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| Badanov: Predictions on Ukraine, from 2014 |
| 2022-06-01 |
| These were my predictions from the fall of 2014 on the possibility of Russian military operations, back in 2014. I got a lot wrong, but also I got some things right. I think the war (2022) will end when Putin makes the Dnepr River and seizes the area south of the line running to the west from Kharkov to the Dnepr River. [Facebook] If Putin makes his move to "annex" Ukraine, he will probably do it in December. I think it will be a multi axis operation beginning with light infantry company heliborne or paraborne air assaults in several crossings of the Dnepr starting with the Dnepr estuary going north to and ending at Zaparozhe. Crossings at Kherson, Nova Kakhovka and Zaparozhe. Immediately coming up from the Crimea will be at least two airborne divisions, possibly on a straight up road march from Sevastopol. Then from the east, Putin will "cancel" the Novorossiya drive for independence, "convincing" them that Russian federation is better for them than that nasty, messy independence thing, then move his maneuver divisions west. He doesn't need a contiguous line running across the north, because they are all Russian speaking and generally sympathetic, or maybe just quiet. I say December because by then the humanitarian crisis in Novorossiya will begin to hit hard, and Putin's "concern" for his Russian speaking tovarishchi will take over his better judgement. Plus the ground will be hard enough to support his tanks. And he'll still send in his second string. We won't see his front line troops, similar to what he did in South Ossetia. By then, also most of Ukraine's second and third echelon forces will be immolated by the militias, and all that will be left will be the regular Ukrainian Army, in fortifications behind the Dnepr, being built as we speak. IOW, Ukrainians expect Putin to do this thing. Despite all his bluster, it will still take the Russian Army two months to move up to the Dnepr River line, even unopposed. By then they will have outrun their supply and will be forced to stop. But they will make the river line. A foraging army could be an unpopular army. What happens in the spring: plebiscites and appeals to Russkie Bratya, and the final tally. Putin wins. This all assumes that oil prices do not collapse, which appears they already have and the collapse will temper for a few months, and then continue. Putin has this one window after the fall rains and before the spring rains. On a separate note: Did you read how the governor appointed by Piotr Porosheko (the governor's name escapes me at the moment) stating emphatically that the Russian Army doesn't fight in the winter? Must be Harvard edumacated, I s'pect. |
| Posted by:badanov |
| #2 A level of honest self-examination not often seen in the pundit class. It was a pleasure and a learning experience to work with you back in those days, badanov, and both remain true today. |
| Posted by: trailing wife 2022-06-01 21:21 |
| #1 Good analytical rigor and predictive analysis is seldom 100% accurate. Elements which surface however, should be discussed and planned for, to the extent possible. Tactical or strategic surprise is nearly always unpleasant. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2022-06-01 15:05 |