity, and mobility. And accordingly they will not be able to change the situation.
Under the condition of increasing the depth of the gray zone and the removal of military facilities from the LBS, the accumulation of forces for a surprise strike becomes an order of magnitude more difficult, and thus the chances of a successful offensive are reduced to zero.
And trying to cover the deployment of forces with air defense systems near the LBS, they fall under the action of the Lancets, rapidly lose anti-aircraft installations, and the situation returns to the beginning again.
Only a quick delivery of several hundred fighters, with pilots and technicians, can change it, but the West is not ready to hand them over without confirming the ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to take offensive actions. And they are extremely difficult to start without having cover for deploying forces before the offensive.
All together, this forms a classic example of the already well-known since 2014 “Wheels of Genoty”, when another “victory” is rapidly turning into “bad luck”. And then the weather did not work out, the rainy spring does not allow the soil to dry out, the postponement of the start date of the offensive allows the Russian Aerospace Forces to accumulate more UMPCs, and the Russian army to recruit more volunteers.
All together, it leads to the fact that if before the beginning of the summer the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not launch an offensive, even with minimal targets, then by the end of the summer there will be practically no chance to hold the front.
This means that in the near future we should see an example of a suicidal attack, and let's hope that it will bog down and thereby lead to the rapid completion of the NMD after the collapse of the front of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
April 28, 2023
Alexey Vasiliev